How Capitalism's Great Relocation Pauperized America's 'Middle Class'

Published on Tuesday, July 9, 2013 by The Guardian

As long as workers could wrest gains from capitalism, the system was safe. But with production offshored, that bargain blew up

by Richard Wolff

Detroit's struggle with bankruptcy might find some relief, or at least distraction, by presenting its desperate economic and social conditions as a tourist attraction. "Visit Detroit," today's advertisement might begin, "see your region's future here and now: the streets, neighborhoods, abandoned buildings, and the desolation. Scary, yes, but more gripping than any imaginary ghost story."
(Photo:Kyle J Schultz/ Flickr)
Detroit, Cleveland, Camden and many other cities display what capitalism left behind after it became profitable for capitalists to relocate and for new capital investments to happen more elsewhere. Capitalism and its driving profit motive first developed in England before spreading to western Europe, north America and then Japan. Over the last two centuries, those areas endured a growing capitalism's mix of horrific working conditions, urban slums, environmental degradation, and cyclical instability. Capitalism also brought economic growth, wealth for a minority, labor unions and other workers' organizations. Writers like Dickens, Zola, Steinbeck, and Gorky saw that capitalism's workings clearly, while those like Marx, Mill and Bakunin understood it critically.
Workers' struggles eventually forced capitalists to pay rising wages, enabling higher living standards for large sections of the working classes (so-called "middle classes"). Capitalists and their economist spokespersons later rewrote that history to suggest instead that rising wages were blessings intrinsic to the capitalist system. How wrong that was, as I describe below.
Capitalists eventually had to reach beyond their original bases in Europe, North America, and Japan to the rest of the world. Capitalism's growth required enlarging its hinterland from the agricultural regions near the industrial centers where modern capitalism began. That initial hinterland had provided food, raw materials and markets for the commodities flowing increasingly from the growing urban capitalist centers. The hinterland also sent refugees fleeing from declining job opportunities there to work in and crowd those centers.
As capitalist growth accelerated across the 18th and 19th centuries, more hinterland was required. The response included formal and informal colonialisms that encompassed much of the planet outside its capitalist centers. Capitalism thereby reorganized the whole world's economy to serve as provider of raw materials, food, labor supplies and markets.
Starting especially in the 1970s, several historical trends coalesced to provoke a massive, historic relocation of capitalists and of capitalism's growth. One trend grew out of a US growth spurt after the war ended in 1945. That spurt renewed capitalists' self-confidence and determination to roll back the New Deal and to secure better control of government. They systematically destroyed the social forces (unions, socialists, and communists) that had produced the New Deal and the greatest wave of criticism of capitalism in US history.
Meanwhile, competition among major capitalist countries renewed as Germany and Japan recovered from the war. Capitalists everywhere redoubled efforts to cut costs. Postwar technical revolutions in jet air travel and telecommunications offered competitive advantages to those relocating from older, high cost to newer, distant, low-cost production sites.
At the same time, former formal and informal colonies – recently become relatively more independent nations – also lured capitalists to relocate and invest by offering low wages, tax holidays, subsidies, and other supports. Formerly colonized people were pressing their leaders for significant, sustained increases in mass standards of living. Those leaders' early efforts to use development-oriented government intervention, guided by Keynesian economics, to achieve rapid economic growth had not satisfied those mass pressures.
Across the 1970s, many of those leaders shifted to the neoliberal focus on private capitalist development. This not only represented a strategic change of course but also pandered to the neo-liberalism that swept the old capitalist centers at that time.
Different from the earlier colonialism, after the 1970s the private capital that flowed in from capitalist centers in Europe, North America and Japan did not aim primarily at producing raw materials and food for export. Instead, it increasingly financed the relocation of capitalists and capitalist growth away from the former centers of world capitalism.
Manufacturing moved first, but within two decades, service capitalism joined the exodus. Capital first abandoned the Detroits, Clevelands, and Camdens of the US. Now, it abandons the country more generally. Similar moves afflict the more developed countries in Europe and Japan as well, although in ways that reflect their different histories, including the greater strengths of their working-class organizations. Even Germany, despite its special price, legal and other advantages within the European Union, confronts growing pressures from German capitalists relocating to places with lower wages, benefits, and government social services.
Capitalism is now reconfiguring centers and their hinterlands on a truly global scale. The US increasingly approaches the formerly "third world" pattern of a few centers surrounded by vast layers of more or less desperate hinterland dwellers. In the language of US politics, its "middle class" disappears.
Capitalism's great relocation places a remarkable political question on history's agenda today: can the system survive its relocation?
Capitalism grew successfully in its old centers despite working-class oppositions, expressed by labor unions, socialist and communist parties, anti-capitalist intellectuals and artists and by the resistances of its colonized subordinates. Part of that success – a basis of its 200-year global hegemony – was the ability of its working classes to wrest rising wages and/or standards of living.
In sharp contrast, capitalism's great relocation now underway both presses and enables capitalists to cease raising wages and standards of living in its former, old centers (Europe, North America and Japan). Indeed, it is lowering them.
Competition requires capitalists to raise wages instead in the newer, growing centers, where new sections of better-paid workers arise.
Will capitalism in its old centers of North America, Europe and Japan be able to hold the grudging support of their working classes, as it now delivers long-term declines of wages, working conditions, and living standards? Can capitalism achieve the social acceptance in the new centers that its first 200 years found in the old centers?
Even if it can, the working classes in the old centers may soon withdraw their traditional acceptance. If they do, monumental social struggles pitting supporters against opponents of capitalism are our future.

© 2013 Guardian News and Media Limited

Richard D Wolff is professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, where he taught economics from 1973 to 2008. He is currently a visiting professor in the graduate program in international affairs of the New School University, New York City. Richard also teaches classes regularly at the Brecht Forum in Manhattan. His most recent book is Capitalism Hits the Fan: The Global Economic Meltdown and What to Do About It (2009). A full archive of Richard's work, including videos and podcasts, can be found on his site

Le nuove rivolte popolari: I popoli sono stanchi

Piero Bevilacqua | 6 luglio 2013 |

Non era facile per nessuno prevedere che il XXI secolo ci avrebbe dischiuso uno scenario di rivolte popolari su scala mondiale. Quasi una disarticolata e spontanea risposta dei popoli alla globalizzazione dei mercati e dei capitali. Non si può commettere l’errore di ricondurre tutti gli eventi di questi mesi a poche e uniformi cause, «grande è sotto il cielo la varietà dell’universale scontento», dice Piero Bevilacqua. Tuttavia, almeno due elementi comuni saltano agli occhi: le rivolte non sono organizzate dai partiti, i cittadini non sono più disposti a delegare il cambiamento

di Piero Bevilacqua
Certo, non era facile per nessuno prevedere che il XXI secolo ci avrebbe dischiuso uno scenario di rivolte popolari su scala mondiale. Quasi una disarticolata e spontanea risposta dei popoli alla globalizzazione dei mercati e dei capitali. Ricordiamolo, il millennio scorso – salvo le ombre anticipatrici della guerra nei Balcani e dell’invasione americana dell’Irak – sembrava voler chiudere con una solenne pacificazione, il ’900: il secolo più sanguinoso dell’età contemporanea. D’altronde, non era uscito di scena, con il crollo del blocco sovietico, il Grande Nemico dell’Occidente? Non era stata sanata, con la riunificazione delle due Germanie, la più grave ferita lasciata dall’ultima guerra nel cuore dell’Europa? Non si avviava il Vecchio Continente all’agognata unificazione e alla creazione di una moneta comune? E non apparivano ormai tutte le società del pianeta – perfino la Cina comunista, perfino il Vietnam, simbolo dell’epica antimperialista dell XX secolo – affratellate sotto l’ombrello uniforme del “consenso di Washington”? Per un momento, l’americanizzazione del mondo è apparsa un fatto compiuto. Con significativa coerenza ideologica, ma con troppa fretta e somma ingenuità, qualcuno proclamò la “fine della storia”.
Sappiamo che la grande rete della pacificazione si è smagliata ben presto. Lo stesso Novecento, come si ricordava, prima di uscire dal calendario, ha lasciato un’orrida scia di sangue nell’Europa balcanica. Sappiamo che con il nuovo millennio il conflitto antimperialista ha assunto le forme fanatiche del terrorismo religioso con l’attacco dell’ 11 settembre alle Torri Gemelle. E si è potuto subito constatare che la storia non era ancora finita. Ma oggi la pentola mondiale ribolle per l’alimentazione di altri fuochi.
Grande è sotto il cielo la varietà dell’universale scontento
Certo, non si può commettere l’errore di ricondurre tutti gli eventi che oggi vanno esplodendo un giorno dopo l’altro, a poche e uniformi cause. Grande è sotto il cielo la varietà dell’universale scontento. E la considerazione non vale solo per le rivolte di questi giorni. Non vale soltanto per gran parte del popolo dell’Egitto, trascinato dal moto delle “primavere arabe”e mai rassegnato a subire il calco autoritario e oppressivo dell’islamismo. Non vale per le folle in tumulto del Brasile, che hanno rovesciato per le strade i vecchi idoli del calcio, al cui oppio si erano troppo lungamente assopiti. Né per i giovani turchi di piazza Taksim, anima di una rivolta nazionale innescata dalla difesa del bene comune di un parco. Anche in Europa i movimenti e le lotte che l’hanno attraversato in questi ultimi anni avevano diverse cause e ragioni. Dalle lotte dei francesi contro la riforma delle pensioni del governo Sarkozy, alle proteste degli studenti inglesi contro l’aumento delle rette universitarie, dalle diverse ondate del movimento degli studenti e degli insegnanti italiani, alle prolungate proteste dei giovani spagnoli che hanno occupato le piazze di Madrid e Barcellona. L’Italia meriterebbe una considerazione a sé, per la varietà dei conflitti sociali: da quella dei ricercatori universitari agli operai arrampicati sulle gru per difendere il posto di lavoro, dalle manifestazioni di massa delle donne alla straordinaria campagna popolare contro la privatizzazione dell’acqua. Certo, la crisi economico-finanziaria apertasi nel 2008 ha funzionato da grande detonatore. E non solo nel Vecchio Continente, dove la Grecia è stata squassata dalle proteste disperate della sua popolazione repentinamente immiserita, ma perfino negli USA, dove il movimento Occupy Wall Street ha testimoniato la colossale iniquità su cui si regge il modello sociale americano.
Dunque, dobbiamo concludere che cause molteplici e non collegabili fra loro oggi agitano le nostre società? Niente accomuna questa straordinaria novità storica: il fatto che le lotte non sono limitate all’Europa, ma investono ormai tutti i continenti, pullulano a migliaia nella Cina della Grande Trasformazione, nelle campagne dell’India, in America Latina, nell’Africa settentrionale?
 Questi moti non sono organizzati da partiti
In realtà – benché occorrerà affidare a meno occasionali analisi la ricognizione su una scala così vasta – a osservare da vicino gli eventi, alcuni elementi comuni saltano agli occhi. Il primo fra tutti è che la grandissima parte di questi moti non sono organizzati da partiti politici. Certo, ci sono qua e là i sindacati, quando sono in campo i conflitti operai. Ma i partiti sono assenti. Vale a dire: mancano dalla scena allestita dai movimenti le figure che dovrebbero trasformare le ragioni della protesta in azione politica dentro lo stato. Com’è evidente, soprattutto in Occidente, questo non accade perché i partiti sono diventati, indistintamente, stato. Essi sono sempre meno rappresentanti degli interessi collettivi, e sempre più controparte. Si tratta della conferma di una realtà già nota. La grande ritirata dei partiti da massa da una rappresentanza effettiva degli interessi popolari ha finito col porre non uno, ma due distinti poteri sulle spalle dei ceti popolari: il dominio dei gruppi economico-finanziari e i partiti-stato. Da tempo questi ultimi sono impegnati, con capacità mediatoria che varia da caso a caso, a trasformare il potere mondiale del sopramondo economico finanziario in agende politiche nazionali. Con effetti stridenti sempre più noti ed evidenti. Mentre sono impegnati a liberalizzare e a privatizzare, a piegare tutti gli spazi della vita umana e sociale a regole profittevoli di mercato, a scatenare insonni campagne pubblicitarie sulla competizione e sul merito, a rendere “contendibili” le imprese – come suona le retorica predatoria della finanza – flessibile il lavoro, essi marciano in direzione inversa. I partiti si statalizzano, non premiano il merito ma le clientele, non attivano la competizione, ma più spesso gli accordi segreti, non sono “contendibili”, non adottano flessibilità, a volte sono corrotti e collusi coi poteri criminali. Si sono trasformati, di fatto, in chiusi oligopoli impegnati a perpetuare il loro ruolo e potere.
Questa evidente contraddizione tra ciò che si impone alla società e si risparmia a se stessi è certo causa non ultima del rancore che si va accumulando nel fondo dell’anima popolare e che di tanto in tanto esplode.
Eppure non è questa la grande causa comune che noi crediamo di percepire al fondo dei moti che vanno dilagando in ogni punto del pianeta. Il fuoco che alimenta le rivolte, a prescindere della varietà delle occasioni locali, è una contraddizione che ormai stride sotto gli occhi di chiunque vuole osservare. Una conoscenza diffusa, una informazione quotidiana a scala universale di cui si impossessano ormai masse crescenti di cittadini, confligge con violenza contro l’opacità, la distanza, l’impenetrabilità perdurante del potere, di tutti i poteri. Il cittadino che sa, comprende sempre di più che le scelte operate dallo stato o dall’amministrazione locale influenzeranno la sua vita e perciò pretende di dire la sua, vuole partecipare alle decisioni. Egli va scoprendo, di giorno in giorno, i diritti lungamente occultati di cui non gode. Ma a fronte della conoscenza di cui dispone, il suo potere di influenza sulle scelte del ceto politico è spesso nullo. Non accade solo in Cina, dove, come ormai si dice, c’è il Wi-Fi, la connessione libera alla rete, in ogni villaggio, mentre il potere del Partito rimane gigantesco e imprescrutabile. Ormai accade anche nei paesi dove vige da tempo il moderno stato di diritto.
I popoli sono stanchi

In Italia i gruppi dirigenti continuano la guerra in Afghanistan, violando la Costituzione, in aperto disprezzo della grandissima maggioranza dell’opinione pubblica nazionale. Con la sensibilità delle vecchie dittature latinoamericane del ’900, essi continuano nella fabbricazione e acquisto di armi di combattimento, nella dilapidazione di ingenti risorse per fini di morte, mentre fanno precipitare in condizioni umilianti le nostre scuole e Università. E’ anche per questa ragione che utilizziamo qui il termine popolo. Sappiamo bene che le moderne società industriali hanno sviluppato complesse stratificazioni sociali.
Ma oggi, mentre vediamo sempre più limitate le sovranità nazionali, sempre più inascoltate le richieste e le proposte che salgono dalla società, tale regressione aggiornata all’Ottocento richiede che si torni a parlare di popolo e di popoli. E questi popoli oggi sono stanchi. Stanchi di non essere ascoltati, stanchi di contare sempre meno. Stanchi di osservare l’avanzare in ogni dove di una nuova democrazia dell’informazione, i segnali di un nuovo mondo possibile e di trovarsi addosso inette oligarchie che paiono trascinarli nell’opaca passività dei secoli passati.

Fonte: amigi.org e eddyburg.it
Foto: in alto, un uomo legge in piedi un libro in piazza Taksim, Istanbul, insieme ad altre persone: una forma di protesta e di tutela della propria dignità diffusa in molte città.

Greci: Il capitalismo del disastro

Agnes Rousseaux | 6 luglio 2013 | 0 commenti

E’ tempo di saldi. La più grande promozione del XXI secolo. Per cercare di ridurre il suo debito, la Grecia liquida i suoi beni pubblici: energia, trasporti, acqua, università, coste… Una crisi senza fondo, nonostante i «piani di salvataggio» europei. Quei piani portano grandi profitti alla finanza, mentre per i greci l’austerità è molto più di uno stile di vita. Un grande reportage da Atene racconta come e perché i greci non possono più guarire, salvo nelle cliniche autogestite dove i medici curano gratuitamente i pazienti

di Agnes Rousseaux 
«Più di un terzo della popolazione greca non ha più accesso alla sanità nazionale» stima Giorgos Vichas, cardiologo. Alla clinica autogestita di Hellinikon, in periferia d’Atene, un centinaio di medici curano gratuitamente un numero sempre crescente di pazienti.
Da un anno e mezzo, 10000 persone hanno varcato le soglie di questa clinica di fortuna, installata nel mezzo di una vecchia base militare americana. A causa dei drastici tagli ai salari abbassatisi del 40% in qualche anno- anche chi ha un lavoro non ha più i mezzi per pagare le spese mediche. E gli ospedali pubblici greci mancano di medicine, specialmente per la cura del cancro.
Il settore della sanità è uno dei simboli della delinquenza dei servizi pubblici greci. In una sala di consultazione dai muri bianchi, il cardiologo snocciola storie che la dicono lunga sullo stato del paese : quella di una donna che ha appena partorito e a cui l’ospedale non vuole dare il figlio finché non paga le spese mediche. Un’altra è stata trattenuta nella sua camera d’ospedale, con una guardia davanti alla porta, perché doveva pagare 2000 euro. « Riceviamo molte persone che non possono più pagare per l’acqua e l’elettricità da quando le tasse sugli immobili sono aumentate. La corrente è stata tagliata anche a persone che hanno bisogno di strumenti medici permanenti, come l’ossigeno. » Dice Giorgos Vichas. Lo scorso inverno, non potendo comprare l’olio, di cui il prezzo è raddoppiato, gli abitanti hanno rimesso in funzione i vecchi camini negli appartamenti. Si sono riscaldati con la legna… o la spazzatura. « La sera, ad Atene, l’aria era irrespirabile. » commenta Makis Zervas, professore all’Hellenic open University.
Nonostante i «piani di salvataggio», il debito greco esplode
Tre anni dopo il primo « piano di salvataggio » europeo, la Grecia scivola in una recessione che sembra non dover finire mai. Il tasso di disoccupazione è arrivato al 27%, il triplo rispetto al 2009. Una cifra ufficiale ancora al di sotto della realtà. « I giovani che cercano un lavoro dopo la fine degli studi non sono inseriti nel calcolo, né tutti quelli che lavorano un’ora alla settimana. » precisa Makis Zervas. Nemmeno i lavoratori indipendenti che hanno appena terminato la loro attività a causa di mancanza di clienti. Nel centro di Atene, le saracinesche sono abbassate su una parte delle attività commerciali. Il 63% dei giovani con meno di 25 anni è senza lavoro. La crescita ? Con un tasso del 6% nel 2012, sembra molto lontana. Il Pil è caduto del 25% dal 2008. Come quello degli Stati Uniti al momento della crisi del 1929.
Quali prospettive dopo sei anni di recessione ? La Grecia è « sulla buona strada per raggiungere il suo ambizioso piano di pareggio del debito » osa dire la direttrice generale del FMI, Christine Lagarde. Il paese potrebbe ritornare a crescere nel 2016, profetizzano il FMI e l’Unione Europea (1). Ma per arrivare fin qua, bisognerà fare degli sforzi. Come se si esigesse ancora dalla Grecia già stremata, di correre ancora una maratona in più. Gli obiettivi di riduzione del debito, fissati dalla Troika (FMI, Commissione Europea, Banca Centrale Europea) sembrano irreali. Qualcuno in un ufficio, da qualche parte a Bruxelles o Francoforte, ha disegnato delle curve, smaneggiato la sua calcolatrice, disegnato delle proiezioni. Riprese pari pari dai capi di stato europei. Obiettivo : un debito al 124 % del Pil nel 2020. Era del 156 % nel 2012. Sarà del 175 % nel 2013. E’ cominciata male. Veloce, risponde la Troika, bisogna accelerare le privatizzazioni, smantellare i servizi pubblici, e in assenza di alternative, ricapitalizzare le banche. La vendita delle compagnie di gas è cominciata la settimana scorsa, e la televisione pubblica è stata colpita dal ritorno del boomerang. (2) 2600 disoccupati in più.
Miliardari, è l’ora dei saldi!
Compagnie d’elettricità, d’acqua, di gas naturale, porti e aeroporti, ferrovie e autostrade, lotteria nazionale… la Grecia svende i suoi beni pubblici. Questi dovrebbero portarle 9,5 miliardi di euro entro il 2016. « Stanno anche privatizzando la riscossione delle tasse » si indegna Makis Zervas. « E le università sono state ricomprate al 49 % da società private, il che è contrario alla Costituzione. » Il « piano di cessione delle attività pubbliche » preteso dal FMI e l’Unione Europea, è messo in opera dal Fondo di espropriazione del patrimonio pubblico (Taiped). Questa società anonima greca, fondata nel 2011, ha per obiettivo di « massimizzare il valore » dei beni pubblici venduti. Poiché queste privatizzazioni sono « l’elemento chiave per il ripristino della credibilità, precondizione fondamentale per il ritorno della Grecia sul mercato dei capitali mondiali », martella il sito dell’organismo. Che propone, come in un catalogo turistico, spiagge, foreste, isole deserte o siti archeologici. Tutto deve sparire. Signore e signori miliardari, promotori immobiliari e industrie del turismo, non esitate : è l’ora dei saldi.
In testa sul sito del Taiped : un terreno di 1,8 milioni di m2 (l’equivalente di 250 campi di calcio) con 7 km di costa sull’isola di Rodi. E le zone classificate Natura 2000 sulle quali Taiped suggerisce di costruire alberghi, campi da golf e centri commerciali. O il vecchio aeroporto di Atene, un terreno di 623 ettari (tre volte la superficie di Monaco) in riva al mare, dove qualche resto di infrastruttura costruita per le Olimpiadi del 2004 si eleva nel mezzo di erbacce. « Hanno cercato di venderlo al Qatar, che non l’ha voluto. » spiega Natassa Tsironi, una riparatrice che qui si occupa di un giardino autogestito. « Una legge ha votato che si autorizzino gli investitori a fare quello che vogliono di questo terreno, ivi compreso costruire delle torri. » « 69 ostacoli regolamentari, amministrativi e tecnici, che rallentavano le privatizzazioni, sono stati eliminati. » gioisce Taipedn, nella sua relazione del 2013.
«Il più grande programma di cessione al mondo»
La società di « denazionalizzazione » è guidata da un ufficio di cinque membri, tutti usciti dal settore privato e delle banche greche. Il suo presidente dirigeva fino al 2013 la più grande compagnia della acque in Grecia, e ha fondato un’impresa di costruzione di piscine – le entrate sembrano assicurate, visti tutti i complessi preposti allo svago che cresceranno sulla costa… Il direttore generale di Taiped, Yannia Emiris, era responsabile della banca d’investimenti Alpha Bank. Accompagnato da due « osservatori » nominati dall’UE e dall’Eurozona, questo gruppo è stato incaricato della liquidazione dei beni pubblici greci. E dispone di una « autorità assoluta circa le decisioni ». Tutte le entrate trasferite al Fondo devono essere vendute o liquidate : « il ritorno degli attivi allo Stato non è autorizzato» La grande svendita - « il più grande programma di cessione del mondo » è iniziato.
Alla guida: le imprese private e la Troika
Il popolo greco fatica a veder partire il suo patrimonio sbriciolato ? « Non si può fare una frittata senza rompere le uova » dice retorico il Primo ministro, Antonis Samaras, in un forum (3) a proposito della privatizzazione della radio-televisione pubblica greca, ERT. « Dobbiamo mostrare al popolo (greco) che noi osiamo opporci ai pilastri più urlanti dell’opacità e dello spreco » scrive. ERT era dunque un eccesso. Che i cittadini trovino il modo di vedere una logica in queste decisioni arbitrarie. La frittata è riuscita, almeno ? Gli obiettivi sono lontani dall’essere raggiunti : in due anni, le privatizzazioni non hanno portato che 2 miliardi di euro. Neanche 1% del debito.
La priorità: ricapitalizzare le banche
Questo d’altronde non diminuisce di una virgola. Era di 310 miliardi nel 2009. Nel 2013, qualche « piano di salvataggio » più tardi, il paese che si infossa nel marasma economico e che la democrazia greca è in agonia, il debito si eleva sempre a 309 miliardi di euro. Tutto questo per questo. Il Pil ha subito violenti colpi d’arresto e il debito rappresenta oggi il 180 % del pil (contro il 130 % del 2009) (4) La Grecia non è più un paese sviluppato, stima il fornitore di indici di borsa MSCI, che la pone ormai nella categoria dei paesi emergenti. Quanti anni ci vorranno per ritrovare il tasso d’occupazione del 2009 ? « Con il 4% di crescita, si può sperare di raggiungere quel livello nel 2020-2025, valuta Sotiris Koskoletos, economista all’Istituto di ricerca Nicos Poulantzas (5). Ma chi può sperare oggi in una crescita al 4% ? »
A cosa sono serviti i piani di salvataggio successivi ? A salvare la Grecia da una bancarotta immediata concedendole nuovi crediti. E cancellando un parte del debito, grazie a una sua « ristrutturazione » (6) aggiungendole dei nuovi prestiti. Ma anche – e soprattutto – salvando le banche greche e i creditori stranieri. « Una buona parte del piano d’aiuto è stato utilizzato per la ricapitalizzazione delle banche, è un dato di fatto. Erano infatti sotto-capitalizzate, versando in gravi difficoltà finanziarie e a rischio di fallimento » descrive la situazione Céline Antonin, economista presso il dipartimento analisi e previsione dell’OFCE (7).
Il 77 per cento dell’aiuto europeo diretto verso il settore finanziario
Chi ha ricevuto i 207 miliardi di euro sbloccati dall’Unione Europea e dal FMI dal 2010 ? Le banche greche (per 58 miliardi) e i creditori allo Stato greco (per 101 miliardi), in gran parte banche e fondi di investimento. Almeno il 77 % dell’aiuto europeo non è andato a beneficio dei cittadini ma, direttamente o indirettamente, al settore finanziario ! Uno studio di Attac Autriche mostra che solo 46 miliardi sono serviti a rigonfiare le casse pubbliche – sempre sotto forma di prestito, ovviamente. Da mettere in parallelo con i 34 miliardi pagati dallo Stato ai suoi debitori come interesse sul debito nello stesso periodo. (8)
Salvare le banche è quindi la priorità della Troika. « Si può avere l’impressione, in quanto cittadino, e giustamente, è un assegno in bianco alle banche » prosegue Céline Antonin, dell’OFCE : E’ soprattutto un mezzo di trasformare il debito privato detenuto dalle banche e dai creditori, in debito pubblico ! La parte del debito greco detenuto dai creditori privati è stata divisa in due. (9) Su chi peserà d’ora in poi il rischio di bancarotta della Grecia ? Sull’Unione europea e il FMI. Quindi sugli Stati e sui cittadini europei.
Capitalismo del disastro
Perché i greci hanno accettato queste misure di austerità in cambio di un piano di salvataggio che non ha risolto niente ? « Abbiamo perso un milione di posti di lavoro nel settore privato. E’ come se, in Francia, si sopprimessero d’un colpo 6 o 7 milioni di posti di lavoro. Si ricevono più volte al giorno delle cattive notizie. Come un cervello umano può sopportare questa cadenza ? » si interroga Panagiotis Grigoriou, storico e etnologo, autore del blog Greek Crisis. « Più di 8000 manifestazioni e scioperi hanno avuto luogo in tre anni, i greci si sono rassegnati. Cosa si può fare di più ? Ogni linea del memorandum (lista delle misure di austerità imposte dalla Troika, ndr) è stata votata. Si annullano delle leggi in vigore da decenni. La Costituzione è stata violata. A cosa serve il Parlamento ? » 
« Non siamo più nel capitalismo, ma nel suo prolungamento, una sorta di meta-capitalismo » prosegue. Il trauma collettivo. Una situazione che ricorda stranamente la strategia dello choc, definita da Milton Friedman, teorico del liberismo economico : « Aspettarsi una crisi su ampia scala, poi, mentre i cittadini sono ancora sotto choc, vendere lo Stato pezzo per pezzo, a degli interessi privati prima di trovare il modo di rendere eterne le « riforme » varate sotto il segno della fretta » (10)
Benvenuto in Grecia, laboratorio europeo del « capitalismo del disastro» ! Milton Friedman descrive come dei cambiamenti economici improvvisi e di grande ampiezza provochino delle reazioni psicologiche « facilitanti la risoluzione ». Una risoluzione che si traduce in attacchi sistematici contro la sfera pubblica. Un approccio simile alla dottrina militare degli Stati Uniti in Irak, Shock and Awe (Choc e spavento), descrive l’autrice canadese Naomi Klein, che aveva lo scopo di « controllare la volontà, le percezioni e la comprensione dell’avversario e di privarlo di ogni capacità di agire e reagire .» Per meglio riuscire, infine, la terapia dello choc economico.
«Pagheranno un giorno per i loro crimini»
« Far uscire la Grecia dalla crisi non era la più grande preoccupazione della Troika,analizza Haris Grolemis, responsabile dell’Istituto di ricerche Nicos Poulantzas. Se avessero voluto davvero aiutare il paese, avrebbero agito in maniera meno violenta e più solidale. Ma l’essenziale per loro era di proteggere l’euro. E di imporre una disciplina ai paesi che non seguivano alla lettera le regole di Maastricht. » Risultato : la Grecia è diventata una sorta di zona economica speciale, dalla mano d’opera a buon mercato.
Il 5 giugno 2013, il FMI ha fatto il suo mea culpa : Christine Lagarde ha ammesso che il primo piano di salvataggio in Grecia è terminato con dei « notevoli fallimenti ». E indica come responsabile l’Unione Europea : gli stati europei non avrebbero le « competenze » richieste per far bene avanzar questo tipo di programma di aiuti ! Ma la privatizzazione dei beni pubblici e il salvataggio degli interessi finanziari privati prosegue.
«In Francia siete i prossimi. Preparatevi»
« Miliardi di persone perdono la loro vita o subiscono dei danni irreparabili alla loro salute, a causa della vita politica condotta oggi in Grecia, insorge il dottor Giorgos Vichas. Non sono delle semplici morti. Sono degli omicidi. Quelli che hanno votato delle leggi che provocano l’esclusione di un numero di persone crescente dalla copertura sanitaria nazionale sono degli assassini. Non è solo una responsabilità politica, ma una responsabilità criminale. Speriamo che un giorno pagheranno per i loro crimini »
La morte subita dalla televisione pubblica ha sferzato la popolazione greca. Un risveglio della democrazia ? E’ quello che ci spiegano, gli occhi lucidi, quelli che incrociamo nel locali occupati della televisione pubblica ERT, là dove i tecnici e i giornalisti si affannano per continuare la diffusione de programmi, su dei canali clandestini. La Grecia non è che un laboratorio, altri paesi saranno presto coinvolti. « In Francia, voi sarete forse i prossimi. Preparatevi. » Le politiche d’austerità e la strategia dello chock della Troika saranno presto estese a tutto il continente ? Il solo mezzo di impedirlo è di lottare accanto a chi sarà la prossima cavia.

Fonte: bastamag.net
Traduzione per comedonchisciotte.org a cura di Barbara Simona Leva
Note
(1) Analisi non condivisa dall’OCSE (Organizzazione per la cooperazione e lo sviluppo economico)
(2) La giustizia greca ha annullato il 17 giugno il decreto governativo sulla chiusura della radio-televisione pubblica ERT. Aspettando il giudizio definitivo, i programmi possono temporaneamente riprendere.
(3) Forum pubblicato il 16 iugno dal quotidiano Kathimerini (http://www.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_kathremote_1_15/06/2013_504274).
(4) Confronti : il debito pubblico rappresenta il 197% del Pil in Giappone, 127% in Italia, 92% negli Stati Uniti e in Francia, 82% in Germania. Fonte: Attac.
(5) Istituto di ricerca fondato dal partito di opposizione Synaspismos, membro della coalizione di sinistra Syriza (http://www.poulantzas.gr).
(6) Nel 2012, 107 miliardi di debito sono stati cancellati. Il debito è passato a marzo da 337 miliardi a 251 miliardi di euro.
(7) Leggere l’intervista su Arte Journal, pubblicata il 17/06/13 (http://www.arte.tv/fr/attac-a-l-assaut-du-plan-de-sauvetage-de-la-grece/7558700.html)
(8) O con i 10 miliardi di spese militari per le quali la Grecia, indica Attac Aurtiche, ha ricevuto delle pressioni dalla Francia e dalla Germania : tagliare questi budget avrebbe avuto delle conseguenze sulle imprese di questi due paesi. Rappresenta pertanto il 4% del Pil in Grecia, contro il 2,4% in Francia.
(9) Nel 2012, solo il 27% del debito è rimasto nelle mani delle banche e delle altre istituzioni finanziarie. Fonte: Le figaro, 09/05/2012
(10) Citato da Naomi Klein, La stratégie du choc.

Le

a proliferation of resistance against the economic model of the last sixty years

Turns of the century

from opendemocracy.org

    

Instead of experiencing a proliferation of terrorism, we are witnesses to a proliferation of resistance against the standard economic model of the last sixty years. It’s an endogenous shock, not an exogenous one. The socio-economic contract has been broken.

The twentieth century, it is said, was a short one. Birthed in the trenches of Verdun after 1914 and buried alongside the Soviet Union around 1990, it lasted a mere 76 years. Contrast that, for example, with the previous century, described by the eminent (and recently deceased) historian Eric Hobsbawm as the “long 19th century”: the period between the French Revolution in 1789 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914.
From 1989 until 2001, the End of History seemed nigh. After a century that had been pockmarked by mass violence and hemispheric conflict, liberalism’s triumph appeared inevitable. Anomalies such as the Castro brothers in Cuba, who would soon succumb to old age, or China, which would eventually dismantle its centralized structure to remain competitive in a globalizing world, were at best regarded as temporary hiccups. Iron curtains fell alongside trade barriers and tariffs as the western model of development was transported into the far corners of the earth by the IMF, the World Bank, Coca Cola, and whoever else decided to join the carnival. It was the Washington Consensus going full throttle.
Then 9/11 happened. The British tabloid The Sun declared on its front page on September 12, 2001: “The Day that Changed the World.” Liberalization discourses were replaced by security discourses. The years after 2001 seemed to confirm the fears of pessimists like Sam Huntington, who had warned that the Cold War wouldn’t be replaced by an era of peace and prosperity but by religion and cultural conflicts – the Clash of Civilizations. Much of the west embarked on the twin project of hunkering down under the protection of newly created or newly empowered institutions like the American Department of Homeland Security, and of sending its sons and daughters out into the world to fight the good fight. The new US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual provided the practical blueprint; the TV series “24” served as an appropriate cultural echo chamber.
Thirteen years later, that analysis is beginning to fray. 9/11 ruptured the self-assured optimism of the 1990s, especially (and understandably) in the United States, but the epochal shift towards global contestation and dirty warfare hasn’t quite happened. We’re lucky in that regard. Terrorism hasn’t so much proliferated as it has been kept alive by insurgencies and the military responses they provoked. Much of the terrorist violence directed against the west since 2001 can directly be attributed to the event of 9/11 and to the two wars that we fought in its wake.
Now Iraq and Afghanistan are winding down, and President Obama has acknowledged the long-overdue shift away from a diffuse fight “against terror.” More than a decade after 9/11 we don’t find ourselves locked in battle against an ideological or religious enemy. Indeed, annual deaths from terrorism are lower today than during most of the twentieth century. The price that most of us have paid isn’t inflicted by an external enemy but imposed through the expansion of our internal security apparatuses. One of the reasons why people on the left – and some small-state liberals – have reacted so strongly to recent revelations about the scope of government surveillance programmes is that the threat level which was initially invoked to justify the passage of legislation like the “Patriot Act” or the “FISA Amendment Act” seems hardly plausible today.

Seventy years of growth

But amid the war on terror, when few people seemed to pay attention, another thing happened. Lehman Brothers collapsed. Of course one could pick a different event, such as the US Treasury’s virtual takeover of Freddie Mac, or the revelations about the Greek deficit after the country’s 2009 elections. But the collapse of Lehman Brothers has emerged as the most visible event of the financial crisis, and as a lightning rod it will suffice. Important is not the event in itself, but the historical shift it signals. In this case, the shift is away from the economic paradigm which has sustained much of the world’s growth and economic policies since at least 1945.
As I write this, 300,000 people are marching in Rio de Janeiro against corruption and public sector cuts ahead of next year’s soccer World Cup. (It must be bad if Brazilians start anti-soccer riots.) In Greece, protests have been ongoing for several years. In Spain, Italy and Portugal, popular discontent has ousted several governments and continues to cause a headache for their successors (in Greece, the government coalition is crumbling right now). In Great Britain, cuts to the National Health Service have inspired regular demonstrations and a special segment during the Olympic opening ceremony in 2012, which defiantly celebrated the NHS as one of the great achievements of modern British society. Look at any newspaper front page today worldwide, and you are likely to see one or more photos of police in riot gear, shooting tear gas into crowds of protesters.
The decades since World War II have brought unprecedented increases in expectations about living standards in much of the world. I’m saying “expectations” because the actual increase in wealth and living standards has often been highly stratified: those at the top benefit the most, sometimes at the expense of those at the bottom. In many countries of the Global North, inequality has increased significantly since the 1970s as real wages have stagnated or declined for many income groups.
In the countries of South America, Asia, and parts of Africa, living standards for the middle class have increased somewhat, but the amount of money accumulating at the top meant that middle class expectations often continued to outpace actual improvements. No wonder, then, that protests in Rio have driven a broad cross-section of the population into the streets. As the BBC’s Paul Mason reminds us, the chances for upheaval are much higher when the middle class grows frustrated: “Even where you get rapid economic growth, it cannot absorb the demographic bulge of young people fast enough to deliver rising living standards for enough of them.”
Additionally, much of the economic growth since 1945 has been financed not through real growth but through credit. It’s “buy now, pay later” but on a global scale. For most of the 19th and 20th centuries, western economies could avoid stagnation by amping up productivity, expanding domestic production and consumption and, when that levelled out, by tapping into new markets abroad. At its core, imperialism was an economic strategy.
But where do you go once the world has been thoroughly globalized and the rate of productivity increase is declining? The answer, formulated even before the guns of World War II had fallen silent, was to go virtual: growth would henceforth rely on credit, which could provide the necessary liquidity for investments and purchases. The Bretton Woods conference in 1944 marked an important turning point in the virtualization of monetary policy; the introduction of the first consumer credit cards in the US in the early 1950s virtualized personal consumption.
We’re now facing the consequences of that trend: rising public and private debt are the price we have to pay for the economic miracle of the late twentieth century. Instead of experiencing a proliferation of terrorism, we are witnesses to a proliferation of resistance against the standard economic model of the last sixty years. It’s an endogenous shock, not an exogenous one: it emerges from within the current system after seventy years of unparalleled growth. As a result, it poses a much bigger challenge: hunkering down won’t help as long as the economic foundations remain fragile.

An interlude before the real shock

The confluence of public and private debt leads to the unfortunate situation that welfare budgets are being slashed in the name of austerity while private citizens are themselves feeling the debt squeeze. It’s true in Brazil, true in Spain, and true in Greece as well.
From the perspective of debt, we haven’t quite hit rock bottom yet: countries with the highest public debt-to-GDP ratios often have lower rates of household debt that can help to cushion the effects of public spending cuts. For example, both Italy and Japan are examples of countries with high levels of public debt but without a household debt bubble.
But imagine what happens if US deficit reduction plans go through over the coming decade? The United States already has one of the highest private debt levels in the world, largely thanks to mortgages and student debt. While automation – resulting, ideally, in rising productivity and the outsourcing of menial labour to machines – might offer a partial way out of the debt trap, it’s difficult to see how debt-financed growth could be sustained unchanged for another fifty years.
As the system begins to crumble, the weakest links in the chain go bust first: those who rely on a functioning welfare state for their existence and socio-economic opportunities. Next come those whose dreams have been thwarted and whose expectations have been left unfulfilled. It’s still working fine if you’re at the top, but the socio-economic contract has been broken.
No wonder, then, that a sense of unfairness and powerlessness has taken root and is now driving people into the streets across national and continental borders. The discontent with representative politics – still the least bad option we’ve got in many regards – is rooted not so much in the alleged gap between “the people” and “the politicians” but in the steadfast insistence that a few piecemeal changes will suffice to straighten out the crisis.
The laThe language employed by protesters in Rio, Athens, and Madrid – against “corruption,” against “top-down politics,” against “welfare squeezes” – speaks to a commonality of experience that transcends the particularities of each context: economic policies are broken, and politics seems unable to provide a fix.  Hence, it’s misleading to think of the crisis of the last five years primarily as an “economic crisis.” Sure, it all started with a downward cascade in the financial and mortgage markets, but it has long since morphed into a social and political crisis. It is sure to leave its mark not only on economic history or on the history of a specific country, but on history as such.
All of which now brings us back to the story of the 21st century. Forget what you’ve heard about terrorism: the years between 2001 and 2008 weren’t so much the start of a decennial or centennial trend of civilizational conflict but an historical anomaly; an interlude to a much larger story that has become clear only with the benefit of hindsight.
The big shift of our time, the epochal change that affects or will affect billions of people around the globe, isn’t the rising threat of terrorism, but the rising precariousness of economic realities. The story of the twenty-first century begins in earnest with ticker news about imminent financial collapse.
This article was first published in The European on June 23, 2013

'Sorry for the inconvenience, we are changing the country': Brazil

 

from opendemocracy

Leonardo Paz Neves 10 July 2013

In the last month, Brazil has joined the growing number of countries whose civil society has gone to the streets to start large demonstrations. Why did it happen? Who are the protesters? What do they want? What were the main reactions? These are some of the important questions.

Photograph by Rafael Costa. All rights reserved.

The ‘joke’ title is drawn from a creative sign in one of the protests in Rio de Janeiro last June. It is probably the best way to express what is going on in many countries worldwide. This phrase somehow encapsulates the growing discontent within the population from all the countries that have recently experimented with popular manifestations.
Taking a closer look at what happened (and is happening) in Brazil over the last month is a good starting point for grasping the differences and similarities between these manifestations. For roughly two weeks, the country nearly stopped. In more than 350 cities, millions went to the streets to protest. The demands were numerous. In fact, it was very difficult to keep track of every one of them. That prompted some early experts to accuse the manifestations of being too diffuse (apart from the bus fare issue) and to predict that for that reason they wouldn’t last long. Well, those first ‘experts’ had to eat their words as they watched the protests grow into one of the biggest manifestations in Brazilian history.

How did it start?

Protests against the rise of the bus fare are rather common in Brazil. Actually, every year a couple of hundred people, mainly students, organize small demonstrations. So what made the difference this time? If I were to choose a starting date for these manifestations, it all began on June 6. On that date, 2,000 protesters, organized by the “Movimento Passe Livre” (Free Pass Movement), which aims to extinguish public transport fares, organized a protest via social media and marched in São Paulo against the recent rise of public transport fares (these ordinarily occur in January, but this year the Brazilian Finance Minister pleaded with the mayors to hold off for some months in order to keep inflation down). The manifestation ended in violence, inflicted both by protesters and the police.
The same protest pattern was repeated over the following days. What is interesting is that, at the very beginning, the movement did not enjoy wide public support, with a good part of the media identifying the protests as ‘disturbances’ and its actors as ‘delinquents’. This early assessment changed rapidly after two key episodes: the protest of June 13 in São Paulo and the protest of June 16 in Rio de Janeiro, during the opening of the famous Maracanã football stadium.
Both of them were met with heavy repression. The indiscriminate use of tear gas and rubber bullets by the police contributed to the warzone-like imaginaries which quickly went viral in the media (mostly the social media such as Twitter and Facebook). In my opinion, those events were the turning point, because the manifestation gained incredible popular support, not only across the Brazilian cities, but also in many different countries.

Photograph by Rafael Costa. All rights reserved.

From this point forward, the logic of the protests changed dramatically. The media, experts and politicians (although still stunned) started to “welcome” the right to popular manifestations and to condemn the violence and the vandalism promoted by a “small few”. The following protests soared, reaching  their peak on June 20 when around 2 million (although I believe this number is very conservative) people took to the streets. Again, the day ended up in violence – this time, on their side, the police clamped down as hard as they could. On the other side, these “small few” destroyed police cabins, torched cars and dustbins and smashed the glass walls of banks. The following day, President Dilma broke her silence and addressed the population. Her speech was received with mixed feelings – some believed that she was smart in not compromising much and putting pressure on the legislative powers to meet public demands; others criticized the emptiness of her words.
It is important to acknowledge that virtually all cities brought the bus fares back down to their original price. But, at this point, the damage was already done. The protests continued, although smaller in number. It was possible to see manifestations on TV every day in a different city, always with thousands of people and sometimes repressed by the police. The endurance of the movement forced President Dilma to make a second address on June 24. This time, the President came up with a 5 point national pact, which was received again with a large degree of skepticism. Meanwhile, at an incredible speed, the Congress rushed to rule on some of the main demands from the manifestations. They cut taxes on fuel, rejected controversial legislation on “Gay Cure” and an attempt to the limit the federal attorneys’ power over criminal investigations. They also approved a law identifying corruption as a severe felony.
All these measures have somehow appeased the mood of some of the protesters, even though it is still possible to see some protests in different parts of the country. A good example of this is a group of students who have been camping outside of the official residence of the governor of Rio de Janeiro.

Who are the protesters?

One of the most interesting questions posed by this process was: who are they? They are not politically affiliated and do not belong to any union or association. Well, the very first activists were students mobilized by the “Movimento Passe Livre” group. As aforementioned, they rapidly gained support from many sectors of society and became diversified: but the vanguard was still composed by students, mainly from the middle classes.
Why them? There are many different theories. Mine rely on two facts. The first has to do with the age factor. This generation has been hearing about how the last two generations have changed the country, first fighting the military dictatorship, participating in manifestations such as the “Diretas Já” in 1982 (a demonstration that demanded direct presidential elections) and the second creating the “Caras Pintadas” movement in 1992( a demonstration which ended with the impeachment of President Collor). The new ‘generation y’ was repeatedly labeled as reconciled and passive. Whether this is the case it is hard to say, but what is clear is that this generation suffers from disaffection with the political system and widespread skepticism regarding popular action. Nonetheless, we were faced with hundreds of signs saying, “the giant woke up”.
The second fact relates to social strata. Brazil has become internationally famous for its social inclusion policy – roughly 35 million people have attained middle class status. In itself, this fact is truly remarkable and deserves to be praised. The problem is that as soon as those 35 million people so arose, they were presented with the “middle class bill”. Currently, Brazil has one of the highest taxes in the world, higher than many developed countries; but its public services are only really comparable to those of developing countries. Tied to the public service issues, there is the living cost issue. Brazil’s recent rise in living costs, where housing and food are the biggest villains, has been one of the biggest causes of discontent. Just to illustrate, housing prices have increased by over 150% in the last 5 years.
Another characteristic of the main body of the protesters is their independence, as mentioned above. They (all of us) continue to suffer from a crisis of representation and widespread discontent when it comes to the political parties. Most of the protesters do not feel represented and they tried at all costs to avoid the participation of the political parties in this movement. There were even reports that people carrying party flags were beaten up.

So what do they want?

As said above, all “started” with the rise of bus fares, but soon after that there was an impressive increase in the number of demands. They were so diverse that many experts said it was impossible for the movement to sustain itself. I would divide the demands into two main groups (although I am aware that in doing so I will commit some injustices): first are those that are more tangible, such as the bus fare raise, the approval/rejection of some of the more controversial legislation. The second group is more complex, whose demands require a great deal of effort to be put into practice. Here, I would group all the demands for investment in social services (education and healthcare being the most popular), more transparency in politics and in government spending, more ethics in politics, and even the removal of some important politicians such as the President of the Senate, some governors, mayors and even Dilma herself.
It is also important to take a moment to address the FIFA case. Among the most frequent demands are those that claim that public services should apply “FIFA Standards” and that criticize the opaque public spending on the World Cup and the Olympics. The issue here is that almost nobody is actually against these events taking place in Brazil/Rio. The problem is the widespread perception that there is ill management and planning (and even corruption). Originally, the World Cup was planned to be fully funded by the private sector, but in the end, public money covered most of the budget, which got to be revised upwards several times (the budget from the stadiums alone went from US$ 2.7 billion, originally, to around UUS$ 3.5 billion). There is a lot is misguided anger in that case.

What have the protesters achieved so far?

At first, a large part of the political class was stunned by the protests. They were not expecting it. In fact, many people believed that most of the politicians were “playing dead” and hoping that the storm would shortly subside. Well, it got worse. The first demand met was the return of the bus fares to their original price. But, now, this was not enough. After manifestations swept the country (and spread to other cities in the Europe and the US), the National Congress rushed to meet some of the more tangible demands - the “gay cure” bill, the PEC 37 and the anti-Corruption law are notable examples. Another “gain” was the 5 point pact created by Dilma, in which the crown jewel is the political reform promised for next year (which is being carried out, in my opinion, in the most irresponsible fashion – to be discussed on another occasion).

Reactions: in brief

Media
As in other protests around the world, the social media played a key role. The way that it manages to bring together an incredible number of people with no institutional affiliation to the same place, is remarkable! The traditional media, on the other hand, had a less positive record. At the beginning, they were clearly condemning the manifestations. As soon as it soared, they rushed to greet it and were very careful in saying that the vandals were a “small number of people”. Many protesters were directing their anger to the main media channels (notably O Globo, the biggest news channel). They claimed that the media channels did not portray the demonstrations in a neutral way and that they are lining up with the government (consequently ignoring some of the abuses by the police and being selective on the coverage of scandals). It is hard to say to what extent these claims are true, but no one is completely innocent here.
Police
I wish I could say that the police reaction was the worst surprise, but it was not. In fact, the only surprise arises from the fact that they suppressed the manifestations (of middle class students) with the same brutality they use every day in the ‘favelas’. What we saw (I saw), were scenes of an occupation in an enemy territory. The police hunted down protesters on the streets through the night, throwing tear gas bombs at any agglomeration of people, in bars and even in a hospital. The only upside was that the police actions reignited the discussion of police reform (demilitarization and unification of the police forces). Anyhow till this date, I have not heard of a single police officer who has been held accountable for the ‘excessive use of force’. Right now, in my opinion, this issue should be put at the top of the list of priorities.

Photograph by Rafael Costa. All rights reserved.

Politicians
At the beginning it was almost funny (and sad) to see how flummoxed the politicians were by the protests. They simply did not understand them. They took several days to start positioning themselves. After a while, they all started up with the same discourse: “The population is within its democratic right to perform manifestations, but we have to condemn all kinds of violence”. Also, after the very 1^st speech from President Dilma, the Congress started meeting all the major demands from the streets.
Many have been accusing the politicians of acting in an opportunistic manner, since they already have their eyes on next year’s elections. Examples to support this argument are the recent accusations of several congressmen and senators who used public money and resources, like helicopters and planes from the Air Force (still in the heat of the protests) to attend the Confederation Cup games and other private social events, with their families and friends.

Consequences, challenges and the future

Meanwhile, some conclusions that can be drawn about what happened in Brazil are:

1. The police have to pass through a deep and comprehensive reform. The lack of responsibility, the violence and the certainty of impunity cannot be part of its modus operandi - (this is very serious!);
2. It was exceptional to see the power of social media. They managed to achieve what even powerful unions and political parties have never succeeded in: the ability to mobilize people (all kinds of people) and to 
3. There is a deeprooted crisis of representation in Brazilian society. It is so serious that it made people react violently against all those who attempted to wield any political party flag in the demonstrations. This is a very dangerous situation.
4. The political class in Brazil is an interesting entity. They act as political professionals, with an internal logic, ethics of their own and their interests not necessarily matching those of the general society. I do believe, when it comes to that, that they reacted opportunistically in the case of the controversial legislation. Somehow, some of the actions taken (and here I include the president as well) were carried out with the sole purpose of appeasing the ‘mob’ and not with a long-term sustainable view. Here, I offer only one example, but the most dangerous one: political reform. Facing a sharp drop in popularity, president Dilma is convinced that rushing into political reform at all costs over the next year is of ultimate importance, so that these could be applied in the upcoming elections (in which she will try for re-election). The tools and means she proposes are not only unconstitutional, but also might result in a weak and/or unsuccessful reform.

It is hard to predict what is going to happen. The manifestations, although still ongoing and scattered all over the country, are losing momentum. Promises from the government and the approval/rejection of some controversial legislation have for the time being apparently appeased most of the protesters. And it is unlikely that what we saw in the last month will be repeated anytime soon, at least not until next year. The World Cup and the presidential elections, however, offer an excellent opportunity for a new round of protests.
When it comes to comparisons with other countries: scores of analysts are trying to trace the line that connects these manifestations. The most imaginative ones have even tried to locate the origin of all that is happening this year in the Arab Spring. The most prevalent ones compare Brazil to Turkey and even to Egypt. I will not address this issue or attempt to develop a deep comparison among them – except to say that there are indeed many similarities, but the differences are more important. Here are only a couple of them. The first difference is the lack of a religious element (which makes things much less complex). The second is the political response and the way the manifestations were dealt with by security forces. Although there was violence in Brazil, I feel that it is not comparable to what has been happening either in Turkey or in Egypt.
Fun Fact: for those who want to amuse themselves a little, try deciphering some of the protesters’ signs. It is of unparalleled creativity. It is amazing how Brazilians are able to make fun out of their own misfortune.

1.  

The Army’s Coup in Egypt: For the People or Against the People?

Published on Wednesday, July 10, 2013 by Open Democracy]

 

by Andrea Teti and Gennaro Gervasio

The Muslim Brotherhood’s atrocious record in government has obscured the nature of the army’s coup, directed against the Egyptian people and the revolutionary potential of their deep disaffection with the old regime. As for the remnants of that regime – these elites are playing a game in which instability is a vital ingredient.Can massive protests keep the army true? (Photo: Demotix/Adham Korshed)
The Brotherhood: poor in opposition, terrible in government
In power, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was an unmitigated disaster. Mohammed Morsi was elected by the skin of his teeth, and only with the votes of a good slice revolutionary public opinion, who thought that however bad he might be, the prospect of his presidency couldn’t be as full of foreboding as that of Shafiq.
But Morsi revealed himself to be colossally incompetent, increasingly authoritarian, and utterly unable to come up with a plan for the economy, for political reform, for new legislation on key areas like the media, unions or NGOs, let alone for the reform of corrupt state institutions like the security forces.
The only tactics the Brotherhood seemed to have in its arsenal were taken straight out of the Mubarak rulebook. The only strategy it seemed capable of conceiving in government was to occupy all the institutions of the state in order to prevent any other group from returning it to opposition. Its utter inability to approach anything like a plan to fulfil popular demands for social justice, at least, should not have been surprising, given how closely its economic policies – dominated by its ‘pious bourgeoisie’ of businessmen – resemble that of the old regime.
Morsi’s not-so-creeping authoritarianism was in your face, and alienated virtually every political counterpart in Egypt. He handpicked a prosecutor-general in an attempt to neutralise the judiciary, rammed through a partisan (and poorly written) Constitution, played with the fire of sectarianism, and passed a constitutional decree conferring on himself powers so vast they probably made Mubarak blush. He marginalised or ignored any political voice not supporting the Brotherhood, and actively tried to neutralise any opposition, targeting political groups, the media, civil society, and independent trade unions.
In fairness, Morsi certainly faced enormous opposition from within the state apparatus, not just from the security sector – with which he thought he’d successfully struck a ‘non-interference’ pact – but also the judiciary and state bureaucracy. But the Brotherhood signally failed to build coalitions against such established centres of power, making it unlikely that the Brotherhood’s strategies would have been much different without such opposition from former regime apparatchiks.
Democracy and popular will
This context is necessary to start grasping the depth and breadth of popular opposition to Morsi. This popular mobilisation cannot be dismissed by stigmatising it as being politically or socially partisan: opposition has come from a range of quarters, from secularists to Islamists, socialists to liberals – Morsi’s political talent turns out to have been alienating opponents and potential allies. The Tamarrod (Rebel) campaign which claims to have gathered over 22 million signatures calling for Morsi to go was only the latest and most spectacular manifestation: even all the way back to his ultimately successful presidential campaign, Morsi’s support was not assured even amongst his natural constituencies and in the Brotherhood’s stronghold: in Alexandria, Morsi lost in the first round to both leftist nationalist Hamdeen Sabbahi and moderate Abdul Moneim Aboul Futouh.
The crowds protesting against Morsi around the country were unprecedented, and even if they did not reach 40 million (50% of the population), they compared favourably to the masses that turned out during the 2011 January Uprising.
There must be no mistake that these demonstrations represented the most serious challenge conceivable to Morsi’s presidency, to the Brotherhood’s role as the country’s largest political force. Nor can there be a question that in a democracy the purpose of formal processes is to convey popular will: appealing to such formalities to usurp or ignore that will is a challenge straight to the heart of democracy. Neither the Brotherhood nor the western governments that had begun to make their peace with it can shirk this.
When is a coup not a coup?
However, going against such formal procedures cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the Presidency was the office of state with the greatest claim to legitimacy, the lower house of parliament having been dissolved by the judiciary, and the upper house being elected on a paltry 8% turnout. Anti-Brotherhood protesters claimed that Tamarrod’s groundswell of popular opinion was enough to delegitimise Morsi, and that therefore the army’s removal was legitimate, and even democratic, in that it acted on behalf of the people. The army gladly echoed this rhetoric, emphasising Morsi’s obvious unwillingness to compromise.
On the one hand, it is possible to make such a case. Legitimacy can derive from essentially two contrasting sources. One is formal, based on institutional and procedural legitimacy, the legitimacy of constituted power. The other derives from the clear manifestation of popular will, a manifestation of constitutive power – after all, institutional legitimacy depends ultimately on popular consent. Leaving aside the well-known and genuinely thorny problem whether one should take precedence over the other, and ignoring for a moment the size of pro-Brotherhood crowds, arguably popular demonstrations might provide the grounds to claim that while Morsi may have been legitimate in the first sense, he was not in the second, and that therefore the army had grounds to act legitimately in the name of popular will.
However, there is simply no evidence that the armed forces intervened somehow on behalf of “the people’s” will, as opposed to merely attempting to legitimise its actions this way.
History cautions against claiming that the Egyptian upper echelons of the armed forces are willing to act in the popular interest or even to respect civilian oversight at all. On the contrary, the one thing the Egyptian armed forces’ leadership have tried to do since Mubarak’s removal has been to preserve their insulation from that popular will which civilian oversight enshrines.
This was precisely why protests against them in 2011/12 were so vehement: the Army’s leadership at that time clearly had no plan save to ride out the storm of popular protest and attempt to secure its ‘red lines’, particularly legal immunity and control over its budget and financial empire. Its failure was only marginally less spectacular than Morsi’s. Indeed, the very roadmap for transition the Brotherhood is (rightly) accused of failing to implement was the same that the Army itself failed to follow through on.
To avoid pre-empting history, one could claim that although the coup might have been undemocratic, its outcomes might yet be democratic, and that the sheer pressure of a new wave of massive protests will keep the army true. Experience would suggest scepticism, but the Egyptian people have surprised the world before, and for their sake and everyone else’s, we must hope that they will do so again.
Who benefits from Egypt's deepening political polarisation?
This debate, while important, misses a crucial point which must be included in any analysis: it assumes that the army’s leadership – and the rest of the Mubarak-era state apparatus – have an interest in restoring Egypt’s stability. This is far from clear.
Egypt’s political landscape is in tatters. The now-former president is detained incommunicado, Brotherhood leaders have been arrested on vague charges, as have journalists and political activists, and there is the serious risk that the army’s actions and Tamarrod’s support for them are finally proving to a generation of Islamists the hollowness of democracy.
But more important still is the army’s role in the violence. The army intervened claiming it wished to prevent a descent into civil war, and yet violence has only escalated since its intervention. It not only failed to secure protests and prevent clashes between rival camps, but faces mounting evidence of actively stoking conflict, for example by firing upon pro-Morsi protesters or by allowing pro- and anti-Brotherhood demonstrators to clash. This apparently contradictory behaviour – the army first took over and then appeared to leave the streets, allowing clashes to take place – begs the question: what is the function of a (preventable) spiral in political violence in Egypt today? It is difficult to conclude that it benefits anyone other than the military and the regime of which it is still part.
Stirring up conflict as a tactic of political control is not new. Mubarak leveraged Coptic/Muslim tensions, and Morsi ratcheted those up, and stoked Sunni/Shia tensions. The question is what effect this tactic has. The effect has been to polarise Egyptian politics between supporters and opponents of the Brotherhood. In turn, this reduces the chances of forming a broad coalition amongst the old/new regime, pushing the pro-democratic opposition – which remains highly fractious, the Tamarrod campaign notwithstanding – away from the tentative embrace with the shakily-democratic Brotherhood or portions thereof, and straight into the waiting arms of the certainly-undemocratic felool.
And yet, what mobilised people during the 2011 uprising and since then, was not the call for the downfall of individual portions of the regime – Mubarak, the Police or the Army, or even corrupt business elites – but of the nizam, the entire system itself. Protesters were right to feel that Egypt had changed and protesters would not simply allow things to go back to the way they were under Mubarak.
In this sense, the unprecedented groundswell of popular support that the Tamarrod campaign has generated was in itself the most significant novelty facing the old/new regime, and there could be no higher goal for that regime than pre-empting its revolutionary potential. It is difficult to overemphasise just what a galvanising effect the Tamarrod campaign has had: until very recently, pro-democracy activists were thoroughly disheartened, but the unprecedented success of this campaign has given a new impetus to popular demands, taking the initiative away from efforts at top-down ‘reform’ and ‘guided transition’.
From this point if view, the coup and the ‘legitimacy debate’ have become a trap and a distraction for the Egyptian people, in that their greatest effect has been to distract collective attention from issues of bread, freedom and social justice, engage in factional fighting, and make a cohesive front between genuinely democratic Islamist, leftist, nationalist and liberal forces far more arduous.
Ongoing low-level conflict serves this purpose well. The elites risk overplaying their hand, however, as the Egyptian population is increasingly mobilised, and certain portions of the old/new regime – such as the Army’s middle ranks – might be less cohesive than expected.
Nonetheless, part of Egypt’s elite is playing a dangerous game of chicken not just with the opposition or the Brotherhood, but with the country itself – a game they feel they have little chance of losing. But this calculus might yet be mistaken: given the precedents set since January 2011, one can only wonder what the outcome will be.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 License

Andrea Teti is Director of the Centre for Global Security and Governance at the University of Aberdeen and Senior Fellow at the Brussels-based European Centre for International Affairs. Follow him on Twitter @a_teti

Gennaro Gervasio is a Lecturer in Middle East Politics and History at the British University in Egypt. Follow him on Twitter @masritali

'Daylight Robbery': UK Privatization of State-Run Mail Service

Published on Wednesday, July 10, 2013 by Common Dreams

Royal Mail sell off will hamper mail service and hurt working conditions, unions warn

- Jacob Chamberlain, staff writer

(Getty Images)The official plan for the privatization of the UK's centuries old mail service, Royal Mail, was announced by business secretary Vince Cable on Wednesday to the ire of trade unions and others who have slammed the biggest privatization since the railways in the 1990s as "daylight robbery."
Cable said a majority of the shares would be sold in the private sector, although it was unclear as to exactly how much. The majority stake in Royal Mail will be posted on the London Stock Exchange within the next nine months, or by March at the latest, for prospective buyers including "foreign postal services, hedge funds, and city speculators," said consumer watchdog group Sum of Us.
Additionally, in "a bid to weaken support for trade unions which have helped to scupper past attempts to sell off Royal Mail," the government announced plans to give away 10 percent of shares in Royal Mail to the 150,000 UK postal workers, Reuters reports.
Billy Hayes, general secretary of the Communication Workers Union (CWU), which represents two-thirds of the Royal Mail's 150,000 workforce, said they wouldn't "sell their soul" for the 10 percent stake.
30-year Royal Mail employee Malcolm Curry told the Guardian, "The government are the winners, not the Royal Mail workers. The rich get richer and the poor get poorer … I don't think there's any benefits for us and none for the customers. I can't see that in 12 months' time we'll be delivering to every household every day. Privatization is all about making profits. There will be cut-backs, and shareholders will have profits instead."
Journalist and author John Harris adds sarcastically that the privatization is happening "with the aid of a syndicate of banks headed by those well-known guarantors of the public interest, Goldman Sachs and UBS. The financiers will take home around £30m; over time, the rest of us will likely end up with a threadbare postal service, and the feeling that we were robbed, in broad daylight."
Cable also made promises that Royal Mail would be obligated to continue providing six-day mail service across Britain despite its new private ownership. However, many people, including unions representing Royal Mail workers, remain opposed to the privatization and say it could lead to a decline in working conditions.
Unions representing the Royal Mail staff rejected a pay offer and are now threatening strike action including the CWU.
Dave Ward, the CWU deputy general secretary, stated Wednesday:

The flotation announcement has ignored the views of the workforce and the British public. The workforce agreed a modernization program with Royal Mail three years ago and it didn't include privatization.
They have worked hard to modernize the company and deliver the profitable organization Royal Mail is today. They have recently voted in big numbers against the sale and they will be angered by the announcement.
CWU will continue to fight the sale and without worthwhile and legally binding assurances on terms and conditions, strike action is inevitable.

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