sexta-feira, 25 de março de 2022

Experts warned for decades that NATO expansion would lead to war

 

Experts warned for decades that NATO expansion would lead to war: Why did nobody listen to them?

Analysts and diplomats have been saying since the 1990s that NATO expansion would eventually spark a conflict in Eastern Europe

Russia’s military offensive in Ukraine has been underway for a month now. It has already led to a global economic crisis stemming from disruptions in supply chains and rising energy prices. And although the beginning of the hostilities came as a surprise to the whole world, the current state of affairs was not unpredictable – international relations experts have been warning about the risk of this escalation for the past 30 years.

Why didn’t politicians in the West listen to their advice, instead of allowing war to break out in Europe, and fuel and food prices to skyrocket at home? RT explains.

Told you so

“I want to make it clear to everyone, both in our country and abroad, to our partners, that it’s not even about the line that we don’t want anyone to cross. The fact is that we have nowhere to retreat. They have pinned us against a line from which, sorry for the bad manners, we have nowhere to retreat,” President Vladimir Putin stated at the end of December 2021, almost two months before he ordered the assault on Ukraine. 

At the time, Moscow was trying to come to an agreement with NATO on mutual security, hoping that the US-led bloc would agree to provide comprehensive written guarantees that it would not expand any further, to the east. Not only Putin, but also other Russian officials, talked about ‘red lines’ that posed a serious threat, with ominous consequences for the world, if crossed.

The existence of these red lines – most notably against NATO expansion into Ukraine – is not some subjective concept born in the minds of Russia’s current leadership. Oddly enough, they were being discussed in the West long before they became the subject of conversation in the Kremlin. 

In 1998, George Kennan, an American diplomat and historian known as the ‘architect of the Cold War’, said NATO expansion would mean nothing less than “the beginning of a new Cold War,” warning that it would be a “tragic mistake.” 

“Of course, this will provoke a bad reaction from Russia. And when that happens, [those who made decisions about NATO expansion] will say that we have always told you the Russians are like that. But it’s just not true,” he said.

In 1997, 50 prominent foreign policy experts, including former senators, military leaders, and diplomats, sent an open letter to then-President Bill Clinton outlining their opposition to NATO expansion. “It is a policy error of historic proportions,” they wrote.

Conservative political commentator Pat Buchanan wrote in his 1999 book ‘A Republic, Not an Empire’, “By moving NATO onto Russia’s front porch, we have scheduled a twenty-first-century confrontation.”

The current director of the CIA, William Burns, said in 2008 that for Russia, “Ukraine’s accession to NATO is the brightest of all red lines.”

“I have not yet found anyone who would consider Ukraine in NATO as something other than a direct challenge to Russia’s interests,” he said.

These are just some of the statements made by major American political figures, but it would be possible to compile an entire book from forecasts made in the 1990s alone. And after the Ukraine crisis began in 2014, and Russia’s subsequent reabsorption of Crimea, opinions about the folly of further NATO expansion were heard more and more often in the West. 

Over the past eight years, former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, Henry Kissinger, famed American scholar of Russian studies Stephen Cohen, and many other experts have issued warnings about NATO expansion.

Are you for peace or victory?

The decisions made by Western government officials over the past 20-25 years have clearly contradicted the recommendations of these experts. 

Timofei Bordachev, the program director of the Valdai International Discussion Club and academic director of the Center for Integrated European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics, believes the reason for this is obvious – politicians listen to experts, but don’t consider it necessary to follow their recommendations.

“In an area like international relations, politicians, unfortunately, almost never listen to the expert community. The reason for this is understandable. The task of the expert community is to achieve peace and prevent conflict. But since politicians answer to the voters, they always work to achieve victory at any cost,” Bordachev said in a conversation with RT.

“The difference in approach is obvious. Therefore, it is very difficult for politicians to listen to the opinion of experts. In achieving their goals, they bluff to the last,” he added.

This hypothesis is most clearly confirmed in an interview with the adviser to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Alexey Arestovich, which was given to the Apostrophe TV YouTube channel in 2019. At the time, he not only accurately predicted the year war would break out in his country and the reasons behind it, but also asserted that conflict was inevitable, indicating that it was necessary for Ukraine:

“With a 99.9% probability, our price of joining NATO is a big war with Russia... The optimal outcome is a major war with Russia and a transition to NATO based on the results of victory over Russia.”

These words suggest that Ukraine’s leadership was not intent on preventing war at all. On the contrary, the country was preparing for war, believing it was a justifiable means of achieving ‘victory’ – joining NATO.

However, this does not explain why American, or at least European, politicians did not try to prevent the war in Europe. According to Bordachev, the fact is that Western leaders proceeded from the assumption that there was no way their countries could join the war.

“Given the existence of nuclear deterrence, everyone understands the risk of a general destructive war is very easily separated from all other risks: it is easy to localize and prevent. We can see this now from the behavior of the United States and its allies, who are taking all measures against Russia short of direct intervention in the conflict. That is, they very confidently exclude from the equation a scenario that would pose a danger to themselves – they are not suicidal. But Western politicians do not care at all about how many Ukrainians must die in order for them to achieve their goals,” Bordachev said.

It’s all Fukuyama’s fault

Dmitry Suslov, the deputy director for research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) and deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the National Research University – Higher School of Economics (NRU HSE), believes there is a different reason why the actions of politicians deviate so much from what the expert community prescribes.

It’s not that Western politicians refuse to listen to foreign policy analysts – they listen to the wrong ones.

“There was no unity among the experts in the West, no consensus at all. It was mainly the foreign policy realists from the US and Europe that had warned about the dangers of expanding NATO. The problem was, after the end of the Cold War, the realists’ influence in the Western foreign policy establishment has diminished significantly,” Suslov told RT.

According to him, once the Cold War ended, the liberal viewpoint quickly gained popularity among Western expert circles and policymakers. “The idea was, first off, that Russia was in a state of impending and irreversible decline, and that it wouldn’t dare challenge the West in any shape or form. It was believed that Russia would eventually fall in line and join the ‘right side of history’ (from the West’s point of view), would fit into the NATO-centric paradigm in Europe and take on a subordinate position on the sidelines of global politics. This was the vision espoused by liberals and neoconservatives, and it clearly dominated over the realists’ position,” he said.

This only seemed natural. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many had the feeling that the balance of power and the previous patterns of international relations suddenly became obsolete. Now, they thought, everything would be different – international relations would be guided by a brand-new set of considerations, while those of the realists, along with their notions of geopolitics, would fade away into obscurity.

The ‘end of history’, a concept advocated by Francis Fukuyama in the 1990s, gained a lot of traction during this period. It is well known that Fukuyama’s interpretation of this idea had a powerful influence on George W. Bush and his foreign policy. In his book titled ‘The End of History and the Last Man’, he announced that the age of ideological confrontation, authoritarianism, revolutions, and war was finally over, as all states would eventually embrace liberal democracy modeled after the United States.

Fukuyama is now making predictions about the outcome of the current conflict in Ukraine. He believes that military defeat for Russia in Ukraine is imminent and will result in China not daring to invade Taiwan. This, according to Fukuyama, will revive the spirit of 1989, which will capture people’s hearts and bring the world back to the path towards the ‘end of history’.

The predator senses weakness

Truth be told, Russia gave Western politicians reasons to doubt the assessments of realist experts. 

“In the 1990s and even early 2000s, Russia appeared weak. It didn’t stand determinately and clearly enough against expansion of NATO; moreover, it made the expansion even easier to some extent,” Suslov said.

In his opinion, the very existence of the Founding Act signed in 1997 convinced the West that Moscow was ready to turn a blind eye to NATO expansion. 

This document determined Russia-NATO relations over the past 25 years, until the start of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. It reaffirmed the commitment of the parties to the inherent right of European nations “to choose the means to ensure their own security.” 

For years, this formula was used by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to explain why Russia did not have a say in Georgia or Ukraine joining the alliance.

“Indeed, Russia had secured several important provisions in that document, but at the same time, it gave a signal that a deal on expansion is possible. In general, the act showed Russia wouldn’t wage war against NATO or acceding states,” Suslov said.

The Founding Act gave the alliance legal grounds for admitting new members, but what really assured Western politicians that Russia was ready to allow expansion was the accession of the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

Curiously enough, when this discussion was just beginning in 1997, Joe Biden, then-chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, argued that Russia could go along with NATO accepting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the military bloc, but the Baltic states were where it would draw the line. 

“I think the one place where the greatest consternation would be caused in the short-term would be to admit the Baltic states now,” the future US president said.

In the end, the Baltic states were admitted into the alliance. They received invitations in 2002, and in 2004 became full members. 

“How did Russia react? It did nothing again. It really stood up against expansion only when NATO tried to extend to Georgia and Ukraine. That’s why we ended up where we are now,” Suslov said.

What next?

Reality has clearly changed. The current dynamics of relations between Russia and the West leaves no ambiguity about NATO’s potential advance toward Russia’s borders.

According to Suslov, this, along with other trends observed in contemporary international relations, will strengthen the position of the realists.

“There is no doubt we are now witnessing a resurgence of the realist school. This has to do not only with the conflict in Ukraine, but also with the confrontation between the US and China. Once again, we see that the shifts in the balance of power on the globe are the single most important factor – it is what sets everything in motion and shapes the international system. It is a new shift in the balance of global powers that dictates the state of relations between nations: China has become too strong, and the US is trying to contain it,” he said.


“The realists argue that the US should recognize Ukraine’s geopolitical losses as ‘status quo’, stop supplying Kiev with lethal weapons and even pressure Zelensky into signing a deal with Moscow under which Ukraine would remain independent but neutral.”
Suslov argues that the current patterns in US-China relations “spell doom for the liberals and hold a lot of promise for realists. It is quite likely that, in the near future, Western politicians will start making decisions based on advice from the latter and not the former. If so, then what do the realists propose as their solution to the ongoing conflict in Europe?"

Following these recommendations would help the US solve two important problems, Suslov said. First of all, Washington could stop further Russia-China rapprochement unfavorable to the US. Secondly, it would de-escalate US-Russia tensions by preventing direct military confrontation between the nations.

“Realists believe this kind of confrontation is on the table if Washington continues the economic war against Moscow,” he said.   

In any case, it’s too early to dismiss negative scenarios as unlikely and trust in the good judgment of politicians. According to Bordachev, “Not once in the history of humankind have politicians listened to experts. And there are no hints this could change today.”

sábado, 19 de março de 2022

Guerra bacteriológica, EUA

 

Guerra bacteriológica, um crime dos EUA

Biolaboratórios recém-descobertos na Ucrânia, operados e financiados por Washington, violam convenções internacionais — e poderiam ser usados contra a população e regiões agrícolas russas. Kiev apressa-se em esconder as evidências


Publicado originalmente no South Front | Tradução: Ricardo Cavalcanti-Schiel

Nota preliminar do tradutor: Os recursos de guerra bacteriológica destinam-se não apenas a ações de infecção de forças militares e populações por patógenos que visam atingir a saúde dessas vítimas e a consequente sobremobilização de recursos logísticos do inimigo para seu tratamento, como também a ação de dano biológico a cultivos alimentares, como tem sido sistematicamente empregado pelos Estados Unidos na Síria nos últimos anos, para produzir escassez e fome na população.

A operação especial militar russa na Ucrânia coincidiu com a implantação planejada de biolaboratórios militares dos Estados Unidos em Kiev e em Odessa. Em 26 de fevereiro, a Embaixada dos Estados Unidos na Ucrânia apressou-se em excluir do seu site todos os documentos sobre os 11 biolaboratórios financiados pelo Pentágono na Ucrânia. Todos estes documentos (agora eliminados pela Embaixada) podem ser lidos a partir daqui. Em outubro de 2021, a Agência de Redução de Ameaças de Defesa dos Estados Unidos (DTRA) do Departamento de Defesa (sic!) daquele país publicou no site de compras do governo dos Estados Unidos um aditivo contratual sobre “combate a patógenos altamente perigosos”. O documento diz respeito à fase final dos trabalhos de estabelecimento de dois biolaboratórios na Ucrânia: um em Kiev, outro em Odessa. O acordo adicional cobre o equipamento, treinamento de pessoal e licenciamento das instalações. O custo da obra é de 3,6 milhões de dólares, mas alguns números do documento estão ocultos por questões de sigilo. De acordo com o documento, os laboratórios estavam mais de 90% prontos. No entanto, a conclusão dos projetos foi atrasada em até sete meses, a partir da data de assinatura do documento (julho de 2021), portanto, para o final de fevereiro de 2022:

Os laboratórios na Ucrânia foram construídos dentro do Programa de Cooperação de Redução de Ameaças aos Estados Unidos, lançado em 1991 e voltado contra a antiga União Soviética e, posteriormente, à Rússia. Eles foram financiados no âmbito do Programa de Redução de Ameaças Biológicas. A cooperação entre a Ucrânia e os Estados Unidos neste campo intensificou-se após a primeira revolução colorida na Ucrânia em 2005.

Pode-se ler mais sobre esses biolaboratórios norte-americanos, inclusive na Ucrânia aqui, aqui e aqui (os links remetem a páginas de tradução automática; as páginas originais em inglês encontram-se aqui, aqui e aqui).

Dois novos laboratórios estavam sendo criados, baseados no Instituto de Pesquisa Estatal de Kiev para Diagnóstico Laboratorial e Especialização Veterinária e Sanitária e na divisão de Odessa do Serviço Estatal da Ucrânia para Segurança Alimentar e Proteção ao Consumidor. A parte principal da coleção ucraniana de cepas endêmicas de agentes de doenças perigosas é armazenada em Odessa. Os edifícios dos novos biolaboratórios em Kiev e Odessa foram construídos em 2019, mas não foram postos em operação.

O documento reproduzido acima deixa evidente que este projeto é não só importante como também urgente para o governo dos Estados Unidos. Atrasos potenciais são referidos como inaceitáveis. Além disso, o “DTRA requer a conclusão e entrega urgente de ambos os laboratórios para garantir a execução ativa e segura da missão”.

Ambas as instalações são de propriedade estatal e protegidas pelo governo da Ucrânia, mas nenhuma das instalações está atualmente realizando trabalho biológico ativo, porque o DTRA pediu às autoridades ucranianas que não iniciassem o trabalho até que a aceitação e o licenciamento fossem concluídos, tal como informavam os editais de aquisição.

Moscou expressou sua preocupação com o desenvolvimento de armas biológicas perto das fronteiras da Rússia. O presidente russo Vladimir Putin se preocupou com a coleta “proposital e profissional” de biomateriais de cidadãos russos e de russo étnicos por estrangeiros.

A operação militar russa em andamento na Ucrânia interrompe o programa DTRA na Ucrânia. De qualquer forma, os projetos em Kiev e Odessa serão adiados se não forem cancelados. Os Estados Unidos já gastaram mais de 2 bilhões de dólares em programas desse tipo só na Ucrânia. E há mais outros em desenvolvimento na Geórgia, Cazaquistão, Armênia, Azerbaijão e Uzbequistão.

Neste momento, enquanto as forças russas avançam na Ucrânia, Kiev parece estar com pressa para esconder a evidência de que os Estados Unidos violam a convenção sobre a não proliferação de armas biológicas. A conclusão da operação russa pode vir a revelar todo o esquema.


https://outraspalavras.net/geopoliticaeguerra/guerra-bacteriologica-um-crime-de-guerra-dos-eua/?fbclid=IwAR248dViAfgrHy1TNJEUW-rckVBHcElG8S0K6ozonnnswEM5JPvtUQ7NN2c 

Rússia China EUA

 

Russia's divorce from the West has pushed it into China's arms, here's how it will work

Beijing is the only major power to benefit from Moscow’s conflict with Kiev

First published in Russian on globalaffairs.ru

Russia’s military operation in Ukraine and the consequent economic embargo of Moscow by the West is the largest upheaval in world politics since at least the end of the Cold War. The result will be a complete reformatting of the country’s foreign economic relations and its economic model, as well as Russia and the US sinking into a protracted military-political confrontation in Eastern Europe.

Both factors will have a direct impact on the situation in East Asia amidst a gradually growing confrontation between China and Washington there. As a result of standing on the sidelines of the crisis and calling on the parties to show restraint, Beijing will be the only world center of power to benefit from the Ukrainian catastrophe in the long run. It is possible that the events in Ukraine will predestine China’s success in opposing the United States.

China’s position on the Ukrainian crisis

The Chinese position on the Ukrainian crisis was expressed to the fullest in a telephone conversation between its Foreign Minister Wang Yi and a number of his European colleagues. In brief, it boils down to five points:

  1. China believes it is necessary to protect and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.
  2. China stands for common, sustainable, comprehensive security. The security of some countries cannot be enhanced at the expense of others by strengthening or expanding military blocs. Given the five waves of NATO expansion, Russia’s legitimate security demands must be taken seriously and properly responded to.
  3. China is closely monitoring the situation in Ukraine and what is happening there is not what it would like to see. The parties must exercise restraint, avoid escalation, and prevent a humanitarian crisis and the death of civilians.
  4. China supports any diplomatic efforts that could lead to a peaceful solution of the Ukrainian crisis. China welcomes direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian issue has a complex historical context. Ukraine should be a bridge between East and West, not a line of confrontation between great powers. China also supports EU-Russian dialogue on European security.
  5. The UN Security Council should play a constructive role in resolving the Ukrainian crisis and avoid actions that could exacerbate points of contention.

China has expressed its regret over the ongoing tragedy, and welcomes any negotiations leading to peace. This is the rhetoric traditionally heard from Beijing regarding conflicts and crises in which it is not involved. The Xi Jiping government has avoided condemning Russia, while leveling veiled criticism at the West for NATO expansion and its unwillingness to listen to Moscow’s security concerns.

Chinese officials are not calling Russia’s actions in Ukraine an ‘invasion’. Its state media does not publish materials that present Moscow and its president in a negative light. In the Chinese blogosphere, Vladimir Putin, as well as his actions and rhetoric connected with the Ukrainian operation, are met with wide approval by nationalist-minded people who draw parallels between this situation and China’s relationship with Taiwan.

Despite widespread speculation that Beijing, as Russia’s only remaining friendly major trading partner, could put pressure on Moscow to conclude a peace agreement as soon as possible, there is no indication that Beijing has even considered doing so.

China has taken a position of neutrality that is friendly to Russia concerning the conflict. Representatives of the country’s Foreign Ministry and the Chinese banking regulator have repeatedly stressed their intention to fully maintain relations with Russia despite the situation.

During the UN Security Council vote on the Ukrainian crisis China abstained, electing not to support the Russian veto. But it did the same during the Crimean crisis. In principle, China cannot recognize precedents that support changing the status of territories based on referendums (as happened in the Crimea, Lugansk and Donetsk Republics) since this will affect the Taiwan problem. It should also be noted that Russia does not recognize and does not support the Chinese position in its territorial dispute with India, or Chinese claims in the South China and East China Seas.

American statements about having ‘discussions’ with China about the situation surrounding Ukraine and even of China giving some consideration to Westent sanctions are divorced from reality. This is not the first time this situation has occurred. In 2014, President Barack Obama tried to convince the Chinese not to conclude an agreement with Russia on the construction of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, which was nonetheless signed in May of the same year.

Economic cooperation

As in the previous stages of the Ukrainian crisis, Chinese companies and banks operating on the world market should take into account the possible negative impact of US and EU sanctions. In this respect, they do not differ from the businesses of any other country. However, the Chinese typically exhibit an acute fear of falling under punitive American measures, which leads them to a wide interpretation of sanctions.

Therefore, regardless of the position of the Chinese government, sanctions have always had a certain negative impact on Russian-Chinese cooperation. In addition, the shock effect from the disruption of usual payment mechanisms, production chains, and logistics in the coming months will inevitably manifest itself. Businesses will have to find new ways of operating.

At the same time, the parties have so far carried out significant work to put a secure infrastructure in place to ensure bilateral trade, and such efforts have continued until very recently. In 2020, the share of the ruble in bilateral trade reached 7 percent, and the yuan – 17 percent. China is striving to internationalize its currency, and it can now be used for settlements between non-residents of the country.

Preparing for a tough conflict with the West, Russia has sharply increased the share of yuan in its gold and foreign exchange reserves. According to some estimates, the Bank of Russia has $140 billion worth of Chinese government bonds denominated in yuan alone. Indirectly, this may also indicate that the current volume of sanctions has been expected for a long time.

In addition, China’s CFETS trading system and the Moscow Exchange have been trading in the yuan-ruble currency pair since 2010. Thus, conditions exist for all trade between the two countries to be shifted to national currencies, mainly to the yuan, due to the volatility of the ruble.

In 2020 and 2021, China’s share of Russian trade was about 18 percent. Beijing is Moscow’s largest nation state trading partner, although the EU as a whole takes a bigger share. It was about 38 percent in 2020. Since 1999, the China’s share has been steadily rising, while the EU’s has been gradually falling since the second half of the 2000s.

If this trend were to continue, one would expect the levels of the China and the EU in Russian trade to be roughly equal in the early-mid 2030s. However, with the EU’s embargo of Russian imports, the process of reorienting to China may slightly accelerate, and China could become Russia’s main trading partner within the next two or three years. As a result, the trade between Russia and its main trading partner will be safe from external influences.

A sharp increase in Russian raw material exports to China may be constrained by lack of appropriate infrastructure, including the capacity of railways, pipelines, and port terminals. China exports mainly finished goods, which are less dependent on transport capacity.

Consequently, in the next free years, we should expect a sharp increase in Chinese exports to Russia with a more modest increase in Russian exports to China. There may be a significant imbalance in favor of Beijing in Russian-Chinese trade for some time.

In this context, the early accumulation of huge yuan reserves indicates that Russia’s authorities have been preparing for something resembling the current configuration of economic sanctions.

Beijing’s promotion to the role of the sole or main buyer of some types of Russian products and trade in exchange for yuan is likely to mean some price losses for Russian exporters. But, under the current difficult conditions, this can hardly be considered critical. With the development of new logistics, China may eventually replace the European market.

The importance of redirecting exports to China means development of the requisite infrastructure in the Far East will need to be accelerated. Given the importance of speed, it will probably have to be built with the involvement of Chinese investment and companies. Construction projects like this can give important impetus to development in the Russian regions.

The issue of expediting the conclusion of contracts for this construction will also arise, as well as the question of completing the Soyuz Vostok gas pipeline (a continuation of the Power of Siberia – 2), which taps into the same raw material base as the pipelines to Western Europe, ahead of schedule.

China may have significant interest in redirecting Russian raw material exports to itself while converting it to yuan, as this will not only give Beijing numerous political and strategic benefits, but also bring it huge economic gains. In particular, China’s protection from sanctions and embargo attempts will sharply increase, the cost of acquired resources will decrease, while the role of the yuan in world trade will dramatically rise (the internationalization of the yuan is an important goal for Chinese policy).

Russia’s earlier attempts to diversify its economic ties with Asia can be considered dead after the region’s three most developed economies (Japan, South Korea, and Singapore) supported anti-Russian sanctions to varying degrees, albeit under severe pressure from the United States.

China will inevitably become the dominant partner, and it is possible that, in the near future, its share in Russian trade will be comparable to the peak values of the EU’s share at one time (more than 50 percent).

A positive point for Russia is the growth in the number of Chinese companies that have fallen under various kinds of American sanctions which occupy strong positions in mechanical engineering, information and communication technologies, and the aerospace industry. This increase in pressure from US sanctions began in 2020, and there is reason to expect that this will only grow. Sanctioned Chinese companies will not need to fear the costs of working with Russia.

Chinese partners, including those under sanctions, are capable of occupying places in many important segments of the Russian market formerly held by European and American companies. This is, first of all, in the sale and production of cars, consumer electronics, and industrial equipment in Russia. In many areas, the Chinese are quite capable of replacing Western suppliers – sometimes with a moderate loss of quality, and sometimes without.

An important area where the Chinese cannot be useful to us as of yet, where they are experiencing problems similar to ours, is the aviation industry. China, like Russia, depends on imported equipment. As in Russia, its own civil aviation programs (ARJ21, C919) are dependent on Western components and vulnerable to sanctions pressure that is already being exerted. Strengthening cooperation in replacing Western civil aircraft is an urgent issue.

Prospects for political relations

In order to somehow curb economic dependence on China, Russia will have to use the few tools at its disposal to diversify foreign trade. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, while it is facing an economic blockade by the West, Russia will have no choice but to increasingly expand political and military cooperation with Beijing.

The importance for China of Russia’s resource, technological, economic, and military potential amidst confrontation with the United States will allow Russia to avoid sinking into a clearly subordinate position in this partnership. But China will set the tone, nonetheless.

The real political goal will be to preserve the ability to restore Russia’s ‘strategic autonomy’ with a possible weakening of the embargo in the long term.

Moscow has not been involved in many disputes between Asian powers, and its policy towards Asia has been independent from China’s, except for that of generally containing the influence of the United States. Now Russia will have to protect its ties with independent players, in particular with India and Vietnam, while sacrificing its relations with US allies in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily Japan and Australia, for the sake of strengthening its partnership with China.

The negative trend that has recently emerged in Russian-Japanese relations will sharply intensify. Events like the joint patrol of Russian and Chinese fleets around Japan that took place at the end of 2021 will continue. There may be a question of coordinating the two countries’ positions in territorial disputes with Tokyo (Chinese claims to the Diaoyu /Senkaku Islands and the problem of Russia’s southern Kuril Islands).

As it moves to more actively promote its global initiatives and concepts of world order (Community of Common Destiny, relations between great powers in a new era, the Belt and Road initiative), China may be interested in attracting proactive support from major countries, and it is likely to receive such backing from Russia. Actually, this was already manifested in a joint Russian-Chinese declaration following Vladimir Putin’s visit to China on February 4, 2022.

China probably can’t radically ease the shock of the first months or year of the embargo for Russia – everything will depend on Russian economic policy here. In the long term, Russia’s partnership with China, along with its own industrial policy, will become the basis of a new model for Russian economic development. And, in some respects, a healthier foundation than its previous partnership with the EU. China is less attractive to the elite as a place to extract capital and then permanently relocate, and it has a more rational and predictable system for economic decision-making. Finally, the Chinese economy will grow faster than Europe’s in the foreseeable future, as well as its market demand.

China will replace the EU as our main trading partner, and a gradual reversal of trade flows to the East may become a factor in the development of Siberia and the Far East, right down to the relocation of part of the population there from the European part of the country. The negative impact of Western sanctions on Russian-Chinese cooperation will gradually weaken as China itself is drawn into the sanctions confrontation with the West. Another important factor in this will be trading in yuan.

With a rational policy, Russia can come out of the Western embargo significantly strengthened, with more diversified foreign trade and better developed export infrastructure in the Far East, as well as more balanced foreign relations that are more resistant to sanctions.

The price for this will be the undermining of the policy Moscow had been pursuing for many years to diversify its ties with Asia. Russia will be forced to act in line with China’s Asian policy not only to contain the United States, but also to confront US allies led by Japan. The negative impact of its partnership with China on relations with India and Vietnam can be minimized as long as these countries remain independent players, not unduly beholden to the United States, and, thus, do not become priority targets for Chinese pressure.

The question of forming a military alliance with Beijing will most likely not arise in the near future. But hypothetically, it is still impossible to exclude the emergence of a formal Russian-Chinese military alliance, or situational military interaction in the event of military crises in the Pacific. Or, for example, appeals to article 9 of the Russian-Chinese Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation of 2001. This article stipulates that, in the case of a threat to one of the parties, urgent consultations are to be held to eliminate such a threat. This is quite a realistic prospect in the event of a crisis concerning Taiwan, when Beijing will be interested in Russia’s ‘nuclear umbrella’ to prevent American intervention.

quinta-feira, 17 de março de 2022

NATO is Not a Defensive Alliance

 MARCH 17, 2022

NATO is Not a Defensive Alliance

 
counter punch

NATO planes engaging in aerial bombardments during Operation Deliberate Force. Photograph Source: US Army – dodmedia.osd.mil – Public Domain

Reading US reports on the deadly Russian rocket attack on the so-called International Peacekeeping and Security Center in western Ukraine, one could be excused for thinking that the Russians might have been destroying some UN peacekeeping base.

In fact, the deceptively named target, as a few US news reports on the attack did note, is actually a joint NATO/Ukrainian military base near the border of NATO member Poland that has specifically long been where US and NATO military trainers have worked with Ukrainian troops, teaching them the finer points of handling the lethal equipment being supplied to them by the US and some NATO nations like France, Germany, Britain, and Turkey. (400 Florida National Guard troops were doing just that before being hustled back to Florida as Russia began threatening an invasion into Ukraine a few weeks ago.)

A day before the rocket attack, and just after the Biden administration announced the approval of another tranche of $200 million worth of weapons for Ukraine, Russia warned that any arms shipments coming into Ukraine would (of course!) be considered fair targets for attack. This warning was typically described by the jingoistic corporate-owned media in the US as increasing the risk of a wider war, though the actual supplying of more lethal weapons to Ukraine by the US and its NATO allies was not so labeled.

NATO meanwhile is typically described as a defensive treaty organization of countries that have a mutual assistance pact to come to each other’s aid with military force if any member is attacked.

But NATO is hardly a “defensive organization.”

Indeed, from its founding NATO has been an aggressive alliance designed to hem in the then Soviet Union, and to to threaten it with destruction by US nuclear weapons which were and still are stored in member countries, sometimes actually mounted on missiles and available for rapid loading onto US and NATO bombers parked on air bases all over Europe. That hemming-in process today, following decades of further expansion of NATO following the Soviet Union’s collapse, includes adding members located right up on the Russian border in countries like Poland, Estonia and Latvia (where US rockets and nuclear-capable planes are minutes away from critical Russian targets like army and air bases, as well as major navy ports.

NATO was founded in early April 1949 when the Soviet Union didn’t even have a single nuclear weapon and was not expected by US scientists and security people to get one for another 5-10 years. Yet the organization was also founded at a time that the US, which was working round the clock to industrialize production of its new, initially hand-made atomic bombs, had already assembled and stockpiled over 200 of these city-destroying weapons. That is a pretty awesome arsenal for a country that at that time had no rival in destructive capability.

Add to that reality the fact that the US was also already well on the way to producing a vastly more powerful hydrogen bomb (a project that Los Alamos scientists began almost immediately working on right after the August 1945 surrender of Japan). Significantly, in the late 1940s the Pentagon, on President Truman’s orders, had re-activated the assembly-line for producing B-29 bombers — the only plane at the time able to deliver its atomic weapons — while also developing more powerful heavy bombers like the B-36 and B-52. Why the rush? Because there were plans to launch a preemptive nuclear blitz on the Soviet Union. These plans, updated as the US arsenal of atom bombs expanded towards the 300-400 number that Pentagon strategists advised Truman would be needed to destroy the USSR as an industrial society. The succession of operational plans for that attack had such cringe-inducing names as Operation Sizzler, Scorch, Broiler, and Dropshot. (The only reason such a genocidal first-strike on the Soviet Union never happened in the early ’50s when the US stockpile finally reached that attack goal of over 300 bombs, was that on Aug. 29, 1949, the USSR successfully exploded its first atom bomb, shocking the US war department and leading to cancellation of any Washington plans for an early attack.)

Three years later, on Nov. 1, 1952, the US successfully exploded its first thermonuclear bomb, a weapon a thousand times more powerful than the atom bomb dropped on Nagasaki.

NATO’s creation has to be viewed in the historical context of America’s astonishing power at that time. Knowing it had the only atom bombs in the world, making it unopposable, the treaty with western European nations was clearly set up to allow the US to keep troops in Europe indefinitely and more important, to stockpile and prepare to launch nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union from locations a short distance from the Soviet capital and industrial heartland.

Any American political figure who claims NATO is or ever was a “defensive” alliance and: “not an offensive threat” to Russia is either ignorant or a liar. And calling the military base that was just hit with Russian missiles, killing 34 and injuring another 135 people, a “peacekeeping” center is as laughable as naming the incredibly deadly MX missile with its ten 300-kiloton independently targetable nuclear warheads, the “Peacekeeper,” as that professional huckster President Reagan did.

Dave Lindorff is a founding member of ThisCantBeHappening!, an online newspaper collective, and is a contributor to Hopeless: Barack Obama and the Politics of Illusion (AK Press).