Aristóteles - animal político bbb

Aristóteles - animal político bbb https://www.academia.edu/6310238/The_centrality_of_politeia_for_Aristotle_s_Politics_Aristotle_s_continuing_significance_for_social_and_political_science Bates 155 14 One could argue that the questions that are raised (implicitly and explicitly) not only at 6.8 but throughout Book 6 and even Books 4–5, point us to the kind of questioning that happened in Book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Regarding the version of the NE used, see Irwin (1985) and Grant (1885). 15 Regarding the nation, for Aristotle the nation (ethnos) is more the given people or tribe, some- thing that lacks viability as a political system. Aristotle does note that tribal rule often operates in earlier times via the rule of kings but suggests that, as peoples evolve and develop and form political communities, tribal (ethnos) rule and kingly rule become less and less present. Also the nation as a politically viable unit is something that would not arise for seventeen centuries after Aristotle and it has political viability only from the help of the modern concept of the state. The state is not something Aristotle spoke of. Nor is it something he creates, no matter how many translators of him and the classical Greek authors insist on translating ‘state’ for ‘polis’. The state is a product of modern political philosophy. It is understood to be a Machiavellian over- turning of the classical modes and order (see De Alvarez, 1989: xii–xvii, xxxii–xxxiii; Hexter, 1956: 113–138; Mansfield, 1983: 849–857; Strauss, 1962 [1936]: xv; also see De Alvarez, 1999; Manent, 1994b; Mansfield, 1989; Masters, 1989b; Strauss, 1989: 39–55, 1991). 16 Montesquieu’s and Tocqueville’s focus on despotism is rather interesting in light of the point I am making here. Perhaps there is more connection to Aristotle in these writers than is com- monly held, given their treatment of despotism is clearly seen to be opposing force to politics for those authors, echoing much of what is implicitly raised by Aristotle about the political dimensions of despotic rule in Politics 1 and 3. For an interesting comparison of Aristotle’s view with that of Tocqueville and Montesquieu see Mansfield (1989) and Manent (2006, 2007, 2010). References Agamben G (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life, tr. Heller-Roazen D. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Ambler W (1985) Aristotle’s understanding of the naturalness of the City. Review of Politics 47: 53–95. Arendt H (1958) The Human Condition. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Barker E (ed. & tr.) (1946) The Politics of Aristotle. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Bates Jr CA (2003) Aristotle’s Best Regime. Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press. Bennington G (2008) For better and for worse (there again . . .). Diacritics 38(1–2): 92–103. Bennington G (2009) Political animals. Diacritics 39(2): 21–35. De Alvarez LPS (tr.) (1989) Niccolo Machiavelli: The Prince. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. De Alvarez LPS (1999) Machiavelli’s Enterprise: A commentary on The Prince. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press. Derrida J (2009) The Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. I, tr. Bennington G. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Derrida J (2012) The Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. II, tr. Bennington G. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Dietz M (2012) Between polis and empire: Aristotle’s Politics. American Political Science Review 106(2): 275–293. Dreizhnter A (1970) Aristoteles’ Politica. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Everson S (ed.) (1996). Aristotle: The politics and the constitution of Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hardt M, Negri A (2000) Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 156 Social Science Information 53(1) Hexter JH (1956) Il Principe and lo stato. Studies in the Renaissance 4: 113–138. Hobbes T (1991 [1651]) Leviathan, ed. Tuck R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Irwin T (ed. & tr.) (1985) Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Keyt D (1987) Three fundamental theorems in Aristotle’s Politics. Phronesis 32(1): 54–79. Keyt D (ed. & tr.) (1999) Aristotle’s Politics, Books V and VI. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lord C (1984) Aristotle: The Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Manent P (1994b) The modern state. In: Lilla M (ed.) New French Thought: Political philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 123–133. Masters RD (1989a) Gradualism and discontinuous change in evolutionary theory and political philosophy. Journal of Social and Biological Structures 12: 281–301. Masters RD (1989b) The Nature of Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mulgan RG (1974) Aristotle’s doctrine that man is a political animal. Hermes 120: 438–445. Newman WL (ed.) (1973) The Politics of Aristotle. New York, NY: Arno Press. (4 vols) NewsyScience (2012) Prehistoric flutes date back 40,000 years. NewsyScience 294 videos, 26 May. Pocock JGA (1975) The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reeve CDC (1998) Aristotle: The Politics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Ross WD (1957) Aristotle’s Politica. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rousseau JJ (1964) The First and Second Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ed. and tr. Masters R, Masters J. New York, NY: St Martins Press. Saunders TJ (ed. & tr.) (1991) The Politics. New York, NY: Penguin. Simpson P (1997) The Politics of Aristotle –- Translation and Introduction. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Simpson P (1998) A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Strauss L (1962 [1936]) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its basis and its genesis, tr. Sinclair EM. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Todorov T (1981) Introduction to Poetics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Vergano D (2012) Prehistoric flutes date to 42,000 years ago. USA Today. Available at: http://con- tent.usatoday.com/communities/sciencefair/post/2012/05/prehistoric and: flutes-found-from- 42000-year-old cave/a> (accessed 24 May). Vlassopoulos K (2007) Unthinking the Greek Polis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Additional reading Almond G, Powell Jr GB, Dalton R, Strom K (2008) Comparative Politics Today: A world view. New York, NY: Pearson. (9th ed.) Arnhart L (1990) Aristotle, chimpanzees, and other political animals. Social Science Information 29(1): 479–559. Arnhart L (1994) The Darwinian biology of Aristotle’s political animals. American Journal of Political Science 38: 464–485. Arnhart L (1995) The new Darwinian naturalism in political theory. American Political Science Review 89: 289–400. Aristotle (1984) The Athenian Constitution, tr. and ed. Rhodes PJ. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Bartlett R (1994a) Aristotle’s science of the best regime. American Political Science Review 88(1): 143–155. Bartlett R (1994b) The realism of classical political science. American Journal of Political Science 38(2): 381–402. Bluhm W (1962) The place of ‘polity’ in Aristotle’s theory of the ideal state. The Journal of Politics 24(4): 743–753. Bates 157 Blythe JM (1992) Ideal Government and The Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bookman JT (1992) The wisdom of the many: An analysis of the arguments of Book III and IV of Aristotle’s Politics. History of Political Thought 13(1): 1–12. Cherry KM (2009) The problem of polity: Political participation and Aristotle’s best politeia. Journal of Politics 71(4): 1406–1421. Coby P (1986) Aristotle’s four concepts of politics. Western Political Science Quarterly 39(3): 480–503. Coby P (1988) Aristotle’s Three Cities and the problem of factions. Journal of Politics 50(4): 896–919. Dahl R (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Dahl R (1964) Modern Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Davis M (1996) The Politics of Philosophy: A commentary on Aristotle’s Politics. Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. De Tocqueville A (2000) Democracy in America, tr. Mansfield Jr HC, Winthrop D. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Diamond M (1981) The Founding of the Democratic Republic. Itasca, IL: FE Peacock. During I (1966) Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens [Aristotle: Presentation and Interpretation of his Thought]. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter. Easton D (1953) The Political System: An inquiry into the state of political science. New York, NY: Knopf. Eubin JP (1993) Democracy ancient and modern. PS: Political Science and Politics 26(3): 478– 481. Ewbank MB (2005) Politeia as focal reference in Aristotle’s taxonomy of regimes. Review of Metaphysics 53(3): 815–841. Farrar C (1988) The Origins of Democratic Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Finer SE (1997) The History of Government from the Earliest Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (3 vols) Finley MI (1985) Democracy Ancient and Modern. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. (revised ed.) Fukuyama F (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York, NY: The Free Press. Fukuyama F (2011) The Origins of Political Order. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Grant A (1885) The Ethics of Aristotle. London: Longman, Green and Co. (4th ed. revised; 2 vols) Hansen MH (1993). Aristotle’s alternative to the sixfold model of constitutions. Aristote et Ate’nes = Aristotle and Athens. Fribourg (Switzerland): Séminaire d’histore ancienne, 93–101. Hansen MH (1994) Polis, Politeuma and Politeia: A Note on Arist. Pol. 1278b6–14. In: Whitehead D (ed.) From Political Architecture to Stephanus Byzantius: Sources for the ancient Greek polis. Stuttgart: F Steiner, 91–98. Huntington S (1981) American Politics: The promise of disharmony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Huntington S (2006 [1968]) Political Order and Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Jaffa HV (1975) What is politics? An interpretation of Aristotle’s Politics: The Conditions of Freedom. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 9–72. Johnson C (1988) Aristotle’s polity: Mixed or middle constitution? History of Political Thought 9(2): 189–204. Kant I (1991) Kant: Political writings, ed. Reiss H. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kantorowicz E (1957) The King’s Two Bodies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keyt D, Miller F (eds) (1991) A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 158 Social Science Information 53(1) Kraut D (ed. & tr.) (1997) Aristotle: Politics, Books VI and VII. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kraut D (2002) Aristotle: Political philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kullman W (1980) Der Mensch als politisches Lebewesen bei Aristoteles [Man as a political ani- mal in Aristotle]. Hermes 108(3): 456–477. Lindsay TK (1992a) Aristotle’s qualified defence of democracy through ‘political mixing’. Journal of Politics 54(1): 101–119. Lindsay TK (1992b) Liberty, equality, power: Aristotle’s critique of the democratic ‘presupposi- tion’. American Journal of Political Science 36(3): 743–761. Lockyer A (1988) Aristotle: The Politics. In: Forsyth M, Keens-Soper M (eds) A Guide to the Political Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lord C (1987) Aristotle. In: Strauss L, Cropsey J (eds) History of Political Philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 118–154. (3rd ed.) Lord C, O’Connor D (eds) (1991) Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lowenthal A, Jaquette J (2009) Samuel P. Huntington 1927–2008. New Perspectives Quarterly 26(2): 64–83. Manent P (1994a) An Intellectual History of Liberalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Manent P (1994c) The contest for command. In: Lilla M (ed.) New French Thought: Political philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 178–185. Manent P (1995) Christianity and democracy, tr. Mahoney D, Seaton P. Crisis, Part I (January): 40–44; Part II (February): 42–48. Manent P (2006) A World Beyond Politics: A defense of the nation-state. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Manent P (2007) Democracy Without Nations? The fate of self-government in Europe. Wilmington DE: ISI Press. Manent P (2010) Les Métamorphoses de la cité. Paris: Flammarion. Mansfield Jr HC (1983) On the impersonality of the modern state: A comment on Machiavelli’s use of Stato. American Political Science Review 77(4): 849–857. Mansfield Jr HC (1989) Taming the Prince. New York, NY: The Free Press. Mansfield Jr HC (1995) Self-interest rightly understood. Political Theory 21(1): 48–66. Meier C (1990) The Greek Discovery of Politics, tr. McLintocks D. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mulgan RG (1977) Aristotle’s Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mulgan RG (1991) Aristotle’s analysis of oligarchy and democracy. In: Keyt D, Miller F (eds) A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Oxford: Blackwell, 279–306. Nagel B (2006) The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Nichols MP (1991) Citizens and Statesmen. Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Pascal M, Gruengard O (1989) Knowledge and Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Patzig HVG (ed.) (1989) IX Symposium Aristitelicum: Studien zur Politik des Aristoteles. Gottingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht. Rasmussen D, Den Uyl D (1991) Liberty and Order: An Aristotelian defence of liberal order. LaSalle, IL: Open Court. Robinson R (ed. & tr.) (1962) Aristotle’s Politics, Books III and IV. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rousseau JJ (1978) On the Social Contract, ed. and tr. Masters R, Masters J. New York, NY: St Martins Press. Rubinstein N (1987) The history of the word politicus in early modern Europe. In: Pagden A (ed.) The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sachs J (ed. & tr.) (2012) Aristotle The Politics. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing. Saunders TJ (ed. & tr.) (1995) Aristotle Politics, Books I and II. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Saxonhouse A (1992) The Fear of Diversity. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Schmitt C (1976) The Concept of the Political, tr. Schwab G. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Merleau-Ponty e a obra de arte", por Marilena Chaui bbb

Merleau-Ponty e a obra de arte", por Marilena Chaui" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73E9CwycVq8

Meditações metafísicas Descartes

Meditações metafísicas Descartes https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/7888155/course/section/6531687/DESCARTES%2C%20R.%20Meditac%CC%A7o%CC%83es%20%281%C2%AA%20e%202%C2%AA%29.pdf

FEnomenologia da percepção´bbb

EXPLICANDO A FENOMENOLOGIA DA PERCEPÇÃO DE MERLEAU-PONTY | Paulo Niccoli Ramirez https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlnoXBcqy3U https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZs-4fLUJ9c FRanklin Leopoldo

Aristóteles Metafisica diego fusaro bbb

Aristóteles Metafisica diego fusaro https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t49DvA5h2fg

Aristoteles comunidade bbb

Aristoteles comunidade bbb https://www.academia.edu/9635522/The_Distinction_between_the_Economy_and_Politics_in_Aristotles_Thought_and_the_Rise_of_the_Social?email_work_card=thumbnail Introduction At the outset of the Politics and of the Nicomachean Ethics, 2 Aristotle declares that both texts are composedwith the aim of establishing that the polis is the com-munity in which man, as a communal creature ( zoonkoinonikon ), 3 may live happily. Aristotle not only de-clares that the polis is the “most supreme” of all com-munities because it is the community in which man,qua communal creature, may pursue the best mode of life, a pursuit which is “the aim of politics”; in thesecond book of the Politics he also argues zealouslyagainst Plato’s call to eradicate the distinction betweenthecommunitiesofthe polis andthe oikos bysharingallpossessions among citizens of the polis , as if it were agigantic oikos. How does Aristotle convince us that thisdistinction must be preserved, and that, moreover, the polis ,andnotthe oikos ,isthecommunitythatfacilitatesthe good life?A satisfactory theoretical answer to these questionscannotbefoundintheliteraturethatstudiestheconductof the ancient oikos, 4 as compared with that of the polis .The oikos / polis literaturemakesfrequentuseofHannahArendt’s reading of Aristotle as a reference point. In herwork, 5 Arendt relies on Aristotle’s distinction betweenthe economic community that, as he defines it, comesabout in the course of nature for everyday purposes,” 6 and the political community that, although it “comesinto existence for the sake of life,” exists “for the goodlife,” 7 namely the kind of life that enables citizens to“pursue the best mode of life.” 8 Arendt’s description of the economy, that is, the conduct of the oikos , 9 has beencriticized, however. Even though most scholars accepther description of the oikos as the sphere for managingthenecessitiesoflife,aspherethatwasmeanttosustainthe polis , they present a much more complicated, lesspolarized relation between the oikos and the polis . Inaddition, contemporary literature persuasively presentsthe oikos as a diversified domain in which there existallkindsofhumanrelationsbesidesdespoticones.Theystress the friendship between husband and wife, it be-ing for the sake of happiness and not just as a meansto support the polis , the role of education of childrenwithin the household, the different kinds of slaves, theuse of other means of government beside violence,and the household’s existence in and for itself. In this depiction, not only the master, but many participants inthe household can demonstrate virtue, doing so withinits bounds. It ought to be stressed that what Aristotleand his contemporaries called the economy (oikono-mia), the management (nemein) of the oikos , must notbe mistaken with what we, moderns, call the economy— that is, market relations. Moreover, Aristotle himself regarded market transactions — “the other form of theart of supply ( χρηµατιστικ ῆ ς )” 10 — as standing instark contrast to economics. Another crucial distinctionbetween ancient and modern economics has to do withethics. While modern economics “involves inter alia afirm rejection of the “ethics-related” view,” 11 the an-cient Greeks held that the “economy is intelligible onlyas an ethical domain.” 12 Furthermore, the reason whyAristotle made sure to distinguish between the econ-omy and the market is ethical. As discussed in somedetails in Part 2.3.2, he held that the market arousesthe vice of wantonness — the negation of the economicvirtue of soundness of mind — and as such underminesthe ability to live a happy communal life in both oikos and polis . 13 But while contemporary scholars 14 have providedus with vivid portraits of the oikos as a self-sufficientsphereinwhichmanyofitsmemberscoulddemonstratevirtue and live a relatively happy life, 15 they have notdiscussed in purely theoretical terms their claim that theeconomiccommunitywasindeedhappy,self-sufficient,governed by perfect virtue and manifesting human mul-tiplicity.Moreover,theyhavenotsufficientlyaccountedforthereasonsthatmakethe polis supremeinallhumancommunities. The more complex picture drawn by con-temporaryliteraturerepeatedlyappearsinthecontextof examining each of Aristotle’s three criteria for uphold-ing the distinction between the oikos and the polis : 16 the community’s self-sufficiency and completeness; themultiplicity that appears in it; and its conformity withvirtue.ButasIargueinthisarticle,thoughtheeconomyappears at times to withstand the test of these criteria,emerging as no less self-sufficient than the polis , asexhibiting a greater level of multiplicity and as gov-erned by a perfect virtue equal in rank to the virtuedemonstrated in politics, the supremacy of the politi-cal community over the economic is nonetheless wellestablished by Aristotle. Constellations Volume 00, No 0, 2014. C  2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2 Constellations Volume 00, Number 0, 2014 2. The Three Criteria for a HappyCommunal Life The correspondence between happiness and acting vir-tuously is put forward by Aristotle in his discussionof the nature of happiness, where he argues that “hap-piness is a certain activity of soul in conformity withperfect virtue.” 17 Aristotle adds two further criteria forthe appearance of the happy life in politics: “If, there-fore, the more self-sufficing a community is, the moredesirable is its condition, then a lesser degree of unityis more desirable than a greater.” 18 Thus, according toAristotle, in order to decide which of all human com-munities is the one in which humans can indeed livehappily, one must examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2.1 Self-Sufficiency and Completeness The first criterion for calling a life happy is that it isself-sufficient: Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is itschief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good; 20 [. . .] In speaking of degrees of completeness, we meanthatathing pursued asan end initself is morecompletethan one pursued as a means to something else, andthat a thing never chosen as a means to anything elseis more complete than things chosen both as ends inthemselves and as means to that thing; and accordinglyathingchosenalwaysasanendandneverasameanswecall absolutely complete. Now happiness above all elseappearstobeabsolutelycompleteinthissensewhereasthe Supreme Good seems to be something complete[. . .] The same conclusion also appears to follow froma consideration of the self-sufficiency of happiness —for it is felt that the complete good must be a thingsufficient in itself.[. . .] we take a self-sufficient thingto mean a thing which merely standing by itself alonerenders life desirable lacking in nothing, and such athing we deem happiness to be. 21 The level of self-sufficiency and the completenessattached to it positions all things on the Aristotelianscale of the good life, at whose head stands happiness.Its status at the top of the ladder as the “end all actionsaim at” is justified by its being self-sufficien st examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2 Constellations Volume 00, Number 0, 2014 2. The Three Criteria for a HappyCommunal Life The correspondence between happiness and acting vir-tuously is put forward by Aristotle in his discussionof the nature of happiness, where he argues that “hap-piness is a certain activity of soul in conformity withperfect virtue.” 17 Aristotle adds two further criteria forthe appearance of the happy life in politics: “If, there-fore, the more self-sufficing a community is, the moredesirable is its condition, then a lesser degree of unityis more desirable than a greater.” 18 Thus, according toAristotle, in order to decide which of all human com-munities is the one in which humans can indeed livehappily, one must examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2.1 Self-Sufficiency and Completeness The first criterion for calling a life happy is that it isself-sufficient: Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is itschief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good; 2

animal racional historia de uma dfinição bbb

animal racional historia de uma definición https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/3611/361133110012.pdf Una de las cuestiones más discutidas en la historia del pensamiento es la que se refiere a la definición del ser humano. Ya en la antigüedad se buscó aquello que lo distingue del resto de seres y se estableció, de acuerdo con Platón y Aristóteles, que era la razón el elemento diferenciador, con lo cual se inició una larga e influyente tradición filosófica, que también ha sido muy criticada por algunos pensadores modernos y contemporáneos.

Cenas de um casamento 4 a 6

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yC8xAUaDEv8

Aristoteles vida e obra bbb

Aristotle and the History of Political Ideas: Citizenship https://www.academia.edu/79403727/Aristotle_and_the_History_of_Political_Ideas_Citizenship?email_work_card=thumbnail Introduction Contemporary political philosophies, which are sometimes referred to with the expressionMarx used for false justifications , “ideologies”, are social or political theories . Political parties andsocial movements have their own ideology, that is to say, their “vision of the world . ” Contemporary political science aims at making a neutral analysis of political reality, or a theory . Regimes,constitutions, political parties, elections are observed impartially, “from the point of view of Mars , ” as the French saying goes. It is fundamentally theoretical research. For this purpose, current politicalscience sometimes coins new expressions (for example, a democracy can be either consensus ormajoritarian; dominant values can be materialistic or “expressive , ” etc.). Aristotle ’ s “ political science ” is different from ours, first of all, because it sees politics ascitizens or rulers facing concrete issues. His view is not essentially different from the commonsense view: it goes further, but in the same direction. It does not observe “political phenomen a ” from outside. There are no new technical words in his political books alien to the practical knowledge ofGreek citizens, nor does he use “scientific” terminology (and even less inferences from a “theory”). His description of ethics and politics is certainly not intended to be neutral and begins precisely bystudying what “ good ” means. In fact, politics has only recently become a theoretical science, movingradically away from the Aristotelian methods and perspective. We borrow from his vocabulary, but,as modern men, we try to make it precise and scientific.One of the keywords we borrow is the concept of citizenship. We no longer live in self-governing cities, but the concept “civic” and the very word “politics” derive from civitas and polis .In translations of the works of Plato and Aristotle, polis is sometimes incorrectly translated as “ S tate” (or at best, as “city - state”), but the difference between polis and State is very profound. The ancientcity is different from the modern State because Greek politics did not consist, as it does today, inmanaging a population within a certain territory. The Greek “regime” is not opposed to “c ivilsociety ,” as distinct from political organization. The ancient city is not spontaneously born out ofanarchy, like the modern state. The city must be founded by men and ordered by legislators. The political authority of the ancient city, sometimes compared to a ship, does not seek to organize a sortof cruise, where passengers live their own private lives while everyone is taken along by the cruise. Neither is the ancient political authority a “sovereign” who manages everythin g that exists in aterritory, like a guard who manages a forest park; the sovereign rules men and distributes offices.In the polis , the free part of the population is called to participate actively in a special “institution” that is the city, with a view to the excellence and goodness of its members. Ethicalinquiry aims at attaining nobility or good, and political inquiry aims at the good of all members of the city. None of these inquiries are “neutral” becau se neutrality would obscure the main object ofthe noble life and the place where virtue or excellence ( arété ) flourishes. “ Natural justice” is not about the right of man as man, but part of political right. What is just by nature is only understood and can only flourish in the environment of the polis . This thesis isdiametrically opposed to the later theses of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, for whom the formation ofcivil society implies moving away from the state of nature and is, therefore, unnatural.Only with Stoicism and Christianity did the good of man come to be understood as, if notalien or indifferent, much more important than, and “separable” from , political life, makingcitizenship infinitely less important. This is why today we think that a “merely” political question is somewhat less serious and profound than a moral one. Life and Works Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in the small town of Stagira, in the Macedonia region, in thenortheast of Greece. His father was the personal physician to the King of Macedonia, Amyntas, Alexander the Great's grandfather, and came from a line of famous “physicists” or medical doctors. On the death of his father, his tutor sent him at the age of seventeen to study in Athens, perhaps first at Isocrates’ rhetorical school and then at Plato’s Academy. Plato was then almost 60 years old. Aristotle remained in the Academia until Plato ’ s death in 347, but curiously there are no textual references in either Plato’s or Aristotle's writings to personal contact between the two. Plato introduces a young Aristotle who discusses the theory of ideas in the Parmenides , 1 and Aristotle doesnot hide his differences versus Plato — if the unnamed person who is described as a friend of ideasI isPlato; Aristotle just claims to be his friend, but to be a greater friend of the truth. Hellenistic and Arab biographers nonetheless collected many stories of Aristotle’s life at theAcademy. It is said, for example, that he was the only one who remained to the end in Plato’s lectures (on the Timaeus ), that Plato never began his lectures befo re Aristotle’s arriving, that he read to exhaustion with a stone in his hand that would fall with a noise to awaken him, and that he was nicknamed “the reader.” It is still an open question whether Aristotle was fundamentally an heir oran opponent of Plato. On his master’s death, Aristotle departed for Assos , on the northwest coast of Asia Minor.There he collected many examples of the marine fauna that he would use in his work On the Parts of Animals , where he presents detailed descriptions, revealing curiosity “even for the most repellent” living beings. He lived for three years in the royal court of the tyrant Hermias, where he met his future wife, the ruler’s adopted daughter. On Hermias’ death, he dedicated to him a hymn to excellence 2 that survives complete. He left Hermias’ court, joining Theophrast , another student at the Academia. In 343, at the request of Philip of Macedonia, he joined the king’s court with the mission of educating his then -13-year-old sonAlexander, 3 on whose relationship with Aristotle much has been speculated. The young Alexanderthe Great, however, becomes a military commander of the at age 15, and a year later temporarilyreplaced his father as regent; thus, it is uncertain what Aristotle’s role as his tutor really was. 3 Whatever the case, Aristotle only returned to Athens in 335, after 13 years of absence; he began teaching in a gymnasium area dedicated to Apollo, known as the Lyceum, which Socrates hadfrequented long before. In this gymnasium 4 Aristotle taught a wide variety of subjects: botany, biology, logic, music, astronomy, medicine, cosmology, physics, rhetorical ethics, politics and poetics. According to Aulus Gaelius, some subjects were taught in classes open to all (his exotericteachings), while other subjects such as the natural sciences and metaphysics were taught to a morerestricted group ( achroatic ). According to Strabo, he assembled the first known library. After his wife’s death, he had a son by his former slave, named Nicomachus, after Aristotle’sfather. In the face of the sudden death of Alexander and the ensuing “revolution” in Athens, and toavoid an accusation of impiety ( asebeia ), he decided to retire to an island near the Attic coast,Eubeia, where he died of natural causes in 322, just a year after leaving Athens. 5 When writing his treatise on politics, Aristotle thus had an unusually wide direct experienceof public life. He lived in the royal court of Macedonia and at the court of a benevolent tyrant in Asia Minor; and, as a “metic” (or resident foreigner), he also lived for over thirty years in democratic Athens, where he witnessed two critical moments of the city ’s history: first, its recovery at the end ofthe Peloponnese War — years of heated debate over the Pan-Hellenic ideal — and second, its end as anindependent city, falling under the protectorate of King Antipater of Macedonia. Except for fragments of some dialogues quoted by Hellenistic authors, and the Protrepticus , ahymn to wisdom which was eventually fully reconstructed, all Aristotle’s surviving works appear to be “ lecture notes, ” with signs of internal reviews and passages inserted at various times. Theorganization of the texts into the “books” we now possess may be the work of a later editor. What isclear is that the list of Aristotle’s extant works does not match any of the Hellenistic lists. Cicero’s testimony suggests that he wrote works of great literary beauty that have probably not come down to us. Aristotle’s treatises nonetheless have a certain charm, for we seem to hear him “thinking aloud,” with sudden steps forward and flashbacks, ellipses and asides. The “sciences” ( epistêmê ) or branches of knowledge, according to Aristotle, are all eithertheoretical, practical or “productive . ” These great classes of research presuppose, however, a preparatory study, that of logic. The most important of Aris totle’s logical works are in the Organon ,containing the Categories , On Interpretation , Prior Analytics , Posterior Analytics , Topics , and OnSophistic Refutation. The branches of philosophy beyond these preparatory studies are defined by their ends:contemplative sciences aim at knowledge for its own sake; practical sciences at acting well; and productive knowledge at making useful or beautiful objects.The word epistêmê means any kind of knowledge, but in the strict sense it designates onlytheoretical knowledge about the world, animals, man, and what is beyond the universe (or cosmos).The sciences or branches of theoretical philosophy are three: physics (which includes all natural sciences), mathematics, and “first philosophy. Aristotle’s works on the theoretical sciences include Physics , On Generation and Corruption , On the Heavens , Metaphysics , De Anima , the Parva Naturalia (short treatises on nature), History of Animals , On the Parts of Animals , Movement of Animals , Meteorology , The Development of Animals and Generation of Animals . The extant works on the practical sciences are the Nicomachean Ethics ,the Eudemian Ethics , the Magna Moralia , Politics , and the Constitution of Athens . On the non- philosophical, merely productive sciences, his only surviving treatises are on Rhetoric and Poetics ,the latter not in full.Of the nearly two hundred titles mentioned in the Hellenistic catalogs, we have only about thirty of his books, although it is unclear how titles in both lists relate. Aristotle on Politics and Ethics Our English word politics derives from the Greek politikos , “relating to the polis .” Aristotle’s treatise is titled Politikê after p olitikê epistêmê , political knowledge (also translated as politicalscience). It is not only his most important practical political treatise, but it is often considered to be the oldest known wok of political “science” 7 – a work that still defines the subject and the themes of modern political science. (Plato’s Republic and the Laws are earlier, but they are dialogues, that is,something between dramas and formal treatises.) Aristotle’s science, however, is , as we said before, very different from ours, in the first place because he views politics as a citizen or as a statesman, not as a detached observer. His view is notessentially different from the commonsense view: it goes further, albeit in the same direction. Hedoes not contemplate the “political phenomenon” from some external vantage point, or fromnowhere.Today we often use the same concepts expressed by Aristotle (or Plato before him), butwithout the present intention of establishing a scientific terminology, so our use of terms such as “regime,” revolution, civic and citizenship, is in a sense derivative. Further we add our own specificterminology: terms such as “consociationalism” or “polyarchy.” By contrast, in Aristotle’s Politics there is not a single technical word that does not form part of the practical knowledge of the Greekcitizens.Politics, in fact, only recently became a theoretical science, while for Aristotle it waseminently practical knowledge, dispensing with some of the accuracy of the speculative sciences.Politics as a practical science is concerned with the happiness and excellence of the citizens. In the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle explains that all the arts and all forms of inquiry aimat some good. But there is a great variety of goods or ends, to which the many arts and manysciences roughly correspond (e.g., medicine has as its end health, and shipbuilding aims at an endwhich is the boat). Some ends are desired in pursuit of others, and so there are some arts that are “architectural.” One of these is politics because it governs the other practical sciences, and the ends of the latter aremeans to its end which is human good Returning to the problem of the nature of political inquiry at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics , 9 Aristotle states that just as medical treatises are useful only to experienced doctors, socollections of laws and studies of regimes are only useful to those who have the ability to make agood judgment. Before him, he says, thinkers have left the subject of legislation and regime( polytheia ) under-explored, but the subject needs to be addressed so that the philosophy of human things is complete (this is quite a statement considering that his master, Plato, wrote a lengthy booktitled Politeia ).Aristotle sets out the aims of his study of public life: (1) to review the valuable contributionsmade by his predecessors; (2) to determine, in the light of the descriptions of the regimes ( polytheies ) previously surveyed, the factors that preserve and destroy each kind of regime and the reasons whysome cities are well governed and others are not; (3) finally, to decide which is the best regime andwhat laws and means should be employed to establish such a regime. 10 In short, politics is an architectural art, which he calls the philosophy of human things. Thefirst part of his politics is presented in his ethical writings, and the second in the treatise on politics. Aristotle’s political “science” therefore includes the two domains that modern philosophers call moral philosophy and political philosophy, but the umbrella under which he gathers both is notethics, as in medieval philosophy, or (universal) mora lity as in Kant. Instead, Aristotle’s ethical inquiry is deeply political, or related to regimes. The Books in Politics The work on political regimes that has come down to us seems less like a complete treatisethan a collection of essays or lectures on various subjects, which could have been compiled by a latereditor rather than Aristotle himself. Politics consists of eight books whose themes are roughly asfollows 5 things is complete (this is quite a statement considering that his master, Plato, wrote a lengthy booktitled Politeia ).Aristotle sets out the aims of his study of public life: (1) to review the valuable contributionsmade by his predecessors; (2) to determine, in the light of the descriptions of the regimes ( polytheies ) previously surveyed, the factors that preserve and destroy each kind of regime and the reasons whysome cities are well governed and others are not; (3) finally, to decide which is the best regime andwhat laws and means should be employed to establish such a regime. 10 In short, politics is an architectural art, which he calls the philosophy of human things. Thefirst part of his politics is presented in his ethical writings, and the second in the treatise on politics. Aristotle’s political “science” therefore includes the two domains that modern philosophers call moral philosophy and political philosophy, but the umbrella under which he gathers both is notethics, as in medieval philosophy, or (universal) mora lity as in Kant. Instead, Aristotle’s ethical inquiry is deeply political, or related to regimes.The Books in Politics The work on political regimes that has come down to us seems less like a complete treatisethan a collection of essays or lectures on various subjects, which could have been compiled by a latereditor rather than Aristotle himself. Politics consists of eight books whose themes are roughly asfollows:I. Nature of the city ( polis ) and the house ( oikos ).II. Study of Aristotle ’s predecessors’ contributions to the study of the best regimes ( polytheies ).III. Citizenship and regimes.IV. Inferior or defective regimes.V. Preservation and destruction of regimes.VI. Discussion of democracy and oligarchy.VII – VIII. Outline of the best regime (unfinished). This structure roughly corresponds to the program of regimes with which the Nicomachean Ethics ends. Scholars have raised several problems about the organization of the work. The firstquestion concerns the ordering of its eight books. Some authors argue that the debate on the bestconstitution (Books VII – VIII) should immediately follow Book III, which has a passage thatestablishes this connection. Indeed, the examination of cross-references has shown that books IV – V – VI form one series, just as books VII – VIII form another; and each series seems to “ignore” the other, 11 as if they constituted independent treatises. These two series could perhaps represent strata in the composition of the full book, with a more, so to say, “utopian” or idealistic focus and a more“empirical” focus, respectively. 10 E.N. 1181b15 – 22. 11 Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960). 6 A second disputed point, therefore, is the order of composition of these books, assuming that the order could reflect the evolution of Aristotle’s thought, in line with a progressive distancing from Plato’s teaching. 12 Is the polis natural? Although translations often do so, Aristotle never uses the word State, always referring to the polis or city. The city is a type of association that, like all associations, is formed for the sake ofsome kind of good, but the city is the most important as it is directed towards the mostcomprehensive end. Aristotle engages in controversy with those (unnamed, but many take this as a reference to Plato’s Statesman ) who claim that there is no essential difference between authority inthe polis and in other communities, in particular the “household”— a view Aristotle firmly rejects.According to Aristotle, the most basic society is the association between male and female,which is necessary for procreation and so involves children. The second most basic association isthat which exists between master and slave, which aims at survival, for there are strong-bodied people who are unable to look after themselves, and others who do not have the same physicalstrength but are endowed with self-mastery. These two associations are the origin of the “household.” Its development or natural growth gives rise to the village, which is able to satisfy many other needs that the household cannot, but there are many needs that neither the village or tribecan meet, and which require the association of many villages in a polis , the most perfect andcomplete association. The polis is the most comprehensive association since it aims at the “good life” rather than life as such or mere survival. Men come together out of necessity, but when they associate, theydiscover that the city can do more than protect life. The polis is the pinnacle of all associations thatexist by nature. As the family is natural, so the polis , which is the most self-sufficient although itseems conventional, is on the contrary in line with nature as it completes the end to which otherassociations tend (the telos or end of something is its perfection). 14 As a colt is not a horse in the fullsense and children, women or slaves (according to Aristotle) are not complete human beings, thevillage is not a complete association. The polis is defined by its self- sufficiency or “autarchy,” which implies the ability to foster happiness or to satisfy all natural human desires according to their orderof importance, including the life of the body and the life of the soul. 6 A second disputed point, therefore, is the order of composition of these books, assuming that the order could reflect the evolution of Aristotle’s thought, in line with a progressive distancing from Plato’s teaching. 12 Is the polis natural? Although translations often do so, Aristotle never uses the word State, always referring to the polis or city. The city is a type of association that, like all associations, is formed for the sake ofsome kind of good, but the city is the most important as it is directed towards the mostcomprehensive end. Aristotle engages in controversy with those (unnamed, but many take this as a reference to Plato’s Statesman ) who claim that there is no essential difference between authority inthe polis and in other communities, in particular the “household”— a view Aristotle firmly rejects.According to Aristotle, the most basic society is the association between male and female,which is necessary for procreation and so involves children. The second most basic association isthat which exists between master and slave, which aims at survival, for there are strong-bodied people who are unable to look after themselves, and others who do not have the same physicalstrength but are endowed with self-mastery. These two associations are the origin of the “household.” Its development or natural growth gives rise to the village, which is able to satisfy many other needs that the household cannot, but there are many needs that neither the village or tribecan meet, and which require the association of many villages in a polis , the most perfect andcomplete association. 13 The polis is the most comprehensive association since it aims at the “good life” rather than life as such or mere survival. Men come together out of necessity, but when they associate, theydiscover that the city can do more than protect life. The polis is the pinnacle of all associations thatexist by nature. As the family is natural, so the polis , which is the most self-sufficient although itseems conventional, is on the contrary in line with nature as it completes the end to which otherassociations tend (the telos or end of something is its perfection). 14 As a colt is not a horse in the fullsense and children, women or slaves (according to Aristotle) are not complete human beings, thevillage is not a complete association. The polis is defined by its self- sufficiency or “autarchy,” which implies the ability to foster happiness or to satisfy all natural human desires according to their orderof importance, including the life of the body and the life of the soul.The main alternatives to this conception — which some scholars today classify as “naturalistic” 15 —are two. The first states that the city is a mere human artifact, a pure “convention” (this view existed before Aristotle, and he intends to contest it). Another venerable alternative that healso excludes is that the city is something sacred (like Homer ’s “Sacred Trojan” created by the gods). The polis , in fact, was for the Greeks not only a mode of organization of authority but a mode oforganization of religious worship as well, for what we may (anachronistically) call the distinction between “C hurch and State ” was alien to the Greeks. Aristotle not only denies the merely “conventional” nature of the polis, but also denies that the city is sacred. He makes a historical argument: at first men were ruled by kings, and so we imagine divine rule as royalty, but this is nomore than an illusion — the God of Aristotle is very different from Zeus. If the city is natural, man is by nature an animal of the city or a “political animal.” The proof of a natural human propensity to live in cities is that reason or discourse ( logos ) is peculiar to man.Human beings are political animals by nature because nature, which does nothing in vain, endowsthem with speech, allowing them to communicate ethical concepts, such as justice, that areindispensable to — and presume — the household and the polis . 16 Other animals communicate, butunlike man they cannot convey praise and blame. There is no contradiction between city and nature;on the contrary, men fulfill their nature in the city. 17 Justice is the excellence pertaining to the polis since justice is the proper ordering of political association. This is diametrically opposed to the latertheses of Hobbes and Locke: for Aristotle there can be no right or justice prior to the city. After this introduction, Aristotle turns to parts of the city, which are associations, notindividuals. The polis is primary “in the order of nature” because the whole is prior to the part, as the body is primary in relation to a separate arm, which o nly ambiguously holds the name of “arm” when it loses its function. 18 Individual men as components of the city reappear only in book III of the Politics . But Aristotle explains the limitations of his metaphor: those who do not live in the polis aresometimes infrahuman, sometimes more than human (perhaps this happens accidentally, perhaps because they unfortunately live in tribes or empires). The city embraces a number of subordinate societies, such as the deme or tribe and the “household” or family, which include children and slaves, but the city takes precedence over theseelementary societies, not just because it is prior or larger, but because it fosters the most importantgood: happiness. The greatest good of the Greek city cannot be completely separated from the greatest good for its citizens, which is the noble life and a “humanistic” or “musical” education for those who are not tied by manual labor. In his series of ethical books, Aristotle deals with household management, but speaks aboveall of the most controversial relationship in his time, that is the relationship between master and slave(occupying much of Book I), and secondarily about the confusion between household management(or economics) and the art of wealth acquisition ( chrematistics ). The argument begins with a description of the development of the city-state from simplercommunities. Just as man and woman come together for reproduction, the master and slave cometogether for self-preservation. The natural master uses his intelligence to rule, and the slave employshis body to work. The household develops naturally from these elements in order to meet daily needsand several families come together to meet other needs, giving rise to the village, again inaccordance with nature. But even though the city emerges naturally, it is at the same time a creationof human intelligence. The greatest benefactor is, of course, the legislator ( nomothetês ), for the city’s legal system makes human beings just and virtuous and raises them above the bestiality into whichthey would otherwise fall. The domestic economy is natural because it allows the body to meet the needs of the body, but the chrematistic art or art of acquisition ceases to be natural when money is introduced, as itallows the unlimited accumulation of unnatural wealth. Neither the city nor the economy existsnaturally, but each is valued according to the standard of nature. Aristotle’s Critique of Plato and the Pre-Socratics Aristotle then examines the contributions of his predecessors and presents a survey ofregimes of good reputation among the Greeks, without distinguishing between theoreticalconstructions and actually existing cities, both in Greece and abroad. He seems to ignore suchnuances, because his work is a practical treatise intended to guide rulers and statesmen, for whomsuch differences are to some extent irrelevant. Athenian democracy is not studied, for certain becausedemocracy hardly enjoyed a good reputation in the Greek world. Aristotle examines at length elements of his master Plato’s Republic and Laws in search of the best regime, the one that is “in accordance with our/people’s? prayers.” Aristotle theref ore begins by criticizing the views of his predecessors and then offers an outline of his own proposal in books VII and VIII.If his own political views were influenced by his master, Aristotle is nonetheless severelycritical of the regime described in Pl ato’s Republic , claiming that it overstates political “unity” and embraces a system of communism that is impracticable and detrimental to nature, neglecting thehappiness of individual citizens 19 . In his own regime, by contrast, every citizen has to possess the “moral virtue” and the skills to achieve a life of excellence and complete happiness. All citizens haveto hold political office and own private property. One should call a “happy city” only that city which benefits all citizens and not only some of them. There must also be a common education for allcitizens, because they all share the same objective . Aristotle’s best regime does not exist withoutslaves, on account of “scarcity” or resource poverty: not everyone can have the leisure ne eded tocultivate themselves. 8 The domestic economy is natural because it allows the body to meet the needs of the body, but the chrematistic art or art of acquisition ceases to be natural when money is introduced, as itallows the unlimited accumulation of unnatural wealth. Neither the city nor the economy existsnaturally, but each is valued according to the standard of nature. Aristotle’s Critique of Plato and the Pre-Socratics Aristotle then examines the contributions of his predecessors and presents a survey ofregimes of good reputation among the Greeks, without distinguishing between theoreticalconstructions and actually existing cities, both in Greece and abroad. He seems to ignore suchnuances, because his work is a practical treatise intended to guide rulers and statesmen, for whomsuch differences are to some extent irrelevant. Athenian democracy is not studied, for certain becausedemocracy hardly enjoyed a good reputation in the Greek world. Aristotle examines at length elements of his master Plato’s Republic and Laws in search of the best regime, the one that is “in accordance with our/people’s? prayers.” Aristotle theref ore begins by criticizing the views of his predecessors and then offers an outline of his own proposal in books VII and VIII.If his own political views were influenced by his master, Aristotle is nonetheless severelycritical of the regime described in Pl ato’s Republic , claiming that it overstates political “unity” and embraces a system of communism that is impracticable and detrimental to nature, neglecting thehappiness of individual citizens 19 . In his own regime, by contrast, every citizen has to possess the “moral virtue” and the skills to achieve a life of excellence and complete happiness. All citizens haveto hold political office and own private property. One should call a “happy city” only that city which benefits all citizens and not only some of them. There must also be a common education for allcitizens, because they all share the same objective . Aristotle’s best regime does not exist withoutslaves, on account of “scarcity” or resource poverty: not everyone can have the leisure ne eded tocultivate themselves. The city which Aristotle portrays in books VII and VIII is a city without any people devotedto handicrafts; on the contrary, the city is entirely devoted to the education and training of itsmembers in the musical arts — in the broad sense of the Muse-inspired arts. He repeatedly insists thatchildren should be brought up by the city (against Athenian tradition) to habituate them in the pursuitof the common interest and of happiness or wellbeing ( eudaimonia ). Ancient Citizenship Aristotle states that the statesman and legislator are occupied with the city and that the “regime” ( polytheia ) is a certain way of organizing the roles of the city’s inhabitants. The core of Aristotle’s political reflection is found in Book II I. The book begins with a definition of citizenshipand a discussion about whether the city remains the same when there is a change of regime or way of life. This was a practical question: if the city is the same despite a change in “shape,” the ob ligationsand debts incurred by the former regime remain after a revolution.Aristotle also presents a definition of a citizen ( polites ), as the city is made up of a multitudeof citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants of the city, such as resident foreignersand slaves, or even children and the elderly, who are not citizens in their own right, because citizensare not concerned with basic tasks but with the public good. After discussing the debate over the persisting of the city through a revolution, Aristotle defines a citizen as a person who has the right( exousia ) to participate in political or judicial decisions. In Athens, in fact, citizens had the right to participate in the assembly, the council, or other deliberative bodies and could be summoned to juryduty. Athenian citizens were more directly involved in government than those of any modern democracy. Aristotle’s definition of “citizen” certainly reflects this fact. To properly understand Aristotle’s texts, we must understand to what extent ancientcitizenship differs from modern citizenship. The biggest difference is that ancient citizenship is a “privilege,” not a right. It aims at the freedom of free men, not the freedom of men as men, andtherefore peacefully coexists not only with slavery — which was far from unanimously accepted asnatural, as Aristotle himself presents this as controversial and a subject for debate — but also with thenear-absence of any rights for resident aliens or “ metics. ” What Athenian democracy actually presupposes or implies is the idea that no one shouldobey anyone else who is not in turn subject to obedience: it is a method of political organization based on the principle of ruling and being ruled in turn, by lottery, not on the rule of the best or byelections for office, which are aristocratic ways to choose rulers. It also implies an exceptionally partisan or politicized society where citizens totally devote themselves to the life of their city,displaying the sociological behavior of a modern party militant. A citizen does not quibble over civicduties, as a soldier in a campaign should not quibble over his contribution. What is the origin of this ideal that more or less dominated Greek political life for over twocenturies, both in theory and in practice? Max Weber spoke of an origin in the ancient militarydemocracies, 21 but we cannot exclude the possibility that this reflected a deliberate political design. 22 The Athenian citizen makes his assets available to his fellows — or should do so — morespontaneously than the modern taxpayer does: he, for example, collaborates voluntarily in “liturgies” 23 that ennoble his city with beautiful buildings and festivals a duty that is especially binding for the wealthy. In practice, the “ideal” of the Athenian citizen requires leisure— and thus personal fortune — and often comes up against the passive resistance of some individuals, scorned as “idiots.” Aristophanes’ plays present us examples of such idiots. On the other hand, according to Aristotle’s explicit statements , the city (or polis ) wasconcerned not only with the means but with the ends or excellence of man, while recognizing thatthere are different concepts of happiness. But, according to him, it is enough to take into account theconception of happiness by wise, or at least sensible, people — who acknowledge three kinds ofgoods: external goods, allowing for a minimum of material comfort or wealth; bodily goods, likehealth and the pleasures of the body; and the goods of the spirit or the psyche. No sensible manneglects these goods; the argument is only about the right proportion of each good needed to achievehappiness. City-State? Was a polis a city-state? The historicist view now in vogue seems to find no other explanation for Aristotle’s preference for the polis than to say that this attitude was the opinion orcommon- sense view of his age, or if we prefer, that it represented the “popular morality” 24 of the Greeks, or even the morality of the upper-class Greeks. 25 Greeks, especially Athenians (includingAristotle), were supposedly unable to imagine a good life except in a polis . (But this is hardly thecase, for we must recall that the city in the ancient world was not specifically Athenian, nor evenGreek; Aristotle, for example, praises the cities of Carthage and Lacedaemon (Sparta) more than he praises Athens, the city in which he lived as a metic). Aristotle’s supposed inability to transcend the Greek spirit or “worldview” explains why the very idea of a “state” cannot even be expressed in his language, since to speak of a state implies itsopposition to “society,” and the city (or polis ) is prior to and unaware of the separation between Stateand Civil Society. Now if, even while ignoring the historicist contention that Aristotle was blinded by the Greekworldview, we as moderns are to understand his preference for the polis , we must look for the bestmodern equivalents for the terms with which the Greeks expressed themselves. The closest current practical equivalent to the ancient polis is the country or homeland, but even this is far from perfect,as one would have to add that the polis is a “country” whose core is urban and that the inhabitants of the rural world of the country, the rustic, are secondary.The alternatives to the polis , according to Aristotle, are not the State but the tribe or nation, orempire. He knew these other political forms of life, but he deemed them inferior and unable to fostera truly human life, because both proved unable to reconcile civilization and freedom. From atheoretical or conceptual point of view, the scholar might find a better equivalence, not in the modernnation- state (or its ancestor, the “city - state”), but in what we now call “cultures.” 26 Regimes according to Aristotle According to Aristotle, a “regime” is a way of organizing the offices or roles in the city, but particularly the “ sovereign office. ” Regimes are defined according to a sovereign body that takesdifferent forms: for example, in a democracy the sovereign is the people, and in an oligarchy thesovereign is a select group (the wealthy or well-born). Political rule — as opposed to paternal rule ordespotic rule — is the appropriate form when the ruler and the ruled have similar rational capacities.This is the case with naturally equal citizens who take turns in ruling. Aristotle thus sets the stage forthe fundamental argument in his theory: regimes which aim at the common good are unqualifiedlyright and just, while those which aim only at the advantages of their rulers are defective and unjust because they involve a kind of despotic rule not appropriate for a community of free people. A regime is corrupted when its rulers stop worrying about the city’s justice and seek to defend only the interests of a restricted group of men; such a government is despotic, contrary to thevery nature of the polis because a city is a community of free men.The distinction between just and defective regimes is combined with the observation thatgovernment can belong to one person, one group or the crowd. There are therefore six possible typesof regimes. This classification is an adaptation of the theory presented in Plato’s Statesman and sets the stage for Aristotle’s own search for the best regime. “Democracy,” according to Aristotle, is, asthe best regime or the “regime” ( polytheia ) without reserve, one of the six regimes or forms ofgovernment described in the Politics . The others are monarchy and tyranny (when only one manrules) and aristocracy and oligarchy (when a limited group rules). However, despite appearances tothe contrary, this classification is based not merely on the number of rulers, but on the principles thatlegitimize government. It should also be noted that regimes are not “constitutions” in the modern sense of documents that establish the number of rulers and how they are elected. There is neither the notion nor a Greek word for “constitution” as a fundamental law as distinguished from ordinary laws. “Regime” clearlymeans a “political way of life,” as in the French expression Ancien Régime . Regimes take shape inaccordance with the kind of man that inspires the organization of the city. Arguments for Democracy in Aristotle? Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a defective constitution (albeit the best of theimperfect regimes), he also argues that rule based on popular government can be defended, 27 adebate that has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. Aristotle’s central argument is that the rule of many may be better than that of the virtuous few, for when many collaborate, they put together a more comprehensive vision of the affairs of thecity, much like the members of a choir or as we might say the musicians in an orchestra. Even if thevision and the skills of each member of the crowd are lower considered individually, the combinedresult can be superior. If each individual has a small amount of virtue and practical wisdom, it is possible to combine these talents and surpass the ruling ability of even a very wise man. This powerful argument for democracy is based on the analogy of those who judge the arts: “the crowd is a better judge than a single man in music and poetry; for some understand one part, andsome another, and all understand the whole ”. 28 Multiple points of view together bring us closer tothe truth. Such an argument seems to anticipate modern arguments about “ the wisdom of the crowd ” and theorists of deliberative democracy point to a similar argument.Bu t Aristotle doesn’t think that democracy is the best regime, for it is the rule of the uneducated, for the most part solely concerned with the interests of the poor at the expense of what isgood for the city as a whole, such as its honor or adornment and the cultivation of the liberal arts. Hisview of democracy could be termed “ agonistic ” , and in fact to the modern reader, some of his expressions seem to imply a kind of “class struggle.” Aristotle also says there is a need to investigate oligarchy (government by a few, usually thewealthy) and democracy (government of the demos , that is, the poor and less educated) because toaim for the best regime one needs to start from existing regimes. And the most common regimes inreal life are oligarchy and democracy, so Books IV to VI address their variegated forms and how theregimes change. Book V could indeed be read as a practical guide for tyrants — or by the same token,for revolutionaries. Indeed, although Aristotle speaks of the six regimes as being equally regimes, his definitionseems to imply a bias or preference for the specific case of democracy. For example, his definition ofa citizen as “one who has the power to take part in the deliberation s and judicial administration of the city” 29 necessarily presupposes democracy. 30 Yet his recognition of the special value of democracygoes further. While acknowledging the dangers inherent in leaving government offices in the handsof the poor and uneducated, he argues that denying the political participation of these people createsinternal enemies who threaten the preservation of the regime. Regimes and the different conceptions of justice Regimes are not different forms of political authority whose purpose is essentially the samein each case: to secure the common interest of their members, or justice. On the contrary, eachregime corresponds to a distinct conception of justice. This observation explains the seeds of discordwithin the city, because there is not necessarily a convergence between what is generally believed(opinion) and the conclusion of someone who has seriously thought about the matter of justice.In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle distinguishes two different but relatedmeanings of justice. First, in the most general sense, “justice” means observance of the law and aims at the common advantage and happiness of the political community. 31 In a particular sense, however, justice means “equality” or “equity”; this sense correspon ds to commutative or distributive justice. According to distributive justice, different individuals are entitled (although he doesn’t use the word rights ) to a fair share of some common goods, like property. Aristotle analyzes thearguments for and against different regimes as different applications of the principle of distributive justice.Everyone agrees, he says, that justice implies treating equal people equally and treatingunequal people differently, but they do not agree on the standard by which to measure whether onehas equal or unequal merit. In the analysis of distributive justice in Ethic s, he argues that justicerequires that benefits and honors be distributed on merit. In Politics , he further examines certainclaims that were then a matter of debate in Athens. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who aresuperior in wealth should also be superior in all things — i.e., have superior political rights — while thedemocrats argue that those who are equal by free birth should be equal in all things — i.e., have equal political rights.Both conceptions of political justice are, according to Aristotle, mistaken because they err asto the ultimate end of the city. The city is neither a venture for maximizing wealth (as the oligarchsthink) nor an association for promoting freedom and equality (as the democrats think). Instead, he argues, “the good life is the end of the city”— a life consisting of noble deeds.The right conception of justice is aristocratic: those who contribute most to the good of thecity, that is, those who combine virtue, property, and wealth, should have more honor and authority.It is the rule of the best ( aristoi ). Aristotle explores the consequences of the argument in the rest ofBook III, considering the rival demands of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous man.The rule of the absolute monarch is the most extreme case of aristocracy (we cannot avoid thinkingof Alexander). But Aristotle also thinks that everyone should have a voice in government, so we can say that the book retains a certain “republican” bias. 32 Defective regimes and the best regime In addition to studying the conditions required for the best polity to come to exist, the “political scientist” must compare all regimes, even those that are imperfect. Aristotle notes that reforming a defective regime is as important a political task as establishing a new one. The politicalscientist must also be aware of the forces of political change that can undermine regimes. Aristotlecriticizes his predecessors for their neglect of the practical duties of a political scientist, butnonetheless Plato was right to suggest that the best regime is the reference point with which to 31 The content of the “common advantage” (koinon sympheron ) is the subject of controversy. Some passages seem toindicate that justice implies the advantage of all citizens (see, for example, Pol . 1329a23-4, 1332a32-8). But Aristotle alsoallows the banishing of powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crime (cf. Pol . 1284b15-17). 32 In the sense proposed by John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 13 evaluate all systems existing in practice. The best possible regime, however, is, as in Plato’s Laws , a kind of mixed regime centered around the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately affluent class between the rich and the poor. These topics and similar topics occupy the remaining sections of Politics . Books IV to VI areconcerned with existing regimes, that is, the three defective constitutions, as well as the mixedregime, the best possible in most cases. Book V sets out what causes revolution or political change( metabolê ) and how to avoid them.Only at the end of this practical research does Aristotle begin to describe in detail theinstitutions of the best possible regime, which is a kind of universal aristocracy extended to allcitizens. In books VII to VIII, Aristotle describes the best regime, in which all individuals areexcellent. The treatise, however, abruptly ends with a reflection on musical education, and many ofthe subjects said to be addressed in later books are probably in texts that have not reached us. An ancient tradition holds that Aristotle’s works were ignored for a long time because, after their author’s hasty escape from Athens, they were stored in a cave in Asia Minor. The heritage of Aristotle’s political thought We may think that Aristotle’s Politics had no immediate impact on public life because hisdefense of the polis or city was presented when this model was about to become obsolete, as Greekcities lost political autonomy after their conquest by the kings of Macedonia. Many today alsoquestion the applicability of the ideas and institutions that Aristotle advocates to modern nation-states — not to mention the objections, if not outrage, aroused by his defense of natural slavery orfemale subservience and the political exclusion of those who practiced manual trades. But Politics later exerted, nevertheless, an extraordinary influence on political philosophy forcenturies. Aristotle set the boundaries for the study of social reality for longer than any other thinkerin history (according to Hobbes, until close to 1640).In the Middle Ages everyone thought of themselves as following in Aristotle’s footsteps. Even if they had disagreements with him, they still felt themselves to be a part of the tradition ofethical and political inquiry that Aristotle had started. Political science, which, according to Cicero, begins with Socrates, has its first “epistemological break” with the demolition of Aristotleundertaken by Machiavelli and Hobbes. Reference List Aristotle’s Works Aristotle . (2008). Constituição dos atenienses (4.ª ed., Trad. D. F. Leão). Lisboa: Fundação CalousteGulbenkian. ––– . (1998). Política . (Edição Bilingue, Rev. R. M. R. Fernandes & M. C. ––– . (2018). Retórica (5.ª ed., Coord. A. P. Mesquita). Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda. Outras Referências em Português Additional Readings Chroust, A. (1975). Aristotle: New Light on His Life and On Some of His Lost Works , 2 vols. London:Routledge. 14Dorter, K. (1974). Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Basil Blackwell . Vidal-Naquet, P. (1981), Le Chasseur Noir. Paris: Maspero.Düring, I. (1957) Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition . Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell in Komm . Grote, G. (1865). Plato and the other companions of Sokrates . London: John Murray e Guthrie.Guthrie, W. K. C. (1990). A History of Greek Philosophy : Vol. 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Jaeger, W. (1960). Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Meier, C. (1973). Clisthène et le problème politique de la polis grecque. Révue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité , Vol. XX, 115-159.Pangle, P. (2013). Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Pocock, J. (1975). The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic RepublicanTradition . Princeton: Princeton University Press.Strauss, L. (1964). City and Man. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Veyne, P. (1978). Le Pain et le Cirque . Paris: Seuil. 20 1 8 . 8 The domestic economy is natural because it allows the body to meet the needs of the body, but the chrematistic art or art of acquisition ceases to be natural when money is introduced, as itallows the unlimited accumulation of unnatural wealth. Neither the city nor the economy existsnaturally, but each is valued according to the standard of nature. Aristotle’s Critique of Plato and the Pre-Socratics Aristotle then examines the contributions of his predecessors and presents a survey ofregimes of good reputation among the Greeks, without distinguishing between theoreticalconstructions and actually existing cities, both in Greece and abroad. He seems to ignore suchnuances, because his work is a practical treatise intended to guide rulers and statesmen, for whomsuch differences are to some extent irrelevant. Athenian democracy is not studied, for certain becausedemocracy hardly enjoyed a good reputation in the Greek world. Aristotle examines at length elements of his master Plato’s Republic and Laws in search of the best regime, the one that is “in accordance with our/people’s? prayers.” Aristotle theref ore begins by criticizing the views of his predecessors and then offers an outline of his own proposal in books VII and VIII.If his own political views were influenced by his master, Aristotle is nonetheless severelycritical of the regime described in Pl ato’s Republic , claiming that it overstates political “unity” and embraces a system of communism that is impracticable and detrimental to nature, neglecting thehappiness of individual citizens 19 . In his own regime, by contrast, every citizen has to possess the “moral virtue” and the skills to achieve a life of excellence and complete happiness. All citizens haveto hold political office and own private property. One should call a “happy city” only that city which benefits all citizens and not only some of them. There must also be a common education for allcitizens, because they all share the same objective . Aristotle’s best regime does not exist withoutslaves, on account of “scarcity” or resource poverty: not everyone can have the leisure ne eded tocultivate themselves.The city which Aristotle portrays in books VII and VIII is a city without any people devotedto handicrafts; on the contrary, the city is entirely devoted to the education and training of itsmembers in the musical arts — in the broad sense of the Muse-inspired arts. He repeatedly insists thatchildren should be brought up by the city (against Athenian tradition) to habituate them in the pursuitof the common interest and of happiness or wellbeing ( eudaimonia ). 20 Ancient Citizenship Aristotle states that the statesman and legislator are occupied with the city and that the “regime” ( polytheia ) is a certain way of organizing the roles of the city’s inhabitants. The core of Aristotle’s political reflection is found in Book II I. The book begins with a definition of citizenshipand a discussion about whether the city remains the same when there is a change of regime or way of life. This was a practical question: if the city is the same despite a change in “shape,” the ob ligationsand debts incurred by the former regime remain after a revolution.Aristotle also presents a definition of a citizen ( polites ), as the city is made up of a multitudeof citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants of the city, such as resident foreignersand slaves, or even children and the elderly, who are not citizens in their own right, because citizensare not concerned with basic tasks but with the public good. After discussing the debate over the 19 Ver Pol. II, 1-5. 20 For Aristotle education in virtue takes place with the repetition of virtuous actions. See for Books VII and VIII, rarelystudied independently, Thomas Pangle, Aristotle's Teaching in the Politics (Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 2013). 9 persisting of the city through a revolution, Aristotle defines a citizen as a person who has the right( exousia ) to participate in political or judicial decisions. In Athens, in fact, citizens had the right to participate in the assembly, the council, or other deliberative bodies and could be summoned to juryduty. Athenian citizens were more directly involved in government than those of any modern democracy. Aristotle’s definition of “citizen” certainly reflects this fact. To properly understand Aristotle’s texts, we must understand to what extent ancientcitizenship differs from modern citizenship. The biggest difference is that ancient citizenship is a “privilege,” not a right. It aims at the freedom of free men, not the freedom of men as men, andtherefore peacefully coexists not only with slavery — which was far from unanimously accepted asnatural, as Aristotle himself presents this as controversial and a subject for debate — but also with thenear-absence of any rights for resident aliens or “ metics. ” What Athenian democracy actually presupposes or implies is the idea that no one shouldobey anyone else who is not in turn subject to obedience: it is a method of political organization based on the principle of ruling and being ruled in turn, by lottery, not on the rule of the best or byelections for office, which are aristocratic ways to choose rulers. It also implies an exceptionally partisan or politicized society where citizens totally devote themselves to the life of their city,displaying the sociological behavior of a modern party militant. A citizen does not quibble over civicduties, as a soldier in a campaign should not quibble over his contribution.What is the origin of this ideal that more or less dominated Greek political life for over twocenturies, both in theory and in practice? Max Weber spoke of an origin in the ancient militarydemocracies, 21 but we cannot exclude the possibility that this reflected a deliberate political design. 22 The Athenian citizen makes his assets available to his fellows — or should do so — morespontaneously than the modern taxpayer does: he, for example, collaborates voluntarily in “liturgies” 23 that ennoble his city with beautiful buildings and festivals a duty that is especially binding for the wealthy. In practice, the “ideal” of the Athenian citizen requires leisure— and thus personal fortune — and often comes up against the passive resistance of some individuals, scorned as “idiots.” Aristophanes’ plays present us examples of such idiots. On the other hand, according to Aristotle’s explicit statements , the city (or polis ) wasconcerned not only with the means but with the ends or excellence of man, while recognizing thatthere are different concepts of happiness. But, according to him, it is enough to take into account theconception of happiness by wise, or at least sensible, people — who acknowledge three kinds ofgoods: external goods, allowing for a minimum of material comfort or wealth; bodily goods, likehealth and the pleasures of the body; and the goods of the spirit or the psyche. No sensible manneglects these goods; the argument is only about the right proportion of each good needed to achievehappiness. City-State? Was a polis a city-state? The historicist view now in vogue seems to find no other explanation for Aristotle’s preference for the polis than to say that this attitude was the opinion orcommon- sense view of his age, or if we prefer, that it represented the “popular morality” 24 of the 21 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Le Chasseur Noir. (Paris: Maspero, 1981), 149. 22 Veyne, P. (1982). Critique d’une Systématisation : Les Lois de Platon et la réalité». Annales. Économies. Sociétés, Civilizations , Vol. 37 (Nº. 5-6), 887, 904. Cfr. Meier, C. (1973). Clisthène et le problème politique de la polis grecque. Révue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité , Vol. XX, 115-159. 23 Cfr. Paul Veyne, Le Pain et le Cirque (Paris: Seuil, 1978). 24 Cf. For example Kenneth Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 1974). 10 Greeks, or even the morality of the upper-class Greeks. 25 Greeks, especially Athenians (includingAristotle), were supposedly unable to imagine a good life except in a polis . (But this is hardly thecase, for we must recall that the city in the ancient world was not specifically Athenian, nor evenGreek; Aristotle, for example, praises the cities of Carthage and Lacedaemon (Sparta) more than he praises Athens, the city in which he lived as a metic). Aristotle’s supposed inability to transcend the Greek spirit or “worldview” explains why the very idea of a “state” cannot even be expressed in his language, since to speak of a state implies itsopposition to “society,” and the city (or polis ) is prior to and unaware of the separation between Stateand Civil Society. Now if, even while ignoring the historicist contention that Aristotle was blinded by the Greekworldview, we as moderns are to understand his preference for the polis , we must look for the bestmodern equivalents for the terms with which the Greeks expressed themselves. The closest current practical equivalent to the ancient polis is the country or homeland, but even this is far from perfect,as one would have to add that the polis is a “country” whose core is urban and that the inhabitants of the rural world of the country, the rustic, are secondary.The alternatives to the polis , according to Aristotle, are not the State but the tribe or nation, orempire. He knew these other political forms of life, but he deemed them inferior and unable to fostera truly human life, because both proved unable to reconcile civilization and freedom. From atheoretical or conceptual point of view, the scholar might find a better equivalence, not in the modernnation- state (or its ancestor, the “city - state”), but in what we now call “cultures.” 26 Regimes according to Aristotle According to Aristotle, a “regime” is a way of organizing the offices or roles in the city, but particularly the “ sovereign office. ” Regimes are defined according to a sovereign body that takesdifferent forms: for example, in a democracy the sovereign is the people, and in an oligarchy thesovereign is a select group (the wealthy or well-born). Political rule — as opposed to paternal rule ordespotic rule — is the appropriate form when the ruler and the ruled have similar rational capacities.This is the case with naturally equal citizens who take turns in ruling. Aristotle thus sets the stage forthe fundamental argument in his theory: regimes which aim at the common good are unqualifiedlyright and just, while those which aim only at the advantages of their rulers are defective and unjust because they involve a kind of despotic rule not appropriate for a community of free people. A regime is corrupted when its rulers stop worrying about the city’s justice and seek to defend only the interests of a restricted group of men; such a government is despotic, contrary to thevery nature of the polis because a city is a community of free men.The distinction between just and defective regimes is combined with the observation thatgovernment can belong to one person, one group or the crowd. There are therefore six possible typesof regimes. This classification is an adaptation of the theory presented in Plato’s Statesman and sets the stage for Aristotle’s own search for the best regime. “Democracy,” according to Aristotle, is, asthe best regime or the “regime” ( polytheia ) without reserve, one of the six regimes or forms ofgovernment described in the Politics . The others are monarchy and tyranny (when only one manrules) and aristocracy and oligarchy (when a limited group rules). However, despite appearances tothe contrary, this classification is based not merely on the number of rulers, but on the principles thatlegitimize government. 25 L EO Strauss, City and Man. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 30. 26 In spite of the position of Pierre Manent, Les Métamorphoses de la Cité. ( Paris: Flammarion, 2010). 11 It should also be noted that regimes are not “constitutions” in the modern sense of documents that establish the number of rulers and how they are elected. There is neither the notion nor a Greek word for “constitution” as a fundamental law as distinguished from ordinary laws. “Regime” clearlymeans a “political way of life,” as in the French expression Ancien Régime . Regimes take shape inaccordance with the kind of man that inspires the organization of the city. Arguments for Democracy in Aristotle? Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a defective constitution (albeit the best of theimperfect regimes), he also argues that rule based on popular government can be defended, 27 adebate that has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. Aristotle’s central argument is that the rule of many may be better than that of the virtuous few, for when many collaborate, they put together a more comprehensive vision of the affairs of thecity, much like the members of a choir or as we might say the musicians in an orchestra. Even if thevision and the skills of each member of the crowd are lower considered individually, the combinedresult can be superior. If each individual has a small amount of virtue and practical wisdom, it is possible to combine these talents and surpass the ruling ability of even a very wise man.This powerful argument for democracy is based on the analogy of those who judge the arts: “the crowd is a better judge than a single man in music and poetry; for some understand one part, andsome another, and all understand the whole ”. 28 Multiple points of view together bring us closer tothe truth. Such an argument seems to anticipate modern arguments about “ the wisdom of the crowd ” and theorists of deliberative democracy point to a similar argument.Bu t Aristotle doesn’t think that democracy is the best regime, for it is the rule of the uneducated, for the most part solely concerned with the interests of the poor at the expense of what isgood for the city as a whole, such as its honor or adornment and the cultivation of the liberal arts. Hisview of democracy could be termed “ agonistic ” , and in fact to the modern reader, some of his expressions seem to imply a kind of “class struggle.” Aristotle also says there is a need to investigate oligarchy (government by a few, usually thewealthy) and democracy (government of the demos , that is, the poor and less educated) because toaim for the best regime one needs to start from existing regimes. And the most common regimes inreal life are oligarchy and democracy, so Books IV to VI address their variegated forms and how theregimes change. Book V could indeed be read as a practical guide for tyrants — or by the same token,for revolutionaries.Indeed, although Aristotle speaks of the six regimes as being equally regimes, his definitionseems to imply a bias or preference for the specific case of democracy. For example, his definition ofa citizen as “one who has the power to take part in the deliberation s and judicial administration of the city” 29 necessarily presupposes democracy. 30 Yet his recognition of the special value of democracygoes further. While acknowledging the dangers inherent in leaving government offices in the handsof the poor and uneducated, he argues that denying the political participation of these people createsinternal enemies who threaten the preservation of the regime. 27 Pol. III.11. 28 Pol , 1281b7-10. 29 Pol , 1275b19-21. 30 Strauss, City and Man, 36. 12 Regimes and the different conceptions of justice Regimes are not different forms of political authority whose purpose is essentially the samein each case: to secure the common interest of their members, or justice. On the contrary, eachregime corresponds to a distinct conception of justice. This observation explains the seeds of discordwithin the city, because there is not necessarily a convergence between what is generally believed(opinion) and the conclusion of someone who has seriously thought about the matter of justice.In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle distinguishes two different but relatedmeanings of justice. First, in the most general sense, “justice” means observance of the law and aims at the common advantage and happiness of the political community. 31 In a particular sense, however, justice means “equality” or “equity”; this sense correspon ds to commutative or distributive justice. According to distributive justice, different individuals are entitled (although he doesn’t use the word rights ) to a fair share of some common goods, like property. Aristotle analyzes thearguments for and against different regimes as different applications of the principle of distributive justice.Everyone agrees, he says, that justice implies treating equal people equally and treatingunequal people differently, but they do not agree on the standard by which to measure whether onehas equal or unequal merit. In the analysis of distributive justice in Ethic s, he argues that justicerequires that benefits and honors be distributed on merit. In Politics , he further examines certainclaims that were then a matter of debate in Athens. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who aresuperior in wealth should also be superior in all things — i.e., have superior political rights — while thedemocrats argue that those who are equal by free birth should be equal in all things — i.e., have equal political rights.Both conceptions of political justice are, according to Aristotle, mistaken because they err asto the ultimate end of the city. The city is neither a venture for maximizing wealth (as the oligarchsthink) nor an association for promoting freedom and equality (as the democrats think). Instead, he argues, “the good life is the end of the city”— a life consisting of noble deeds.The right conception of justice is aristocratic: those who contribute most to the good of thecity, that is, those who combine virtue, property, and wealth, should have more honor and authority.It is the rule of the best ( aristoi ). Aristotle explores the consequences of the argument in the rest ofBook III, considering the rival demands of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous man.The rule of the absolute monarch is the most extreme case of aristocracy (we cannot avoid thinkingof Alexander). But Aristotle also thinks that everyone should have a voice in government, so we can say that the book retains a certain “republican” bias. 32 Defective regimes and the best regime In addition to studying the conditions required for the best polity to come to exist, the “political scientist” must compare all regimes, even those that are imperfect. Aristotle notes that reforming a defective regime is as important a political task as establishing a new one. The politicalscientist must also be aware of the forces of political change that can undermine regimes. Aristotlecriticizes his predecessors for their neglect of the practical duties of a political scientist, butnonetheless Plato was right to suggest that the best regime is the reference point with which to 31 The content of the “common advantage” (koinon sympheron ) is the subject of controversy. Some passages seem toindicate that justice implies the advantage of all citizens (see, for example, Pol . 1329a23-4, 1332a32-8). But Aristotle alsoallows the banishing of powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crime (cf. Pol . 1284b15-17). 32 In the sense proposed by John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 13 evaluate all systems existing in practice. The best possible regime, however, is, as in Plato’s Laws , a kind of mixed regime centered around the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately affluent class between the rich and the poor.These topics and similar topics occupy the remaining sections of Politics . Books IV to VI areconcerned with existing regimes, that is, the three defective constitutions, as well as the mixedregime, the best possible in most cases. Book V sets out what causes revolution or political change( metabolê ) and how to avoid them.Only at the end of this practical research does Aristotle begin to describe in detail theinstitutions of the best possible regime, which is a kind of universal aristocracy extended to allcitizens. In books VII to VIII, Aristotle describes the best regime, in which all individuals areexcellent. The treatise, however, abruptly ends with a reflection on musical education, and many ofthe subjects said to be addressed in later books are probably in texts that have not reached us. An ancient tradition holds that Aristotle’s works were ignored for a long time because, after their author’s hasty escape from Athens, they were stored in a cave in Asia Minor. The heritage of Aristotle’s political thought We may think that Aristotle’s Politics had no immediate impact on public life because hisdefense of the polis or city was presented when this model was about to become obsolete, as Greekcities lost political autonomy after their conquest by the kings of Macedonia. Many today alsoquestion the applicability of the ideas and institutions that Aristotle advocates to modern nation-states — not to mention the objections, if not outrage, aroused by his defense of natural slavery orfemale subservience and the political exclusion of those who practiced manual trades.But Politics later exerted, nevertheless, an extraordinary influence on political philosophy forcenturies. Aristotle set the boundaries for the study of social reality for longer than any other thinkerin history (according to Hobbes, until close to 1640).In the Middle Ages everyone thought of themselves as following in Aristotle’s footsteps. Even if they had disagreements with him, they still felt themselves to be a part of the tradition ofethical and political inquiry that Aristotle had started. Political science, which, according to Cicero, begins with Socrates, has its first “epistemological break” with the demolition of Aristotleundertaken by Machiavelli and Hobbes. Reference List Aristotle’s Works Aristotle . (2008). Constituição dos atenienses (4.ª ed., Trad. D. F. Leão). Lisboa: Fundação CalousteGulbenkian. ––– . (1998). Política . (Edição Bilingue, Rev. R. M. R. Fernandes & M. C. ––– . (2018). Retórica (5.ª ed., Coord. A. P. Mesquita). Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda. Outras Referências em Português Additional Readings Chroust, A. (1975). Aristotle: New Light on His Life and On Some of His Lost Works , 2 vols. London:Routledge. 14Dorter, K. (1974). Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Basil Blackwell . Vidal-Naquet, P. (1981), Le Chasseur Noir. Paris: Maspero.Düring, I. (1957) Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition . Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell in Komm . Grote, G. (1865). Plato and the other companions of Sokrates . London: John Murray e Guthrie.Guthrie, W. K. C. (1990). A History of Greek Philosophy : Vol. 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Jaeger, W. (1960). Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Meier, C. (1973). Clisthène et le problème politique de la polis grecque. Révue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité , Vol. XX, 115-159.Pangle, P. (2013). Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Pocock, J. (1975). The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic RepublicanTradition . Princeton: Princeton University Press.Strauss, L. (1964). City and Man. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Veyne, P. (1978). Le Pain et le Cirque . Paris: Seui