|Aristóteles 3 sentidos zoon politiikon

Aristotle's concept of zoon politikon: on political benefits of being not too perfect Iwona Barwicka-Tylek Political Philosophy, Aristotle RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The article discusses the concept of zoon politikon in order to provide arguments justifying the attractiveness of Aristotle's practical philosophy. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS: There are three quasidefinitions of man in Aristotle's works, each of which emphasises a different aspect of humanity. According to the philosopher, we are speaking animals, political animals (zoa politika) and the only animals endowed with reason. I argue that it is the condition of zoon politikon that comes to the fore as the most human of human properties. The article uses a historical-philosophical method supported by textual analysis. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: In the first part of the text, Aristotle's term zoon politikon is analysed as a concept intended to show the superiority of humanity over animality. In the second part, it is presented as a limitation that distinguishes humans from gods. By analysing how these two perspectives overlap, it is then possible to discuss some political consequences of the tension between them. RESEARCH RESULTS: The analysis leads to the conclusion that, according to Aristotle, a good human is not someone who "exercises rationality to a high degree" (Hurka, 1993, p. 3), but above all someone who is political to a high degree. It also suggests that Aristotle's concept can be used to distinguish between two kinds of politics, which should not be reduced to each other: "artificial" politics (which can be equated with power), and natural human politics (which is based on free individual action in the area of praxis). CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The notion of zoon politikon reflects the relational character of the individual human self, and thus offers a perspective that allows both methodological and political individualism to be challenged. It can also be (and is; see: Arendt, 1958; Crick, 1962) a source of inspiration for those scholars, who argue that politics cannot be reduced to power.

Complexidade critica quantitativa bbb

Complexidade critica quantitativa bbb Escola de Informática lpalazzo@atlas.ucpel.tche.br ______________________________________________________________________ ______ Resumo Este artigo introduz um conjunto de conceitos provenientes de estudos teóricos e empíricos na ciência do caos e da complexidade com ampla aplicação na modelagem de sistemas computacionais adaptativos, evolutivos de simulação e de otimização em geral. Tais sistemas são aqui considerados sob o ponto de vista de sua organização e dos fenômenos que a provocam e sustentam. Os conceitos de auto-organização, sistemas complexos adaptativos, criticalidade, fronteira do caos e evolução são comentados, destacando-se o modo como estão relacionados na formação de um padrão estrutural coerente observado freqüentemente na natureza. Aborda-se também o emprego desses conceitos na modelagem de sistemas computacionais e suas perspectivas de aplicação como um paradigma para a construção de sistemas complexos de informação. ____________________________________________________ ___________ 1 Introdução O estudo de sistemas complexos cresceu muito nos últimos anos, não obstante ser o próprio conceito de complexidade definido muito vagamente e segundo diversas teorias alternativas [KOL65] [CHA75] [CRU94]. O termo “complexidade” vem do latim, complexus, que significa entrelaçado ou torcido junto. Isto pode ser interpretado da seguinte maneira: para se ter um sistema complexo é necessário (1) duas ou mais diferentes partes ou componentes e (2) estes componentes devem estar de algum modo interligados formando uma estrutura estável [HEY88]. Aqui se encontra a dualidade básica entre partes que são ao mesmo tempo distintas e interconectadas. Um sistema complexo não pode então ser analisado ou separado em um conjunto de elementos independentes sem ser destruído. Em conseqüência não é possível empregar métodos reducionistas para a sua interpretação ou entendimento. Se um determinado domínio é complexo ele será, por definição, resistente à análise. A consciência da existência de fenômenos que não podem ser reduzidos às suas partes em separado conduziu ao holismo, que pode ser visto como uma corrente de pensamento oposta ao reducionismo. O holismo propõe a observação de um fenômeno complexo como um todo, ao invés de como uma coleção de partes. Esta visão, entretanto, também negligencia um importante aspecto das entidades complexas: o fato de que elas são compostas de partes distintas, mesmo que essas partes se encontrem em estreito relacionamento. Considerar um fenômeno como um todo porém significa identificá-lo com uma unidade, isto é, fundamentalmente simples. Na construção de uma ciência da complexidade deve-se portanto buscar uma visão capaz de transcender a polarização entre holismo e reducionismo, permitindo a modelagem de sistemas que apresentam simultaneamente a característica da distinção (sendo portanto separáveis do todo em uma forma abstrata) e da conexão (sendo portanto indissociáveis do todo sem a perda de parte do significado original). Uma forma simples de modelo que satisfaz simultaneamente esses dois requisitos aparentemente contraditórios é o conceito matemático de rede. Uma rede consiste de nodos e de conexões ou arcos entre os nodos. Estes podem ser vistos como partes de um sistema complexo, enquanto que as conexões irão corresponder às relações que estabelecem entre si. Esta visão tem a propriedade de ser reversível, isto é, pode-se também ver os nodos como conexões entre os arcos, que então são tomados como os elementos componentes. Assim a abordagem reducionista pode ser pensada simplesmente como um método que tenta eliminar tanto quanto possível as conexões, enfatizando a individualidade dos nodos, enquanto que a abordagem holística elimina tanto quanto possível as distinções entre os nodos. Neste sentido, ambos os métodos “reduzem” um fenômeno complexo a uma representação basicamente mais simples (um conjunto solto de nodos diferenciados ou uma massa de conexões entre nodos iguais), negligenciando uma parte essencial das características do fenômeno. 2 Ordem e Caos O termo complexidade é por vezes também tomado como um sinônimo de desordem ou caos. Entretanto, somente a noção de desordem não é suficiente para definir complexidade. É necessário também entender o conceito de ordem. Exemplos simples de ordem são estruturas simétricas (p.ex: reticulados cristalinos). A simetria é definida matematicamente como a invariância sob um conjunto de operações ou transformações (não necessariamente um grupo). A principal característica de um sistema ordenado é a sua previsibilidade (espacial ou temporal). Não é necessário conhecer o sistema como um todo para reconstruí-lo ou prever sua estrutura: o sistema é redundante. Levada ao limite esta definição, na tentativa de produzir um sistema em ordenação máxima, obtém-se um sistema caracterizado pelo fato de ser invariável sob qualquer possível transformação. A única estrutura possível para tal sistema se caracteriza por total homogeneidade: deve ser possível mapear o sistema de uma parte qualquer para outra sem que nenhuma modificação ocorra. Além disso o sistema deve possuir uma extensão infinita, porque de outro modo se poderia imaginar transformações que mapeassem de uma parte do sistema para algum elemento fora de seus limites. Em outras palavras, um sistema de ordenação máxima iria corresponder a um vácuo clássico, isto é, a uma substância estendida ao infinito na qual nenhuma parte, componente ou estrutura interna pode ser distinguida. Tal sistema é claramente o oposto do que se tomou como um sistema complexo, que se caracteriza justamente por possuir uma estrutura interna diferenciada. A desordem, por outro lado, é caracterizada pela ausência de invariância, isto é, pela ausência de transformações (não triviais) que não teriam qualquer efeito distinguível sobre o sistema. No limite isto significa que qualquer parte do sistema, por insignificante que seja, deve ser diferente ou independente de qualquer outra parte. Um exemplo aproximado de tal sistema seria um gás perfeito: em geral a velocidade de duas moléculas diferentes seriam distintas e independentes, não havendo qualquer coordenação sobre as diferentes moléculas. Observado mais de perto entretanto o fenômeno de um gás perfeito apresenta diversas invariâncias: o movimento de uma molécula de gás é contínuo durante o curto intervalo de tempo em que ela não colide com outras moléculas, caracterizado pela conservação de momento. Além disso o espaço entre as moléculas pode ser visto com um vácuo clássico, que como se viu é ordenado. Em um sistema de máxima desordem deve-se ter partículas com qualquer momento físico aparecendo e desaparecendo em qualquer instante no tempo e qualquer posição no espaço. Um exemplo de tal sistema é o vácuo como é visto pela teoria quântica. As flutuações quânticas do vácuo continuamente criam e destroem partículas virtuais, assim denominadas porque são tão instáveis que em princípio são impossíveis de observar. Na prática isto significa que o vácuo quântico não pode ser distinguido do vácuo clássico. Isso conduz à conclusão de que tanto a perfeita ordem quanto a perfeita desordem no limite correspondem ao vazio, isto é, à ausência de qualquer forma de complexidade. 3 Dinâmica O passo seguinte no estudo da complexidade corresponde à análise de como um sistema complexo evolui, isto é, como ele se modifica ao longo do tempo. A invariância limitada postulada na seção anterior não se aplica somente a transformações geométricas ou espaciais, mas também a transformações temporais ou dinâmicas. Isto significa que certas partes ou estruturas do sistema serão conservadas durante uma certa evolução de tempo enquanto que outras irão se modificar. Até aqui esta descrição parece bastante trivial: uma parte do sistema se modifica enquanto que outra permanece sem modificações. É necessário entretanto algum método para identificar quais os subsistemas que irão mudar e quais os que irão permanecer inalterados. A evolução de sistemas complexos, de acordo com esta visão, é caracterizada por um intrincado emaranhado de ordem ou invariância e desordem ou variação. Suponha-se que haja uma subestrutura relativamente invariante (isto é, não afetada por um certo conjunto de transformações) em um sistema complexo. Isto significa que enquanto os processos internos do sistema pertencerem a esta categoria de transformação a subestrutura irá permanecer invariável. Na evolução biológica o agente de seleção é o ambiente, que demanda uma certa forma de adaptação do sistema, que de outro modo não irá sobreviver. No estudo da complexidade entretanto, sem fazer uma distinção a priori entre um sistema e seu ambiente externo não é possível empregar tal critério. A distinção entre o sistema que tenta sobreviver e seu ambiente, que pode permitir ou dificultar esta sobrevivência, é por si só uma característica dos sistemas complexos em geral. Discorrer sobre a sobrevivência de um subsistema em um todo maior implica em que se deve ter alguma maneira de reconhecer tais subsistemas invariantes inseridos em ambientes em evolução. Em outras palavras os subsistemas estáveis devem ser distinguidos como indivíduos. A dinâmica de variação-restrição é o princípio sobre o qual se baseia a invariância relativa das distinções em sistemas complexos. O princípio da variação e retenção seletiva [HEY88] foi elaborado a partir deste ponto de vista. Por definição um sistema complexo consiste em um certo número de subestruturas distintas submetidas à variação. Como a variação não é absoluta ou completa, essas subestruturas deverão apresentar alguma invariância ou estabilidade. Isto significa que as subestruturas não irão mudar todas ao mesmo tempo. Há alguma forma de inércia ou continuidade que limita a mudança. Isto permite considerar uma subestrutura como possuindo uma identidade estável durante um certo (talvez infinitesimal) espaço de tempo. O que pode então mudar durante este intervalo? Tanto as relações ou conexões entre a subestrutura considerada e as demais quanto a organização interna das partes da subestrutura mudam. O primeiro processo pode ser denominado (re)combinação e o segundo mutação. 4 Auto-organização Outra questão fundamental é: “De onde vem a ordem?” Segundo as leis gerais da termodinâmica parece que os processos dinâmicos tendem a seguir os caminhos de menor consumo de energia até que o sistema encontre um ponto de equilíbrio onde permanecerá enquanto não sofrer perturbação. Há diversos exemplos na natureza de sistemas e organismos que apresentam elevada energia e organização internas em aparente desafio às leis da física. Alguns deles são: • Partículas de limalha de ferro que se alinham segundo as linhas de força do campo magnético a que são submetidas; • Partículas d’água que suspensas no ar formam nuvens; • Formigas ou abelhas que crescem a partir de um zigoto até formar um complexo sistema de células que então por sua vez participa de uma sociedade altamente estruturada e hierarquizada. A organização surge espontaneamente a partir da desordem e não parece ser dirigida por leis físicas conhecidas. De alguma forma a ordem surge das múltiplas interações entre as unidades componentes e as leis que podem governar este comportamento não são bem conhecidas. A perspectiva comportamental de um sistema auto-organizável poderia revelar como padrões espaciais e temporais - tais como caminhos, limites, ciclos e sucessões - poderiam surgir em comunidades heterogêneas complexas. O entendimento dos mecanismos de auto-organização pode conduzir à construção de modelos mais informativos e precisos. Os primeiros modelos de formação de padrões utilizados baseavam-se em uma abordagem top-down onde os parâmetros descreviam os níveis mais altos dos sistemas. Segundo este enfoque a dinâmica das populações é representada também em seus níveis mais elevados e não como resultado da atividade que ocorre ao nível mais baixo dos indivíduos. A abordagem top-down viola dois princípios básicos dos fenômenos populacionais, que são individualidade e localidade [KAW94]. A individualidade tenta levar em conta as diferenças entre os indivíduos. Tais diferenças, ainda que muito pequenas, podem conduzir a resultados radicalmente diferentes na evolução das populações ao longo do tempo. Por localidade pretende-se significar que cada evento possui uma localização e um escopo de influência. Ignorar a localidade dos eventos obscurece fatores que poderiam contribuir para uma visão mais clara da dinâmica espaçotemporal dos sistemas. 5 Pré-condições da Auto-organização É necessário a um sistema satisfazer diversas pré-condições e valer-se de vários mecanismos para promover a auto-organização [NIC89] [FOR94]. Tais mecanismos são de certa forma redundantes e pouco definidos, entretanto permitem avaliar intuitivamente o potencial de auto-organização dos sistemas. São eles: • Abertura Termodinâmica: Em primeiro lugar o sistema (uma unidade reconhecível, tal como um órgão, um organismo ou uma população) deve trocar energia e/ou massa com o seu ambiente. Em outras palavras, deve haver um fluxo não-nulo de energia através do sistema. • Comportamento Dinâmico: Se um sistema não está em equilíbrio termodinâmico, a única opção que resta para o seu comportamento é assumir algum tipo de dinâmica, significando que o sistema encontra-se em contínua mudança. • Interação Local: Uma vez que todos os sistemas naturais apresentam inerentemente interações locais, esta condição parece ser um importante mecanismo para a auto-organização e como tal deve ser incorporada aos modelos que a representam. • Dinâmica Não-Linear: Um sistema com laços de feedback positivo e negativo é modelado com equações não-lineares. A auto-organização pode ocorrer quando existem laços de feedback entre as partes componentes do sistema e entre estes componentes e as estruturas que emergem em níveis hierárquicos mais altos. • Grande Número de Componentes Independentes: Uma vez que a origem da auto-organização recai nas conexões, interações e laços de feedback entre as partes dos sistemas, torna-se claro que sistemas autoorganizáveis devem possuir um grande número de componentes. • Comportamento geral independente da estrutura interna dos componentes: Isto quer dizer que não importa do que ou como são feitos os componentes do sistema, desde que eles façam as mesmas coisas. Em outras palavras, isto significa, que a mesma propriedade emergente irá surgir em sistemas completamente diferentes. • Emergência: A emergência é provavelmente a noção menos conhecida dentre as que se relacionam com auto-organização [CRU94]. A Teoria da Emergência diz que o todo é maior do que a soma das partes e o todo exibe padrões e estruturas que surgem espontaneamente do comportamento das partes.. • Comportamento geral organizado e bem definido: Desconsiderando a estrutura interna de um sistema complexo e observando-o apenas como um fenômeno emergente constata-se que seu comportamento é bastante preciso e regular. • Efeitos em Múltiplas Escalas: A emergência também aponta para interações e efeitos entre múltiplas escalas nos sistemas autoorganizáveis. As interações em pequena escala produzem as estruturas em grande escala as quais por sua vez modificam a atividade na pequena escala. 6 Estruturas de Feedback Uma estrutura de feedback é um laço causal, uma cadeia de causas e efeitos que forma um anel. Dentre essas estruturas, a mais simples é o feedback de reforço, também conhecido como efeito bola-de-neve ou ciclo vicioso. A principal característica do feedback de reforço é ser auto-amplificador. Quanto mais complexo um sistema (seres vivos, por exemplo) maior o número de estruturas de feedback que apresenta. Tem sido observado que sistemas que apresentam feedback tendem a desenvolver propriedades completamente novas. Este fenômeno, como já se viu, denomina-se emergência e as novas propriedades do sistema são ditas propriedades emergentes. A metáfora da bola que rola e cresce ao mesmo tempo em que aumenta a velocidade ladeira abaixo além de representar muito bem o fenômeno demonstra também dois modos completamente diferentes de perceber o processo. A bola de neve apresenta dois movimentos diferentes: quando se acompanha a bola com os olhos, verifica-se que ela possui um movimento circular de rotação sobre si própria. Por outro lado, quando se observa a bola rolando ladeira abaixo vê-se que sua trajetória descreve uma linha reta. Os dois movimentos correspondem a duas formas fundamentalmente diversas de perceber o tempo. Na tradição científica ocidental adota-se em geral a visão linear. O tempo é visto como passado, presente e futuro dispostos sobre uma linha. O presente é um ponto sobre esta linha, movendo-se em direção ao futuro e deixando o traço do passado atrás de si. Na visão linear as causas estão sempre atrás dos efeitos. Isto entretanto não é o caso na visão circular, onde causa e efeito estão conectados em um ciclo. Não faz sentido falar em “na frente de” ou “atrás” em uma trajetória circular onde qualquer ponto está ao mesmo tempo na frente e atrás de outro ponto. A verdade é que cada uma dessas visões necessita da outra, pois correspondem a duas diferentes perspectivas de um mesmo fenômeno. A metáfora da bola de neve mostra claramente como estas duas perspectivas podem ser combinadas: um feedback é uma estrutura circular rolando sobre um tempo linear. Figura 1 Duas visões complementares para estruturas de feedback 7 O Efeito Dominó A onda é um padrão muito comum, considerado por alguns como emergente. Um dos exemplos que melhor descrevem uma onda é o efeito dominó. Causa grande impressão observar dominós cairem sucessivamente, derrubados pela queda de seus antecessores, produzindo assim uma onda. Entretanto, se este é um padrão emergente, deve haver um ciclo em algum lugar. Observando cuidadosamente o efeito dominó pode-se considerar o mesmo comparável ao efeito produzido por uma esfera invisível, rolando sobre os dominós e derrubando-os em seqüência. Visto desta maneira, o efeito dominó lembra em muito o efeito bola de neve anteriormente citado. A esfera invisível possui o mesmo movimento e, como a bola de neve, deixa um rastro: os dominós tombados atrás de si. A visão circular do fenômeno é vista na Figura 2. Apesar das grandes diferenças, o efeito bola de neve e o efeito dominó compartilham a mesma estrutura subjacente e resultam portanto bastante similares. Esta similaridade, entretanto, permanece invisível a menos que se adote também a visão circular do fenômeno. No caso do efeito dominó, a representação adotada pode parecer estranha, tomando o efeito (a onda) pela causa imaterial (a esfera invisível), no entanto não se deve esquecer que ambos representam apenas diferentes visões de uma mesma estrutura de feedback. Figura 2 Visão circular do efeito dominó 8 Meta-balanceamento Freqüentemente comportamentos muito organizados surgem em sistemas de extrema complexidade. Exemplos óbvios disto são os organismos vivos. Bilhões de células interagem apresentando um comportamento notavelmente organizado. Ainda que os diversos fenômenos emergentes que ali ocorrem sejam muito diferentes uns dos outros, eles possuem algo em comum. Um conceito muito importante que conecta todos os fenômenos emergentes é o meta-balanceamento. Este é um conceito considerado chave para o entendimento da emergência. Um sistema meta-balanceado é um sistema que pode ser visto de duas diferentes perspectivas. A nível de detalhe o sistema está completamente desbalanceado, entretanto, de uma perspectiva global, o sistema parece ser estável e ordenado. O curioso aqui é que o sistema precisa estar desbalanceado internamente para produzir ordem global. Este é talvez um dos aspectos menos intuitivos da teoria dos sistemas. Corresponde a afirmar que a maneira de produzir estabilidade emergente em um sistema é conduzi-lo internamente a um estado desbalanceado. O conceito entretanto é fácil de demonstrar. Tanto o efeito bola de neve quanto o efeito dominó são fenômenos meta-estáveis. No efeito dominó, por exemplo, há um comportamento claramente estável e ordenado no sistema - a onda. Mesmo assim o comportamento observado individualmente em cada dominó é de desequilíbrio. A esfera invisível é formada pelos dominós que caem e rola exatamente no ponto em que estes tombam, desbalanceados. Um sistema dito balanceado ou em balanço é um sistema que não dispende energia. Consequentemente um sistema está desbalanceado quando dispende energia. Assim, para provocar o surgimento de fenômenos emergentes nos sistemas é necessário fazê-los dispender energia. Além disso deve-se continuamente alimentá-los com novos componentes e energia para sustentar o meta-balanceamento. Assim o efeito dominó somente pode ser mantido enquanto houver um novo dominó em pé na frente do que está caindo. Em outras palavras, é necessário alimentar-se constantemente a esfera invisível com novos dominós para mantê-la desbalanceada. Da mesma forma como a bola de neve precisa ser alimentada com mais neve para manter-se crescendo. Deste modo, ao contrário dos sistemas estáveis, sistemas meta-estáveis consomem muita energia. Em resumo, o conceito de meta-balanceamento é uma propriedade universal de todos os fenômenos emergentes. 9 Sobrevivência e Uniformidade Quando se observa a onda de dominós (ou uma onda no oceano ou qualquer outra onda) tem-se a sensação que ela de algum modo sobrevive de um momento para o seguinte, isto é, a onda se apresenta como sendo única e de duração prolongada no tempo. A questão é que quando a onda se autoreproduz, avançando para o momento seguinte, ela o faz a partir de componentes diferentes. Assim, se a onda emergente for observada da perspectiva dos dominós ela não será a mesma onda. Isto é verdadeiro para todos os fenômenos emergentes. Na esfera dos seres humanos tem-se a sensação de sobreviver de um instante para outro, no entanto o que realmente ocorre é um contínuo processo de substituição de componentes. Nova energia e novas moléculas fluem continuamente no organismo humano, onde o ciclo de substituição ao nível molecular dura cerca de sete anos. Este é o período em que todas as moléculas do corpo humano são substituídas por novas. No efeito dominó o ciclo dura apenas uma fração de segundo. Assim, quando se fala em sobrevivência e uniformidade deseja-se referir a estrutura do sistema. Ainda que todos os componentes do sistema serem substituídos por novos, sua estrutura permanece fundamentalmente a mesma. Ficam assim evidentes as razões pelas quais os conceitos discutidos acima precisam ser considerados em conjunto, conforme a Tabela 1. Tabela 1 Conceitos complementares segundo diferentes visões Visão Circular Visão Linear Estrutura Perspectiva Global Meta-balanceamento Esfera Invisível Padrão Perspectiva do Componente Desbalanceamento Onda 10 Sistemas Complexos A teoria da complexidade se relaciona muito de perto com a teoria dos sistemas. Ambas por sua vez estão relacionadas com a teoria do caos e com a cibernética. A grosso modo esse relacionamento pode ser resumido como se apresenta na Tabela 2 Tabela 2 Objetos de diferentes teorias Sistemas Comportamento Teoria dos Sistemas simples simples Teoria da Complexidade complexos simples Teoria do Caos simples complexo Cibernética complexos complexo A teoria dos sistemas e a teoria da complexidade se sobrepõem e são baseadas nos mesmos princípios. Qual seria então a necessidade de duas disciplinas distintas? A razão principal parece ser o fato de que ambas pertencem a duas diferentes tradições científicas, entretanto há certamente outros motivos. Nem todos os sistemas são tão simples como a galinha e o ovo. Em um sistema constituído por milhões de componentes seria quase impossível projetar uma estrutura circular descrevendo todos os possíveis laços de feedback. Somente é possível esquematizar o feedback de uma forma muito geral, como é mostrado na Figura 3. Figura 3 Feedback em sistemas complexos Como o diagrama sugere, há um relacionamento circular entre a estrutura global do sistema e as interações locais entre os componentes. A estrutura global pode ser definida como a rede de todos os relacionamentos locais, que é produzida e mantida em um dado momento pelo total de interações que ocorrem neste momento. Cada um e todos os componentes do sistema interagem com seus vizinhos imediatos, modificando assim a estrutura global. Uma vez que cada componente responde à estrutura global, então o comportamento de cada indivíduo é determinado pelo todo. Ao mesmo tempo a resposta independente de todos os componentes em um dado momento produz o todo do momento seguinte. Um exemplo de sistema complexo é uma sociedade. Uma sociedade consiste em muitos componentes independentes interagindo localmente. O estado corrente da sociedade é a estrutura global. Cada um e todos os indivíduos respondem ao estado corrente e portanto criam o novo estado da sociedade no momento seguinte e assim por diante. Assim um sistema complexo pode ser definido como sendo constituído por muitos componentes independentes que interagem localmente produzindo um comportamento geral organizado e bem definido independente da estrutura interna dos componentes. 11 Vórtices Redemoinhos em águas revoltas e tornados em céus turbulentos são exemplos perfeitos de vórtices. O curioso sobre os vórtices é que parece haver alguma força em seus centros sugando grandes massas a partir de um ponto impreciso. Isto entretanto é apenas uma ilusão ocasionada pelo movimento das massas em círculo. Se estas forem removidas do vórtice não resta absolutamente nada. É como remover as cascas de uma cebola esperando encontrar algo em seu interior. Entretanto, observando-se os vórtices, fica claro que existe uma força em algum lugar. Onde está ela? A resposta é talvez uma das mais importantes noções da ciência da complexidade: ela vem de dentro do sistema. Ainda que na aparência uma força externa esteja organizando o vórtice, são as próprias massas em movimento circular que animam o fenômeno. Uma das razões pela qual este conhecimento é tão importante é que ele encerrou a longa disputa entre o vitalismo e o materialismo. Os vitalistas defendiam a idéia de que a existência da vida depende de uma força vital, enquanto que os materialistas acreditavam não ser necessária nenhuma força externa para produzir vida. O estudo dos vórtices mostra que ambas as visões estão corretas. Os vitalistas, bastante acertadamente, identificaram uma força vital, que corresponde à força de sucção ilusória existente no centro do vórtice. A visão materialista é também correta, uma vez que tal força vital emerge do interior do sistema. Nada do exterior está organizando o vórtice. A força vital é real, mas não existe no sentido usual de existência, possuindo o que se denomina uma hiper-existência. Para que ocorra a hiper-existência é necessário satisfazer as seguintes condições: 1. O fenômeno emergente deve estar incorporado, 2. Os componentes do sistema devem estar desbalanceados, e 3. Deve haver feedback no sistema. Todas essas três condições são satisfeitas pelos vórtices: (1) Um vórtice não pode emergir no vácuo, ele necessita estar incorporado em um meio físico. Isto corresponde à primeira parte da definição de um sistema complexo: um sistema complexo consiste em muitos componentes independentes. (2) Um vórtice não pode emergir a menos que as massas de ar ou água que o compõem estejam em movimento (desbalanceadas). Finalmente, (3) um vórtice é por si próprio uma estrutura circular, possiblilitando a ocorrência de feedback. Quando essas três condições são satisfeitas, a força ilusória de sucção emerge no centro do vórtice. 12 Ressonância Além do efeito bola-de-neve, do efeito dominó e do vórtice, há um quarto fenômeno emergente que deve ser observado: a ressonância. Como se verá a seguir a ressonância possui exatamente as mesmas propriedades das três outras estruturas. Além disso, enfatiza outras importantes propriedades dos sistemas complexos. No sentido usual com que a palavra é empregada, ressonância é um som prolongado por um processo repetitivo. Pode ser produzida pelo uivo do vento, por um apito, por uma guitarra elétrica ou um órgão tubular. A definição técnica de ressonância é basicamente a mesma, exceto que não está restrita a ondas sonoras, generalizando a idéia para qualquer tipo de onda. O que se denominou processo repetitivo é exatamente algum tipo de feedback. Na Figura 4 apresenta-se um tipo de ressonância sonora que é um problema comum entre os músicos. Figura 4 Ressonância sonora O som captado pelo microfone é amplificado e retorna ao ambiente através do alto-falante. Daí este som amplificado passa a ser também captado pelo microfone e a bola de neve começa a rolar novamente. O resultado audível é um som muito agudo e alto que pode inclusive danificar equipamentos mais sensíveis. Uma análise do espectro deste som mostra a evolução emergente de um pico senoidal, que cresce e se torna cada vez mais alto, terminando em uma única freqüência, como é mostrado na Figura 5. Este é o padrão característico de desenvolvimento de uma onda de ressonância A novidade aqui é a redução de informação: o som original, composto de muitas freqüências, termina em uma única freqüência. Figura 5 Ressonância como um redutor de informação Em outras palavras, a ressonância age como um filtro emergente. Sua estrutura de feedback filtra todas as freqüências deixando apenas uma. Mas, além de filtrar todas as outras freqüências, ela amplifica a freqüência restante. Por esta razão a ressonância é considerada um filtro ativo na teoria dos filtros. Deve-se notar aqui a similaridade entre o vórtice e a ressonância. No vórtice há uma força ativa no centro que suga a matéria em sua direção. Na ressonância um sistema de freqüências é sugado e aprisionado em um único padrão. 13 Evolução Viu-se então que as estruturas de feedback podem atuar como filtros emergentes, caracterizando processos de redução de informação. Este processo pode ser entendido como uma forma de seleção. Há cerca de 150 anos atrás, o grande biólogo Charles Darwin descobriu que o mecanismo de evolução biológica correspondia exatamente a um processo de seleção, que ele denominou seleção natural, e que este processo nada mais era do que a sobrevivência do melhor adaptado. Os organismos que não se adaptaram ao longo da cadeia evolutiva foram extintos, isto é, filtrados para fora do processo. Darwin viu os organismos como se fossem máquinas perpétuas, atravessando um processo de filtragem natural. Somente as verdadeiramente perpétuas conseguiam atravessar o filtro. O significado de uma máquina perpétua no contexto da complexidade é o de mecanismos capazes de perpetuar sua execução e de se reproduzir. Os organismos vivos caem exatamente na categoria das máquinas perpétuas. Os organismos agem como se imbuídos da seguinte missão: manter-se em funcionamento por tempo suficiente para produzir cópias de si próprios. Para manter-se em funcionamento necessitam de um contínuo fluxo de energia e matéria através de si próprios. Em outras palavras, necessitam comer. Em comparação se poderia dizer que um carro mantém-se em movimento comendo gasolina. Isto não significa, evidentemente, que o carro esteja vivo. O problema é que o carro não faz nenhum esforço de moto próprio para obter mais gasolina. Os organismos deveriam ao menos usar a energia proveniente de seu alimento para obter mais alimento e então reproduzir-se. Analogamente, na seleção natural, os que não forem capazes de obter alimento e reproduzir-se (isto é, os inadequados) serão retidos pelo filtro. A seleção natural não é somente um filtro, ela é também uma ressonância que amplifica os organismos adequados enquanto que os inadequados vão sendo retirados de cena. Entretanto, para ser realmente criativa a seleção natural precisa estar desbalanceada. Como desbalancear um sistema biológico? A resposta é: levar os organismos a competir por recursos limitados. Quando os organismos competem eles tornam a própria adequação instável. O que hoje é adequado pode não o ser amanhã. Um cenário de adequação dinâmica é fonte de novos fenômenos emergentes que tornam a seleção natural mais do que um mero processo de filtragem passiva. A adequação dinâmica produz criatividade e inteligência. Este é o fenômeno emergente mais importante de todos, porque abre o caminho para a evolução da evolução. Isto pode ser constatado na seleção natural, na evolução da mente e na evolução cultural dos povos. Sistemas complexos são todos constituídos de outros todos. Um relógio, por exemplo, não é um sistema complexo por ser constituído de partes e não de todos. A remoção de uma mola traz conseqüências fatais para o relógio, que simplesmente deixa de funcionar. Um sistema complexo, por outro lado, não é criticamente dependente de seus componentes, que por sua vez são outros todos. Se uma célula morre ou uma formiga se perde isto tem pouco efeito sobre o sistema ao qual pertencem. Para estar em meta-balanceamento um sistema complexo precisa estar desbalanceado ao nível dos componentes. Como colocar sistemas complexos em desbalanceamento? Simplesmente dando independência e liberdade a seus componentes. Sistemas complexos são meta-estáveis porque são constituídos de todos independentes que interagem. Quanto mais liberdade possuem os componentes, mais desbalanceado se torna o sistema e isto é fonte de mais meta-estabilidade global. Tudo isto traz claras evidências de que a natureza de alguma forma oscila entre o caos e a ordem. 14 A Fronteira do Caos Sistemas auto-organizáveis apresentam freqüentemente uma forma altamente complexa de organização. As colmeias, por exemplo, tem padrões óbvios e regularidades mas não são estruturas simples. Elementos estocásticos afetam a estrutura e a dinâmica de uma colmeia obtendo respostas variáveis e não determinísticas. Da mesma forma as nuvens, padrões climáticos, correntes nos oceanos, assembléias comunitárias, economias e sociedades, todos exibem formas complexas de auto-organização. Não há uma definição geral apropriada para complexidade, apesar desta ser considerada de muitas formas. Intuitivamente a complexidade encontra-se em algum lugar entre a ordem e o caos, entre a superfície espelhada de um lago e a turbulência de um maremoto. A complexidade tem sido medida através de entropia métrica, profundidade lógica, conteúdo de informação e outras técnicas semelhantes. Estas medidas são adequadas a aplicações específicas da química e da física mas nenhuma delas descreve completamente as características da auto-organização. Uma forma de abordar o estudo da complexidade, considerando a ausência de uma definição satisfatória, é descrever um certo espaço, compreendido entre a ordem e o caos, denominado a fronteira do caos [PAC88, LAN90, KAU91, KAU93]. Em 1990 Chris Langton [LAN90] conduziu um experimento empregando autômatos celulares (AC), onde tentava descobrir sob que condições um AC simples poderia suportar primitivas computacionais, tais como transmissão, armazenamento e modificação de informações. Em seu experimento um AC unidimensional é composto por 128 células conectadas em círculo. Cada célula apresenta quatro possíveis estados internos e recebe todos os seu inputs das demais células em sua região, denominada sua vizinhança. A vizinhança definida por Langton era constituída por cinco células. Cada célula é considerada membro de sua própria vizinhança, juntamente com suas duas células vizinhas de cada lado. O estado interno das células no momento seguinte é determinado pelo estado de sua vizinhança e alguma função de transição que descreve qual o novo estado que a célula deve assumir para um dado estado de sua vizinhança. Assim o estado da vizinhança é associado com a transmissão, o estado interno do autômato com o armazenamento e a função de transição com a modificação da informação. Para determinar como a ordem e o caos afetavam a computação, Langton formulou um valor lambda que descrevia a probabilidade de uma dada vizinhança produzir em uma célula um determinado estado interno particular, denominado estado quiescente. Quando lambda assumia o valor zero, todas as vizinhanças moviam uma célula para o estado quiescente e o sistema era imediatamente organizado. Por outro lado, quando lambda assumia o valor 1 nenhuma vizinhança se movia para o estado quiescente e o sistema mantinha-se desordenado. O experimento de Langton mostrou a existência de um valor crítico para lambda, correspondendo a pontos de transição de fase, em cuja proximidade a organização computada pelo sistema é máxima. Por outro lado, caso esse valor fosse ultrapassado, o caos surgia muito rapidamente. Segundo Langton, devido a associação da computação com tal valor crítico, um sistema autoorganizado precisaria manter-se na fronteira do caos para conseguir computar a própria organização. As transições de fase nem sempre ocorrem de forma brusca como quebra entre dois estágios. Por exemplo, a passagem de um líquido do ponto de congelamento para o de ebulição se dá de forma gradual entre um estado e outro. Entretanto, a transformação do estado líquido para o gasoso nas vizinhanças de temperatura de ebulição se dá num espaço muito estreito entre os dois estados. Após um aquecimento gradual ocorre uma mudança brusca para o estado de gás, de forma que as duas fases são claramente distintas, separadas por uma estreita região que apresenta as condições de transição de fase. O estudo de tais regiões é normalmente muito útil para a previsão das propriedades do sistema ou substância em diferentes condições. 15 Criticalidade Auto-organizada Em um estudo pioneiro, Per Bak e seus colaboradores. [BAK88] investigaram o comportamento de sistemas dinâmicos espacialmente estendidos empregando simulações em computadores de um modelo que haviam desenvolvido e denominado “monte de areia”. Neste modelo grãos de areia vão sendo continuamente depositados sobre uma mesa. Em um certos momentos o monte está tão alto quanto possível para sua base e então a areia escorrega pela encosta aumentando a base e permitindo ao monte continuar crescendo. O monte de areia é muito sensível a perturbações (se a mesa for sacudida mais areia cai pelas encostas) mas os valores obtidos para a inclinação máxima do monte de areia, apesar de não se apresentarem absolutamente regulares, flutuam dependendo das condições iniciais e da perturbação exercida sobre o sistema. Devido a este equilíbrio estável, ainda que precário, Bak e sua equipe concluíram que o sistema se apresentava em estado crítico. Além disso notaram que o sistema se auto-organizava em direção ao estado crítico sem necessidade de nenhum ajuste ou sintonia: quaisquer que fossem as condições iniciais o sistema tendia sempre ao estado crítico. Este fenômeno recebeu a denominação de criticalidade autoorganizada. Especula-se que este conceito possa ser fundamental para a escalabilidade espacial e temporal em sistemas dissipativos em desequilíbrio. Sole e Manrubia [SOL95] usaram a teoria de Bak para examinar se o desenvolvimento de florestas exibia criticalidade auto-organizada. Sabendo que a queda de árvores e formação de clareiras é vital para a dinâmica das florestas tropicais eles propuseram que a distribuição e abundância de clareiras seria um indicativo do estado organizacional da floresta. Testando esta hipótese eles propuseram que as clareiras da floresta existente na ilha de Barro Colorado iriam apresentar uma distribuição auto-similar em multiescala. Esta hipótese foi sustentada tanto por dados empíricos quanto por simulações em computadores denominadas o jogo da floresta. Além disso as florestas simuladas também apresentaram propriedades fractais. Uma abordagem semelhante foi empregada no estudo de colônias de formigas do gênero leptothorax onde se verificou que a existência de uma densidade crítica de indivíduos que possibilita a informação máxima da colônia. Quando esta densidade é atingida, a colônia desenvolve pulsos de atividade que exibem auto-similaridade. 16 Sistemas Complexos Adaptativos Em sistemas bióticos, um elemento importante na lista de mecanismos e condições que caracterizam a auto-organização é a habilidade que os agentes apresentam de se adaptar ao meio em que se encontram. Isto significa que os agentes são capazes de alterar suas funções internas de processamento de informações. Sistemas que apresentam tal característica são denominados sistemas complexos adaptativos (SCA) [HOR95]. No modelo de Langton as células seriam capazes de sintonizar suas regras de transição (e conseqüentemente seus valores lambda) ao longo do espectro entre o caos e a ordem. Em colônias de formigas leptothorax isto significa que as formigas que inicialmente não respondiam à modificações na densidade da colônia, ou o faziam de maneira adversa, acabariam por adaptar suas respostas de modo a conduzir à criticalidade auto-organizada. Ao se considerar a adaptação, uma série de novas questões sobre sistemas auto-organizados surgem: Quais são os mecanismos da adaptação? Sob que condições eles são possíveis? Este movimento se dá sempre na direção da criticalidade auto-organizada? Em termos evolutivos a criticalidade auto-organizada seria obtida através das condições para a evolução (variação fenotípica individual, reprodução em excesso e herança de características genéticas). Uma população seria capaz de adaptar-se através da herança de variações genéticas introduzidas por mutação e recombinação. A causa da criticalidade auto-organizada seria a seleção natural. Uma população poderia evoluir na direção de um estado crítico porque a seleção natural removeria as variantes do sistema que se afastassem do estado crítico. Stuart Kauffman [KAU91, KAU93, KAU95] desenvolveu uma rede booleana para a modelagem de SCA. Em seu modelo N unidades, cada uma das quais capaz de assumir A estados e conectada a K outros agentes são mapeadas em um panorama K-dimensional que expressa topograficamente todos os estados possíveis do sistema. Kauffman associou valores de adequação a cada um dos A estados assumidos por uma unidade de modo que quando os estados do sistema eram calculados através das K conexões entre N agentes, apareciam picos de adequação no panorama, representando estados ótimos do sistema. No modelo de Kauffman é possível obter panoramas em um sistema adaptativo para representar agentes, genomas, populações, etc. Sobrepondo diversos destes panoramas para estudar a co-evolução, Kauffman descobriu que K é um dos principais determinantes do grau de organização dinâmica de um sistema complexo. 17 Aplicações de Sistemas Auto-organizáveis Apesar de exigir ainda um grande esforço de pesquisa na construção de uma teoria unificada, o conceito de auto-organização apresenta excelentes perspectivas de aplicação em simulação, modelagem científica e otimização [DEC97].. Mecanismos encontrados em sistemas auto-organizáveis tem sido identificados com possíveis fontes de auto-organização em diversas áreas da física, química, biologia, economia, sociologia, comunicação, informação, educação, etc. [BRO94, HIE94]. Diversos tipos de modelos baseados em indivíduos foram desenvolvidos e pesquisados, incluindo redes de autômatos celulares (AC) [CAS91, LAN94], sistemas de vida artificial (A-Life) [KAW94] e modelos de clareiras em florestas [SHU92]. O interesse em tais modelos reside na possibilidade de aplicar suas propriedades estatísticas em modelos análogos do mundo real. 18 Estudo de Caso: Auto-organização na WWW O principal atrativo da Internet é a facilidade que oferece à distribuição e comunicação de idéias e conhecimento. Sua estrutura, baseada no princípio da descentralização de operações e controle, possibilita uma interação muito mais direta entre produtores e consumidores de informações do que ocorre por exemplo na área de publicações, na televisão ou na indústria cinematográfica. A World Wide Web (WWW ou simplesmente Web) é o serviço da Internet que maior crescimento apresentou nos últimos anos. Seu maior apelo é oferecer aos seus usuários um interface agradável e relativamente eficiente para o acesso ao conhecimento desejado. Isto é obtido com o uso do protocolo HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol), que permite integrar a informação e seu interface com o usuário em uma única representação. A WWW adota o princípio da distribuição na representação de conhecimento, o que significa que este é armazenado como uma rede de nodos e links. Os nodos podem conter qualquer combinação de texto, imagens, som, vídeo, etc. Os links conectam os itens individuais de um nodo para outro de acordo com a preferência de seus autores, formando algo assim uma rede de conceitos conectados através de relacionamentos informais. Os usuários navegam nesta rede perseguindo os links que lhes são significativos entre um nodo e outro. Neste processo empregam uma forma de julgamento associativo que visa conduzir a partir de uma certa posição inicial ao nodo ou nodos que contém a informação desejada. Assim a organização material da WWW é produzida por seus projetistas que usam suas idéias intuitivas de estruturação do conhecimento e semântica na construção de nodos e sub-redes. Estas contribuições individuais são integradas gradualmente a corpos mais amplos de conhecimento preexistentes na WWW, assim expandindo o conhecimento da rede como um todo. Diversos elementos influenciam neste processo de organização de conhecimento, inclusive fatores psicológicos, lingüísticos, sociais e culturais, interesses e motivações dos autores e usuários das páginas WWW. Esta organização uma vez materializada na rede assume uma representação dinâmica, objetiva e em geral de duração prolongada. Os novos nodos e links introduzidos modificam-se relativamente pouco ao longo do tempo. As modificações que ocorrem na rede são fruto de procedimentos de atualização, remoção e principalmente adição de conhecimento, sob a forma de nodos e links. Tais procedimentos produzem modificações concretas na rede e em geral são controlados pelos próprios produtores da informação. Eventuais inconsistências decorrentes de modificações materiais na rede, como links para nodos inexistentes ou nodos com features não suportadas por certos browsers, não possuem ainda uma solução satisfatória. Por outro lado, o que se poderia denominar organização virtual da rede é produzida pelo processo dinâmico de navegação, o qual decorre da percepção semântica associativa dos usuários, ativando determinados links, que lhes parecem mais promissores ou interessantes em detrimento de outros que o são menos. No atual estágio tecnológico da WWW o conhecimento produzido pelo processo de navegação não é registrado sistematicamente, sendo portanto desperdiçado. No entanto - e este é o foco deste artigo - poderia ser empregado na construção de modelos auto-organizáveis de aprendizado associativo, em um sentido muito próximo ao proposto por Bollen em [BOL96], onde a WWW é vista como uma memória associativa de grandes dimensões. Francis Heylighen [HEY96] propõe que o primeiro passo para tornar uma memória associativa mais eficiente é permitir que ela própria descubra a melhor organização possível para si própria. Na mente humana, conhecimento e significado se desenvolvem mediante um processo de aprendizado associativo: os conceitos que são mais freqüentemente usados juntos se tornam mais fortemente conectados. É possível implementar mecanismos similares na WWW criando associações com base nos caminhos percorridos pelos usuários através da rede de links. O princípio é simplesmente este: os caminhos percorridos por mais usuários se tornam mais fortes, enquanto que links raramente usados se tornam mais fracos. Uma heurística simples pode então propor possíveis candidatos para novos links: Se um usuário navega de A para B e de B para C, é provável que exista não somente uma relação entre A e B mas também entre A e C (transitividade) e entre B e A (simetria). Desta forma novos links potenciais seriam continuamente gerados (variedade) mas somente aqueles que obtivessem determinada força seriam retidos e tornados visíveis ao usuário (restrição), enquanto que aqueles que não atingissem tal limiar de visibilidade seriam mantidos ocultos. Um experimento realizado sobre um sistema hipertexto adaptativo [BOL96] comprovou a exeqüibilidade desta idéia. Uma das principais vantagens deste modelo de aprendizado associativo reside no fato de que ele funciona localmente (é necessário armazenar informações sobre nodos que estão no máximo dois passos adiante), mas a auto-organização que ele produz é global. Com tempo suficiente, nodos que se encontrassem a um número arbitrário de passos de distância poderiam se tornar diretamente conectados caso um número suficiente de usuários percorrer o caminho entre eles. O resultado esperado deste processo de aprendizado associativo é que os nodos que mais provavelmente serão utilizados em conjunto estarão também situados mais próximos na topologia da WWW. Se tais algoritmos de aprendizado pudessem ser generalizados na WWW como um todo, o conhecimento ali existente poderia estruturar-se em uma rede associativa em permanente aprendizado. Cada vez que um novo nodo fosse introduzido seus links iniciariam imediatamente a adaptar-se ao padrão de seu uso e novos links não previstos pelo autor poderiam nele surgir se o seu potencial ultrapassasse um determinado limiar. Uma vez que tal mecanismo de certa forma assimilaria o conhecimento coletivo de todos os usuários da WWW, supõe-se que os resultados obtidos viriam a ser muito mais úteis, abrangentes e confiáveis do que qualquer sistema de indexação concebido segundo os interesses de indivíduos ou grupos. A mesma idéia também se aplica a contextos onde a organização da rede se daria a partir de um determinado ponto de partida - um servidor ou uma rede de servidores em uma organização - espalhando-se sem limites por toda a Web. A rede formada segundo tal principio certamente se aproximaria muito da semântica informal do grupo de usuários considerado, que poderia ser caracterizado sob muitos aspectos a partir desta representação. O estudo das redes produzidas por auto-organização decorrente da observação da atividade de navegação na WWW pode levar ainda à identificação de estruturas e construções semânticas básicas, capazes de serem recombinadas na formação de representações mais complexas com múltiplas finalidades, tais como a otimização de redes de informações, mapeamento e representação do conhecimento compartilhado por especialistas, o provimento de um padrão para a identificação de idéias, etc. Bibliografia [BAK88] Bak, P.; C. Tang; e K. Wiesenfeld: Self-organized criticality. Physical Review A 38:364-374, 1988. [BOL96] Bollen, J.; Heylighen, F.: Algorithms for the Self-Organization of Distributed Multi-user Networks. In: R. Trappl (ed.). Cybernetics and Systems ‘96.. World Science, Singapore, 1996. [BRO94] Brown, J. H.: Complex ecological systems. Pages 419- 443 in G. Cowan, D. Pines, and D. Meltzer (eds.) Complexity: metaphors, models, and reality. Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts, 1994. [CAS91] Caswell, H.; J. E. Cohen. Communities in patchy environments: a model of disturbance, competition, and heterogeneity. p. 97-122 in J. Kolasa and S. T. A. Pickett (eds.): Ecological Heterogeneity. Springer, New York, 1991. [CHA75] Chaitin, G.J.: A Theory of Program Size Formally Equivalent to Information Theory. Journal of ACM 13(1966) ibid 22(1975), .p.329. [CRU94] Crutchfield, J. P.: Is anything ever new? In G. Cowan, D. Pines, and D. Melsner (eds.): SFI studies in the sciences of complexity XIX. Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts, 1994. [DEC97] Decker, N.: Self-Organizing Systems. University of New Mexico. Biology 576: Landscape Ecology & Macroscopic Dynamics. Albuquerque, 1997. [FOR94] Forrest, S.; T. Jones. Modeling complex adaptive systems with echo. P. 3-21 in R. J. Stoner and X. H. Yu, (eds.) Complex Systems: mechanisms of adaptation. IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1994. [GEL94] Gell-Mann, M.: The Quark and the Jaguar. W. H. Freeman, New York, 1994. [GRE93] Green, D. G.: Emergent behaviour in biological systems. P. 24-35 in D. G. Green and T. J. Bossomaier, editors. Complex Systems - From Biology to Computation. IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1993. [HEY88] Heylighen, F.: Building a Science of Complexity. 1988 Annual Conference of the Cybernetic Society. Londin, 1988. [HEY96] Heylighen, F.; Bollen, J.: The World Wide Web as a Superbrain: From Methafor to Model. In: Cybernetics and Systems ’96. World Science, Singapore, 1996. [HIE94] Hiebeler, D.: The swarm simulation system and individual-modeling based. In Decision Support 2001: advanced technology for natural resource management, 1994. [HOR95] Horgan, J. From complexity to perplexity. Scientific American (June 1995):104-109. [HOU88] Huston, M., D. DeAngelis, and W. Post. 1988.: New computer models unify ecological theory. Bioscience 38:682-691, 1988. [ISO97] ISOC - Internet Society: Internet Growth Statistics. February 1997. ftp://ftp.isoc.org/isoc/History/90s_host.txt [ITO93] Ito, K; Y. Gunji.: Self-organisation of living systems: towards criticality at the edge of chaos. BioSystems 33:17-24, 1993. [KAU91] Kauffman, S. A. 1991.: Coevolution to the edge of chaos: coupled fitness landscapes, poised states, and coevolutionary avalanches. Journal of Theoretical Biology 149:467-505, 1991. [KAU93] Kauffman, S. A.: Origins of Order: self- organization and selection in evolution. Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1993. [KAU95] Kauffman, S. A.: At Home in the Universe. Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. [KAW94] Kawata, M., and Y. Toquenaga.: Artificial individuals and global patterns. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 9:417-421, 1994. [KIL96] Killen, J.: Internet: Global Penetration 1996 and Forecast 2000. December 1996. http://www.killen.com/ipf.htm. [KOL65] Kolmogorov, A. N.: Three Approaches to the Quantitative Definition od Information. Problems of Information Transmission v1 n.1 pp. 1-1, 1965. [LAN90] Langton, C. G.: Computation at the edge of chaos: phase transitions and emergent computation. Physica D 42:12-37, 1990. [LAN94] Langton, C. G., (ed.): Artificial Life III. Addison-Wesley, New York, 1994. [MIT93] Mitchell, M., P. Hraber, and J. P. Crutchfield. 1993. Revisiting the edge of chaos: Evolving cellular automata to perform computations. Complex Systems 7:89-130, 1993 [NIC89] Nicolis, G., and I. Prigogine: Exploring complexity. W. H. Freeman, New York, 1989. [OLS95] Olson, R. L., and R. A. Sequeira: An emergent computational approach to the study of ecosystem dynamics. Ecological Modelling 79:95-120, 1995. [PAC88] Packard, N. H. 1988. Adaptation toward the edge of chaos. P. 293-301 in A. J. Mandell, J. A. S. Kelso, and M. F. Shlesinger (eds.) Dynamic Patterns in Complex Systems. World Scientific, Singapore, 1988. [PAL96] Palazzo, L.: Aspectos da Modelagem de Sistemas de Informações Inteligentes. Exame de Qualificação em Profundidade. CPGCC da UFRGS, Programa de doutorado, agosto de 1996. [PER95] Perry, D. A. 1995. Self-organizing systems across scales. Trends in Evolution and Ecology 10:241-244, 1995. [PRI84] Prigogine, I.; Stengers, I.: Order Out Of Chaos. Bantam Books, New York, 1984. [SHU92] Shugart, H. H., T. M. Smith, and W. M. Post: The potential for application of individual-based simulation models for assessing the effects of global change. Annual Review of Ecological Systems 23:15-38, 1992. [SOL95] Sole, R. V.; S. C. Manrubia.: Are rainforests self-organized in a critical state? Journal of Theoretical Biology 173:31-40, 1995. [SOL95a] Sole, R. V.; O. Miramontes.: Information at the edge of chaos in fluid neural networks. Physica D 80:171- 180, 1995. [SWE89] Swenson, R.: Emergent attractors and the law of maximum entropy production: foundations to a theory of general evolution. Systems Research 6:187-197, 1989. [WAL92] Waldrop, M.M. Complexity: the emerging science at the edge of order and chaos. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992. [YAT87]Yates, F. E.(ed.): Self-Organizing Systems: the emergence of order. Plenum Press, New York, 1987. [ZAK96] Zakon, R. H.: Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v.2.5, July 1996. http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Internet

Escandinávia bbb

How Sweden & Denmark Ride the Imperialist Wave, w/ Torkil Lauesen https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ri20jd4iFk

Roger Chartier sobre mentalidades

evolução do pensamdento da École des Annales https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wfef8Nbky0M

A destruição da razão Lukács

A destruição da razão Lukács https://www.marxists.org/portugues/lukacs/1954/mes/91.pdf

Aristóteles - animal político bbb

Aristóteles - animal político bbb https://www.academia.edu/6310238/The_centrality_of_politeia_for_Aristotle_s_Politics_Aristotle_s_continuing_significance_for_social_and_political_science Bates 155 14 One could argue that the questions that are raised (implicitly and explicitly) not only at 6.8 but throughout Book 6 and even Books 4–5, point us to the kind of questioning that happened in Book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Regarding the version of the NE used, see Irwin (1985) and Grant (1885). 15 Regarding the nation, for Aristotle the nation (ethnos) is more the given people or tribe, some- thing that lacks viability as a political system. Aristotle does note that tribal rule often operates in earlier times via the rule of kings but suggests that, as peoples evolve and develop and form political communities, tribal (ethnos) rule and kingly rule become less and less present. Also the nation as a politically viable unit is something that would not arise for seventeen centuries after Aristotle and it has political viability only from the help of the modern concept of the state. The state is not something Aristotle spoke of. Nor is it something he creates, no matter how many translators of him and the classical Greek authors insist on translating ‘state’ for ‘polis’. The state is a product of modern political philosophy. It is understood to be a Machiavellian over- turning of the classical modes and order (see De Alvarez, 1989: xii–xvii, xxxii–xxxiii; Hexter, 1956: 113–138; Mansfield, 1983: 849–857; Strauss, 1962 [1936]: xv; also see De Alvarez, 1999; Manent, 1994b; Mansfield, 1989; Masters, 1989b; Strauss, 1989: 39–55, 1991). 16 Montesquieu’s and Tocqueville’s focus on despotism is rather interesting in light of the point I am making here. Perhaps there is more connection to Aristotle in these writers than is com- monly held, given their treatment of despotism is clearly seen to be opposing force to politics for those authors, echoing much of what is implicitly raised by Aristotle about the political dimensions of despotic rule in Politics 1 and 3. For an interesting comparison of Aristotle’s view with that of Tocqueville and Montesquieu see Mansfield (1989) and Manent (2006, 2007, 2010). References Agamben G (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life, tr. Heller-Roazen D. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Ambler W (1985) Aristotle’s understanding of the naturalness of the City. Review of Politics 47: 53–95. Arendt H (1958) The Human Condition. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Barker E (ed. & tr.) (1946) The Politics of Aristotle. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Bates Jr CA (2003) Aristotle’s Best Regime. Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press. Bennington G (2008) For better and for worse (there again . . .). Diacritics 38(1–2): 92–103. Bennington G (2009) Political animals. Diacritics 39(2): 21–35. De Alvarez LPS (tr.) (1989) Niccolo Machiavelli: The Prince. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. De Alvarez LPS (1999) Machiavelli’s Enterprise: A commentary on The Prince. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press. Derrida J (2009) The Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. I, tr. Bennington G. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Derrida J (2012) The Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. II, tr. Bennington G. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Dietz M (2012) Between polis and empire: Aristotle’s Politics. American Political Science Review 106(2): 275–293. Dreizhnter A (1970) Aristoteles’ Politica. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Everson S (ed.) (1996). Aristotle: The politics and the constitution of Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hardt M, Negri A (2000) Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 156 Social Science Information 53(1) Hexter JH (1956) Il Principe and lo stato. Studies in the Renaissance 4: 113–138. Hobbes T (1991 [1651]) Leviathan, ed. Tuck R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Irwin T (ed. & tr.) (1985) Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Keyt D (1987) Three fundamental theorems in Aristotle’s Politics. Phronesis 32(1): 54–79. Keyt D (ed. & tr.) (1999) Aristotle’s Politics, Books V and VI. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lord C (1984) Aristotle: The Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Manent P (1994b) The modern state. In: Lilla M (ed.) New French Thought: Political philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 123–133. Masters RD (1989a) Gradualism and discontinuous change in evolutionary theory and political philosophy. Journal of Social and Biological Structures 12: 281–301. Masters RD (1989b) The Nature of Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mulgan RG (1974) Aristotle’s doctrine that man is a political animal. Hermes 120: 438–445. Newman WL (ed.) (1973) The Politics of Aristotle. New York, NY: Arno Press. (4 vols) NewsyScience (2012) Prehistoric flutes date back 40,000 years. NewsyScience 294 videos, 26 May. Pocock JGA (1975) The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reeve CDC (1998) Aristotle: The Politics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Ross WD (1957) Aristotle’s Politica. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rousseau JJ (1964) The First and Second Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ed. and tr. Masters R, Masters J. New York, NY: St Martins Press. Saunders TJ (ed. & tr.) (1991) The Politics. New York, NY: Penguin. Simpson P (1997) The Politics of Aristotle –- Translation and Introduction. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Simpson P (1998) A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Strauss L (1962 [1936]) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its basis and its genesis, tr. Sinclair EM. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Todorov T (1981) Introduction to Poetics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Vergano D (2012) Prehistoric flutes date to 42,000 years ago. USA Today. Available at: http://con- tent.usatoday.com/communities/sciencefair/post/2012/05/prehistoric and: flutes-found-from- 42000-year-old cave/a> (accessed 24 May). Vlassopoulos K (2007) Unthinking the Greek Polis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Additional reading Almond G, Powell Jr GB, Dalton R, Strom K (2008) Comparative Politics Today: A world view. New York, NY: Pearson. (9th ed.) Arnhart L (1990) Aristotle, chimpanzees, and other political animals. Social Science Information 29(1): 479–559. Arnhart L (1994) The Darwinian biology of Aristotle’s political animals. American Journal of Political Science 38: 464–485. Arnhart L (1995) The new Darwinian naturalism in political theory. American Political Science Review 89: 289–400. Aristotle (1984) The Athenian Constitution, tr. and ed. Rhodes PJ. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Bartlett R (1994a) Aristotle’s science of the best regime. American Political Science Review 88(1): 143–155. Bartlett R (1994b) The realism of classical political science. American Journal of Political Science 38(2): 381–402. Bluhm W (1962) The place of ‘polity’ in Aristotle’s theory of the ideal state. The Journal of Politics 24(4): 743–753. Bates 157 Blythe JM (1992) Ideal Government and The Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bookman JT (1992) The wisdom of the many: An analysis of the arguments of Book III and IV of Aristotle’s Politics. History of Political Thought 13(1): 1–12. Cherry KM (2009) The problem of polity: Political participation and Aristotle’s best politeia. Journal of Politics 71(4): 1406–1421. Coby P (1986) Aristotle’s four concepts of politics. Western Political Science Quarterly 39(3): 480–503. Coby P (1988) Aristotle’s Three Cities and the problem of factions. Journal of Politics 50(4): 896–919. Dahl R (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Dahl R (1964) Modern Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Davis M (1996) The Politics of Philosophy: A commentary on Aristotle’s Politics. Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. De Tocqueville A (2000) Democracy in America, tr. Mansfield Jr HC, Winthrop D. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Diamond M (1981) The Founding of the Democratic Republic. Itasca, IL: FE Peacock. During I (1966) Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens [Aristotle: Presentation and Interpretation of his Thought]. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter. Easton D (1953) The Political System: An inquiry into the state of political science. New York, NY: Knopf. Eubin JP (1993) Democracy ancient and modern. PS: Political Science and Politics 26(3): 478– 481. Ewbank MB (2005) Politeia as focal reference in Aristotle’s taxonomy of regimes. Review of Metaphysics 53(3): 815–841. Farrar C (1988) The Origins of Democratic Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Finer SE (1997) The History of Government from the Earliest Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (3 vols) Finley MI (1985) Democracy Ancient and Modern. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. (revised ed.) Fukuyama F (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York, NY: The Free Press. Fukuyama F (2011) The Origins of Political Order. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Grant A (1885) The Ethics of Aristotle. London: Longman, Green and Co. (4th ed. revised; 2 vols) Hansen MH (1993). Aristotle’s alternative to the sixfold model of constitutions. Aristote et Ate’nes = Aristotle and Athens. Fribourg (Switzerland): Séminaire d’histore ancienne, 93–101. Hansen MH (1994) Polis, Politeuma and Politeia: A Note on Arist. Pol. 1278b6–14. In: Whitehead D (ed.) From Political Architecture to Stephanus Byzantius: Sources for the ancient Greek polis. Stuttgart: F Steiner, 91–98. Huntington S (1981) American Politics: The promise of disharmony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Huntington S (2006 [1968]) Political Order and Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Jaffa HV (1975) What is politics? An interpretation of Aristotle’s Politics: The Conditions of Freedom. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 9–72. Johnson C (1988) Aristotle’s polity: Mixed or middle constitution? History of Political Thought 9(2): 189–204. Kant I (1991) Kant: Political writings, ed. Reiss H. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kantorowicz E (1957) The King’s Two Bodies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keyt D, Miller F (eds) (1991) A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 158 Social Science Information 53(1) Kraut D (ed. & tr.) (1997) Aristotle: Politics, Books VI and VII. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kraut D (2002) Aristotle: Political philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kullman W (1980) Der Mensch als politisches Lebewesen bei Aristoteles [Man as a political ani- mal in Aristotle]. Hermes 108(3): 456–477. Lindsay TK (1992a) Aristotle’s qualified defence of democracy through ‘political mixing’. Journal of Politics 54(1): 101–119. Lindsay TK (1992b) Liberty, equality, power: Aristotle’s critique of the democratic ‘presupposi- tion’. American Journal of Political Science 36(3): 743–761. Lockyer A (1988) Aristotle: The Politics. In: Forsyth M, Keens-Soper M (eds) A Guide to the Political Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lord C (1987) Aristotle. In: Strauss L, Cropsey J (eds) History of Political Philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 118–154. (3rd ed.) Lord C, O’Connor D (eds) (1991) Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lowenthal A, Jaquette J (2009) Samuel P. Huntington 1927–2008. New Perspectives Quarterly 26(2): 64–83. Manent P (1994a) An Intellectual History of Liberalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Manent P (1994c) The contest for command. In: Lilla M (ed.) New French Thought: Political philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 178–185. Manent P (1995) Christianity and democracy, tr. Mahoney D, Seaton P. Crisis, Part I (January): 40–44; Part II (February): 42–48. Manent P (2006) A World Beyond Politics: A defense of the nation-state. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Manent P (2007) Democracy Without Nations? The fate of self-government in Europe. Wilmington DE: ISI Press. Manent P (2010) Les Métamorphoses de la cité. Paris: Flammarion. Mansfield Jr HC (1983) On the impersonality of the modern state: A comment on Machiavelli’s use of Stato. American Political Science Review 77(4): 849–857. Mansfield Jr HC (1989) Taming the Prince. New York, NY: The Free Press. Mansfield Jr HC (1995) Self-interest rightly understood. Political Theory 21(1): 48–66. Meier C (1990) The Greek Discovery of Politics, tr. McLintocks D. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mulgan RG (1977) Aristotle’s Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mulgan RG (1991) Aristotle’s analysis of oligarchy and democracy. In: Keyt D, Miller F (eds) A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Oxford: Blackwell, 279–306. Nagel B (2006) The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Nichols MP (1991) Citizens and Statesmen. Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Pascal M, Gruengard O (1989) Knowledge and Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Patzig HVG (ed.) (1989) IX Symposium Aristitelicum: Studien zur Politik des Aristoteles. Gottingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht. Rasmussen D, Den Uyl D (1991) Liberty and Order: An Aristotelian defence of liberal order. LaSalle, IL: Open Court. Robinson R (ed. & tr.) (1962) Aristotle’s Politics, Books III and IV. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rousseau JJ (1978) On the Social Contract, ed. and tr. Masters R, Masters J. New York, NY: St Martins Press. Rubinstein N (1987) The history of the word politicus in early modern Europe. In: Pagden A (ed.) The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sachs J (ed. & tr.) (2012) Aristotle The Politics. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing. Saunders TJ (ed. & tr.) (1995) Aristotle Politics, Books I and II. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Saxonhouse A (1992) The Fear of Diversity. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Schmitt C (1976) The Concept of the Political, tr. Schwab G. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Merleau-Ponty e a obra de arte", por Marilena Chaui bbb

Merleau-Ponty e a obra de arte", por Marilena Chaui" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=73E9CwycVq8

Meditações metafísicas Descartes

Meditações metafísicas Descartes https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/7888155/course/section/6531687/DESCARTES%2C%20R.%20Meditac%CC%A7o%CC%83es%20%281%C2%AA%20e%202%C2%AA%29.pdf

FEnomenologia da percepção´bbb

EXPLICANDO A FENOMENOLOGIA DA PERCEPÇÃO DE MERLEAU-PONTY | Paulo Niccoli Ramirez https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlnoXBcqy3U https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZs-4fLUJ9c FRanklin Leopoldo

Aristóteles Metafisica diego fusaro bbb

Aristóteles Metafisica diego fusaro https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t49DvA5h2fg

Aristoteles comunidade bbb

Aristoteles comunidade bbb https://www.academia.edu/9635522/The_Distinction_between_the_Economy_and_Politics_in_Aristotles_Thought_and_the_Rise_of_the_Social?email_work_card=thumbnail Introduction At the outset of the Politics and of the Nicomachean Ethics, 2 Aristotle declares that both texts are composedwith the aim of establishing that the polis is the com-munity in which man, as a communal creature ( zoonkoinonikon ), 3 may live happily. Aristotle not only de-clares that the polis is the “most supreme” of all com-munities because it is the community in which man,qua communal creature, may pursue the best mode of life, a pursuit which is “the aim of politics”; in thesecond book of the Politics he also argues zealouslyagainst Plato’s call to eradicate the distinction betweenthecommunitiesofthe polis andthe oikos bysharingallpossessions among citizens of the polis , as if it were agigantic oikos. How does Aristotle convince us that thisdistinction must be preserved, and that, moreover, the polis ,andnotthe oikos ,isthecommunitythatfacilitatesthe good life?A satisfactory theoretical answer to these questionscannotbefoundintheliteraturethatstudiestheconductof the ancient oikos, 4 as compared with that of the polis .The oikos / polis literaturemakesfrequentuseofHannahArendt’s reading of Aristotle as a reference point. In herwork, 5 Arendt relies on Aristotle’s distinction betweenthe economic community that, as he defines it, comesabout in the course of nature for everyday purposes,” 6 and the political community that, although it “comesinto existence for the sake of life,” exists “for the goodlife,” 7 namely the kind of life that enables citizens to“pursue the best mode of life.” 8 Arendt’s description of the economy, that is, the conduct of the oikos , 9 has beencriticized, however. Even though most scholars accepther description of the oikos as the sphere for managingthenecessitiesoflife,aspherethatwasmeanttosustainthe polis , they present a much more complicated, lesspolarized relation between the oikos and the polis . Inaddition, contemporary literature persuasively presentsthe oikos as a diversified domain in which there existallkindsofhumanrelationsbesidesdespoticones.Theystress the friendship between husband and wife, it be-ing for the sake of happiness and not just as a meansto support the polis , the role of education of childrenwithin the household, the different kinds of slaves, theuse of other means of government beside violence,and the household’s existence in and for itself. In this depiction, not only the master, but many participants inthe household can demonstrate virtue, doing so withinits bounds. It ought to be stressed that what Aristotleand his contemporaries called the economy (oikono-mia), the management (nemein) of the oikos , must notbe mistaken with what we, moderns, call the economy— that is, market relations. Moreover, Aristotle himself regarded market transactions — “the other form of theart of supply ( χρηµατιστικ ῆ ς )” 10 — as standing instark contrast to economics. Another crucial distinctionbetween ancient and modern economics has to do withethics. While modern economics “involves inter alia afirm rejection of the “ethics-related” view,” 11 the an-cient Greeks held that the “economy is intelligible onlyas an ethical domain.” 12 Furthermore, the reason whyAristotle made sure to distinguish between the econ-omy and the market is ethical. As discussed in somedetails in Part 2.3.2, he held that the market arousesthe vice of wantonness — the negation of the economicvirtue of soundness of mind — and as such underminesthe ability to live a happy communal life in both oikos and polis . 13 But while contemporary scholars 14 have providedus with vivid portraits of the oikos as a self-sufficientsphereinwhichmanyofitsmemberscoulddemonstratevirtue and live a relatively happy life, 15 they have notdiscussed in purely theoretical terms their claim that theeconomiccommunitywasindeedhappy,self-sufficient,governed by perfect virtue and manifesting human mul-tiplicity.Moreover,theyhavenotsufficientlyaccountedforthereasonsthatmakethe polis supremeinallhumancommunities. The more complex picture drawn by con-temporaryliteraturerepeatedlyappearsinthecontextof examining each of Aristotle’s three criteria for uphold-ing the distinction between the oikos and the polis : 16 the community’s self-sufficiency and completeness; themultiplicity that appears in it; and its conformity withvirtue.ButasIargueinthisarticle,thoughtheeconomyappears at times to withstand the test of these criteria,emerging as no less self-sufficient than the polis , asexhibiting a greater level of multiplicity and as gov-erned by a perfect virtue equal in rank to the virtuedemonstrated in politics, the supremacy of the politi-cal community over the economic is nonetheless wellestablished by Aristotle. Constellations Volume 00, No 0, 2014. C  2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2 Constellations Volume 00, Number 0, 2014 2. The Three Criteria for a HappyCommunal Life The correspondence between happiness and acting vir-tuously is put forward by Aristotle in his discussionof the nature of happiness, where he argues that “hap-piness is a certain activity of soul in conformity withperfect virtue.” 17 Aristotle adds two further criteria forthe appearance of the happy life in politics: “If, there-fore, the more self-sufficing a community is, the moredesirable is its condition, then a lesser degree of unityis more desirable than a greater.” 18 Thus, according toAristotle, in order to decide which of all human com-munities is the one in which humans can indeed livehappily, one must examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2.1 Self-Sufficiency and Completeness The first criterion for calling a life happy is that it isself-sufficient: Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is itschief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good; 20 [. . .] In speaking of degrees of completeness, we meanthatathing pursued asan end initself is morecompletethan one pursued as a means to something else, andthat a thing never chosen as a means to anything elseis more complete than things chosen both as ends inthemselves and as means to that thing; and accordinglyathingchosenalwaysasanendandneverasameanswecall absolutely complete. Now happiness above all elseappearstobeabsolutelycompleteinthissensewhereasthe Supreme Good seems to be something complete[. . .] The same conclusion also appears to follow froma consideration of the self-sufficiency of happiness —for it is felt that the complete good must be a thingsufficient in itself.[. . .] we take a self-sufficient thingto mean a thing which merely standing by itself alonerenders life desirable lacking in nothing, and such athing we deem happiness to be. 21 The level of self-sufficiency and the completenessattached to it positions all things on the Aristotelianscale of the good life, at whose head stands happiness.Its status at the top of the ladder as the “end all actionsaim at” is justified by its being self-sufficien st examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2 Constellations Volume 00, Number 0, 2014 2. The Three Criteria for a HappyCommunal Life The correspondence between happiness and acting vir-tuously is put forward by Aristotle in his discussionof the nature of happiness, where he argues that “hap-piness is a certain activity of soul in conformity withperfect virtue.” 17 Aristotle adds two further criteria forthe appearance of the happy life in politics: “If, there-fore, the more self-sufficing a community is, the moredesirable is its condition, then a lesser degree of unityis more desirable than a greater.” 18 Thus, according toAristotle, in order to decide which of all human com-munities is the one in which humans can indeed livehappily, one must examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2.1 Self-Sufficiency and Completeness The first criterion for calling a life happy is that it isself-sufficient: Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is itschief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good; 2

animal racional historia de uma dfinição bbb

animal racional historia de uma definición https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/3611/361133110012.pdf Una de las cuestiones más discutidas en la historia del pensamiento es la que se refiere a la definición del ser humano. Ya en la antigüedad se buscó aquello que lo distingue del resto de seres y se estableció, de acuerdo con Platón y Aristóteles, que era la razón el elemento diferenciador, con lo cual se inició una larga e influyente tradición filosófica, que también ha sido muy criticada por algunos pensadores modernos y contemporáneos.

Cenas de um casamento 4 a 6

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yC8xAUaDEv8

Aristoteles vida e obra bbb

Aristotle and the History of Political Ideas: Citizenship https://www.academia.edu/79403727/Aristotle_and_the_History_of_Political_Ideas_Citizenship?email_work_card=thumbnail Introduction Contemporary political philosophies, which are sometimes referred to with the expressionMarx used for false justifications , “ideologies”, are social or political theories . Political parties andsocial movements have their own ideology, that is to say, their “vision of the world . ” Contemporary political science aims at making a neutral analysis of political reality, or a theory . Regimes,constitutions, political parties, elections are observed impartially, “from the point of view of Mars , ” as the French saying goes. It is fundamentally theoretical research. For this purpose, current politicalscience sometimes coins new expressions (for example, a democracy can be either consensus ormajoritarian; dominant values can be materialistic or “expressive , ” etc.). Aristotle ’ s “ political science ” is different from ours, first of all, because it sees politics ascitizens or rulers facing concrete issues. His view is not essentially different from the commonsense view: it goes further, but in the same direction. It does not observe “political phenomen a ” from outside. There are no new technical words in his political books alien to the practical knowledge ofGreek citizens, nor does he use “scientific” terminology (and even less inferences from a “theory”). His description of ethics and politics is certainly not intended to be neutral and begins precisely bystudying what “ good ” means. In fact, politics has only recently become a theoretical science, movingradically away from the Aristotelian methods and perspective. We borrow from his vocabulary, but,as modern men, we try to make it precise and scientific.One of the keywords we borrow is the concept of citizenship. We no longer live in self-governing cities, but the concept “civic” and the very word “politics” derive from civitas and polis .In translations of the works of Plato and Aristotle, polis is sometimes incorrectly translated as “ S tate” (or at best, as “city - state”), but the difference between polis and State is very profound. The ancientcity is different from the modern State because Greek politics did not consist, as it does today, inmanaging a population within a certain territory. The Greek “regime” is not opposed to “c ivilsociety ,” as distinct from political organization. The ancient city is not spontaneously born out ofanarchy, like the modern state. The city must be founded by men and ordered by legislators. The political authority of the ancient city, sometimes compared to a ship, does not seek to organize a sortof cruise, where passengers live their own private lives while everyone is taken along by the cruise. Neither is the ancient political authority a “sovereign” who manages everythin g that exists in aterritory, like a guard who manages a forest park; the sovereign rules men and distributes offices.In the polis , the free part of the population is called to participate actively in a special “institution” that is the city, with a view to the excellence and goodness of its members. Ethicalinquiry aims at attaining nobility or good, and political inquiry aims at the good of all members of the city. None of these inquiries are “neutral” becau se neutrality would obscure the main object ofthe noble life and the place where virtue or excellence ( arété ) flourishes. “ Natural justice” is not about the right of man as man, but part of political right. What is just by nature is only understood and can only flourish in the environment of the polis . This thesis isdiametrically opposed to the later theses of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, for whom the formation ofcivil society implies moving away from the state of nature and is, therefore, unnatural.Only with Stoicism and Christianity did the good of man come to be understood as, if notalien or indifferent, much more important than, and “separable” from , political life, makingcitizenship infinitely less important. This is why today we think that a “merely” political question is somewhat less serious and profound than a moral one. Life and Works Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in the small town of Stagira, in the Macedonia region, in thenortheast of Greece. His father was the personal physician to the King of Macedonia, Amyntas, Alexander the Great's grandfather, and came from a line of famous “physicists” or medical doctors. On the death of his father, his tutor sent him at the age of seventeen to study in Athens, perhaps first at Isocrates’ rhetorical school and then at Plato’s Academy. Plato was then almost 60 years old. Aristotle remained in the Academia until Plato ’ s death in 347, but curiously there are no textual references in either Plato’s or Aristotle's writings to personal contact between the two. Plato introduces a young Aristotle who discusses the theory of ideas in the Parmenides , 1 and Aristotle doesnot hide his differences versus Plato — if the unnamed person who is described as a friend of ideasI isPlato; Aristotle just claims to be his friend, but to be a greater friend of the truth. Hellenistic and Arab biographers nonetheless collected many stories of Aristotle’s life at theAcademy. It is said, for example, that he was the only one who remained to the end in Plato’s lectures (on the Timaeus ), that Plato never began his lectures befo re Aristotle’s arriving, that he read to exhaustion with a stone in his hand that would fall with a noise to awaken him, and that he was nicknamed “the reader.” It is still an open question whether Aristotle was fundamentally an heir oran opponent of Plato. On his master’s death, Aristotle departed for Assos , on the northwest coast of Asia Minor.There he collected many examples of the marine fauna that he would use in his work On the Parts of Animals , where he presents detailed descriptions, revealing curiosity “even for the most repellent” living beings. He lived for three years in the royal court of the tyrant Hermias, where he met his future wife, the ruler’s adopted daughter. On Hermias’ death, he dedicated to him a hymn to excellence 2 that survives complete. He left Hermias’ court, joining Theophrast , another student at the Academia. In 343, at the request of Philip of Macedonia, he joined the king’s court with the mission of educating his then -13-year-old sonAlexander, 3 on whose relationship with Aristotle much has been speculated. The young Alexanderthe Great, however, becomes a military commander of the at age 15, and a year later temporarilyreplaced his father as regent; thus, it is uncertain what Aristotle’s role as his tutor really was. 3 Whatever the case, Aristotle only returned to Athens in 335, after 13 years of absence; he began teaching in a gymnasium area dedicated to Apollo, known as the Lyceum, which Socrates hadfrequented long before. In this gymnasium 4 Aristotle taught a wide variety of subjects: botany, biology, logic, music, astronomy, medicine, cosmology, physics, rhetorical ethics, politics and poetics. According to Aulus Gaelius, some subjects were taught in classes open to all (his exotericteachings), while other subjects such as the natural sciences and metaphysics were taught to a morerestricted group ( achroatic ). According to Strabo, he assembled the first known library. After his wife’s death, he had a son by his former slave, named Nicomachus, after Aristotle’sfather. In the face of the sudden death of Alexander and the ensuing “revolution” in Athens, and toavoid an accusation of impiety ( asebeia ), he decided to retire to an island near the Attic coast,Eubeia, where he died of natural causes in 322, just a year after leaving Athens. 5 When writing his treatise on politics, Aristotle thus had an unusually wide direct experienceof public life. He lived in the royal court of Macedonia and at the court of a benevolent tyrant in Asia Minor; and, as a “metic” (or resident foreigner), he also lived for over thirty years in democratic Athens, where he witnessed two critical moments of the city ’s history: first, its recovery at the end ofthe Peloponnese War — years of heated debate over the Pan-Hellenic ideal — and second, its end as anindependent city, falling under the protectorate of King Antipater of Macedonia. Except for fragments of some dialogues quoted by Hellenistic authors, and the Protrepticus , ahymn to wisdom which was eventually fully reconstructed, all Aristotle’s surviving works appear to be “ lecture notes, ” with signs of internal reviews and passages inserted at various times. Theorganization of the texts into the “books” we now possess may be the work of a later editor. What isclear is that the list of Aristotle’s extant works does not match any of the Hellenistic lists. Cicero’s testimony suggests that he wrote works of great literary beauty that have probably not come down to us. Aristotle’s treatises nonetheless have a certain charm, for we seem to hear him “thinking aloud,” with sudden steps forward and flashbacks, ellipses and asides. The “sciences” ( epistêmê ) or branches of knowledge, according to Aristotle, are all eithertheoretical, practical or “productive . ” These great classes of research presuppose, however, a preparatory study, that of logic. The most important of Aris totle’s logical works are in the Organon ,containing the Categories , On Interpretation , Prior Analytics , Posterior Analytics , Topics , and OnSophistic Refutation. The branches of philosophy beyond these preparatory studies are defined by their ends:contemplative sciences aim at knowledge for its own sake; practical sciences at acting well; and productive knowledge at making useful or beautiful objects.The word epistêmê means any kind of knowledge, but in the strict sense it designates onlytheoretical knowledge about the world, animals, man, and what is beyond the universe (or cosmos).The sciences or branches of theoretical philosophy are three: physics (which includes all natural sciences), mathematics, and “first philosophy. Aristotle’s works on the theoretical sciences include Physics , On Generation and Corruption , On the Heavens , Metaphysics , De Anima , the Parva Naturalia (short treatises on nature), History of Animals , On the Parts of Animals , Movement of Animals , Meteorology , The Development of Animals and Generation of Animals . The extant works on the practical sciences are the Nicomachean Ethics ,the Eudemian Ethics , the Magna Moralia , Politics , and the Constitution of Athens . On the non- philosophical, merely productive sciences, his only surviving treatises are on Rhetoric and Poetics ,the latter not in full.Of the nearly two hundred titles mentioned in the Hellenistic catalogs, we have only about thirty of his books, although it is unclear how titles in both lists relate. Aristotle on Politics and Ethics Our English word politics derives from the Greek politikos , “relating to the polis .” Aristotle’s treatise is titled Politikê after p olitikê epistêmê , political knowledge (also translated as politicalscience). It is not only his most important practical political treatise, but it is often considered to be the oldest known wok of political “science” 7 – a work that still defines the subject and the themes of modern political science. (Plato’s Republic and the Laws are earlier, but they are dialogues, that is,something between dramas and formal treatises.) Aristotle’s science, however, is , as we said before, very different from ours, in the first place because he views politics as a citizen or as a statesman, not as a detached observer. His view is notessentially different from the commonsense view: it goes further, albeit in the same direction. Hedoes not contemplate the “political phenomenon” from some external vantage point, or fromnowhere.Today we often use the same concepts expressed by Aristotle (or Plato before him), butwithout the present intention of establishing a scientific terminology, so our use of terms such as “regime,” revolution, civic and citizenship, is in a sense derivative. Further we add our own specificterminology: terms such as “consociationalism” or “polyarchy.” By contrast, in Aristotle’s Politics there is not a single technical word that does not form part of the practical knowledge of the Greekcitizens.Politics, in fact, only recently became a theoretical science, while for Aristotle it waseminently practical knowledge, dispensing with some of the accuracy of the speculative sciences.Politics as a practical science is concerned with the happiness and excellence of the citizens. In the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle explains that all the arts and all forms of inquiry aimat some good. But there is a great variety of goods or ends, to which the many arts and manysciences roughly correspond (e.g., medicine has as its end health, and shipbuilding aims at an endwhich is the boat). Some ends are desired in pursuit of others, and so there are some arts that are “architectural.” One of these is politics because it governs the other practical sciences, and the ends of the latter aremeans to its end which is human good Returning to the problem of the nature of political inquiry at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics , 9 Aristotle states that just as medical treatises are useful only to experienced doctors, socollections of laws and studies of regimes are only useful to those who have the ability to make agood judgment. Before him, he says, thinkers have left the subject of legislation and regime( polytheia ) under-explored, but the subject needs to be addressed so that the philosophy of human things is complete (this is quite a statement considering that his master, Plato, wrote a lengthy booktitled Politeia ).Aristotle sets out the aims of his study of public life: (1) to review the valuable contributionsmade by his predecessors; (2) to determine, in the light of the descriptions of the regimes ( polytheies ) previously surveyed, the factors that preserve and destroy each kind of regime and the reasons whysome cities are well governed and others are not; (3) finally, to decide which is the best regime andwhat laws and means should be employed to establish such a regime. 10 In short, politics is an architectural art, which he calls the philosophy of human things. Thefirst part of his politics is presented in his ethical writings, and the second in the treatise on politics. Aristotle’s political “science” therefore includes the two domains that modern philosophers call moral philosophy and political philosophy, but the umbrella under which he gathers both is notethics, as in medieval philosophy, or (universal) mora lity as in Kant. Instead, Aristotle’s ethical inquiry is deeply political, or related to regimes. The Books in Politics The work on political regimes that has come down to us seems less like a complete treatisethan a collection of essays or lectures on various subjects, which could have been compiled by a latereditor rather than Aristotle himself. Politics consists of eight books whose themes are roughly asfollows 5 things is complete (this is quite a statement considering that his master, Plato, wrote a lengthy booktitled Politeia ).Aristotle sets out the aims of his study of public life: (1) to review the valuable contributionsmade by his predecessors; (2) to determine, in the light of the descriptions of the regimes ( polytheies ) previously surveyed, the factors that preserve and destroy each kind of regime and the reasons whysome cities are well governed and others are not; (3) finally, to decide which is the best regime andwhat laws and means should be employed to establish such a regime. 10 In short, politics is an architectural art, which he calls the philosophy of human things. Thefirst part of his politics is presented in his ethical writings, and the second in the treatise on politics. Aristotle’s political “science” therefore includes the two domains that modern philosophers call moral philosophy and political philosophy, but the umbrella under which he gathers both is notethics, as in medieval philosophy, or (universal) mora lity as in Kant. Instead, Aristotle’s ethical inquiry is deeply political, or related to regimes.The Books in Politics The work on political regimes that has come down to us seems less like a complete treatisethan a collection of essays or lectures on various subjects, which could have been compiled by a latereditor rather than Aristotle himself. Politics consists of eight books whose themes are roughly asfollows:I. Nature of the city ( polis ) and the house ( oikos ).II. Study of Aristotle ’s predecessors’ contributions to the study of the best regimes ( polytheies ).III. Citizenship and regimes.IV. Inferior or defective regimes.V. Preservation and destruction of regimes.VI. Discussion of democracy and oligarchy.VII – VIII. Outline of the best regime (unfinished). This structure roughly corresponds to the program of regimes with which the Nicomachean Ethics ends. Scholars have raised several problems about the organization of the work. The firstquestion concerns the ordering of its eight books. Some authors argue that the debate on the bestconstitution (Books VII – VIII) should immediately follow Book III, which has a passage thatestablishes this connection. Indeed, the examination of cross-references has shown that books IV – V – VI form one series, just as books VII – VIII form another; and each series seems to “ignore” the other, 11 as if they constituted independent treatises. These two series could perhaps represent strata in the composition of the full book, with a more, so to say, “utopian” or idealistic focus and a more“empirical” focus, respectively. 10 E.N. 1181b15 – 22. 11 Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960). 6 A second disputed point, therefore, is the order of composition of these books, assuming that the order could reflect the evolution of Aristotle’s thought, in line with a progressive distancing from Plato’s teaching. 12 Is the polis natural? Although translations often do so, Aristotle never uses the word State, always referring to the polis or city. The city is a type of association that, like all associations, is formed for the sake ofsome kind of good, but the city is the most important as it is directed towards the mostcomprehensive end. Aristotle engages in controversy with those (unnamed, but many take this as a reference to Plato’s Statesman ) who claim that there is no essential difference between authority inthe polis and in other communities, in particular the “household”— a view Aristotle firmly rejects.According to Aristotle, the most basic society is the association between male and female,which is necessary for procreation and so involves children. The second most basic association isthat which exists between master and slave, which aims at survival, for there are strong-bodied people who are unable to look after themselves, and others who do not have the same physicalstrength but are endowed with self-mastery. These two associations are the origin of the “household.” Its development or natural growth gives rise to the village, which is able to satisfy many other needs that the household cannot, but there are many needs that neither the village or tribecan meet, and which require the association of many villages in a polis , the most perfect andcomplete association. The polis is the most comprehensive association since it aims at the “good life” rather than life as such or mere survival. Men come together out of necessity, but when they associate, theydiscover that the city can do more than protect life. The polis is the pinnacle of all associations thatexist by nature. As the family is natural, so the polis , which is the most self-sufficient although itseems conventional, is on the contrary in line with nature as it completes the end to which otherassociations tend (the telos or end of something is its perfection). 14 As a colt is not a horse in the fullsense and children, women or slaves (according to Aristotle) are not complete human beings, thevillage is not a complete association. The polis is defined by its self- sufficiency or “autarchy,” which implies the ability to foster happiness or to satisfy all natural human desires according to their orderof importance, including the life of the body and the life of the soul. 6 A second disputed point, therefore, is the order of composition of these books, assuming that the order could reflect the evolution of Aristotle’s thought, in line with a progressive distancing from Plato’s teaching. 12 Is the polis natural? Although translations often do so, Aristotle never uses the word State, always referring to the polis or city. The city is a type of association that, like all associations, is formed for the sake ofsome kind of good, but the city is the most important as it is directed towards the mostcomprehensive end. Aristotle engages in controversy with those (unnamed, but many take this as a reference to Plato’s Statesman ) who claim that there is no essential difference between authority inthe polis and in other communities, in particular the “household”— a view Aristotle firmly rejects.According to Aristotle, the most basic society is the association between male and female,which is necessary for procreation and so involves children. The second most basic association isthat which exists between master and slave, which aims at survival, for there are strong-bodied people who are unable to look after themselves, and others who do not have the same physicalstrength but are endowed with self-mastery. These two associations are the origin of the “household.” Its development or natural growth gives rise to the village, which is able to satisfy many other needs that the household cannot, but there are many needs that neither the village or tribecan meet, and which require the association of many villages in a polis , the most perfect andcomplete association. 13 The polis is the most comprehensive association since it aims at the “good life” rather than life as such or mere survival. Men come together out of necessity, but when they associate, theydiscover that the city can do more than protect life. The polis is the pinnacle of all associations thatexist by nature. As the family is natural, so the polis , which is the most self-sufficient although itseems conventional, is on the contrary in line with nature as it completes the end to which otherassociations tend (the telos or end of something is its perfection). 14 As a colt is not a horse in the fullsense and children, women or slaves (according to Aristotle) are not complete human beings, thevillage is not a complete association. The polis is defined by its self- sufficiency or “autarchy,” which implies the ability to foster happiness or to satisfy all natural human desires according to their orderof importance, including the life of the body and the life of the soul.The main alternatives to this conception — which some scholars today classify as “naturalistic” 15 —are two. The first states that the city is a mere human artifact, a pure “convention” (this view existed before Aristotle, and he intends to contest it). Another venerable alternative that healso excludes is that the city is something sacred (like Homer ’s “Sacred Trojan” created by the gods). The polis , in fact, was for the Greeks not only a mode of organization of authority but a mode oforganization of religious worship as well, for what we may (anachronistically) call the distinction between “C hurch and State ” was alien to the Greeks. Aristotle not only denies the merely “conventional” nature of the polis, but also denies that the city is sacred. He makes a historical argument: at first men were ruled by kings, and so we imagine divine rule as royalty, but this is nomore than an illusion — the God of Aristotle is very different from Zeus. If the city is natural, man is by nature an animal of the city or a “political animal.” The proof of a natural human propensity to live in cities is that reason or discourse ( logos ) is peculiar to man.Human beings are political animals by nature because nature, which does nothing in vain, endowsthem with speech, allowing them to communicate ethical concepts, such as justice, that areindispensable to — and presume — the household and the polis . 16 Other animals communicate, butunlike man they cannot convey praise and blame. There is no contradiction between city and nature;on the contrary, men fulfill their nature in the city. 17 Justice is the excellence pertaining to the polis since justice is the proper ordering of political association. This is diametrically opposed to the latertheses of Hobbes and Locke: for Aristotle there can be no right or justice prior to the city. After this introduction, Aristotle turns to parts of the city, which are associations, notindividuals. The polis is primary “in the order of nature” because the whole is prior to the part, as the body is primary in relation to a separate arm, which o nly ambiguously holds the name of “arm” when it loses its function. 18 Individual men as components of the city reappear only in book III of the Politics . But Aristotle explains the limitations of his metaphor: those who do not live in the polis aresometimes infrahuman, sometimes more than human (perhaps this happens accidentally, perhaps because they unfortunately live in tribes or empires). The city embraces a number of subordinate societies, such as the deme or tribe and the “household” or family, which include children and slaves, but the city takes precedence over theseelementary societies, not just because it is prior or larger, but because it fosters the most importantgood: happiness. The greatest good of the Greek city cannot be completely separated from the greatest good for its citizens, which is the noble life and a “humanistic” or “musical” education for those who are not tied by manual labor. In his series of ethical books, Aristotle deals with household management, but speaks aboveall of the most controversial relationship in his time, that is the relationship between master and slave(occupying much of Book I), and secondarily about the confusion between household management(or economics) and the art of wealth acquisition ( chrematistics ). The argument begins with a description of the development of the city-state from simplercommunities. Just as man and woman come together for reproduction, the master and slave cometogether for self-preservation. The natural master uses his intelligence to rule, and the slave employshis body to work. The household develops naturally from these elements in order to meet daily needsand several families come together to meet other needs, giving rise to the village, again inaccordance with nature. But even though the city emerges naturally, it is at the same time a creationof human intelligence. The greatest benefactor is, of course, the legislator ( nomothetês ), for the city’s legal system makes human beings just and virtuous and raises them above the bestiality into whichthey would otherwise fall. The domestic economy is natural because it allows the body to meet the needs of the body, but the chrematistic art or art of acquisition ceases to be natural when money is introduced, as itallows the unlimited accumulation of unnatural wealth. Neither the city nor the economy existsnaturally, but each is valued according to the standard of nature. Aristotle’s Critique of Plato and the Pre-Socratics Aristotle then examines the contributions of his predecessors and presents a survey ofregimes of good reputation among the Greeks, without distinguishing between theoreticalconstructions and actually existing cities, both in Greece and abroad. He seems to ignore suchnuances, because his work is a practical treatise intended to guide rulers and statesmen, for whomsuch differences are to some extent irrelevant. Athenian democracy is not studied, for certain becausedemocracy hardly enjoyed a good reputation in the Greek world. Aristotle examines at length elements of his master Plato’s Republic and Laws in search of the best regime, the one that is “in accordance with our/people’s? prayers.” Aristotle theref ore begins by criticizing the views of his predecessors and then offers an outline of his own proposal in books VII and VIII.If his own political views were influenced by his master, Aristotle is nonetheless severelycritical of the regime described in Pl ato’s Republic , claiming that it overstates political “unity” and embraces a system of communism that is impracticable and detrimental to nature, neglecting thehappiness of individual citizens 19 . In his own regime, by contrast, every citizen has to possess the “moral virtue” and the skills to achieve a life of excellence and complete happiness. All citizens haveto hold political office and own private property. One should call a “happy city” only that city which benefits all citizens and not only some of them. There must also be a common education for allcitizens, because they all share the same objective . Aristotle’s best regime does not exist withoutslaves, on account of “scarcity” or resource poverty: not everyone can have the leisure ne eded tocultivate themselves. 8 The domestic economy is natural because it allows the body to meet the needs of the body, but the chrematistic art or art of acquisition ceases to be natural when money is introduced, as itallows the unlimited accumulation of unnatural wealth. Neither the city nor the economy existsnaturally, but each is valued according to the standard of nature. Aristotle’s Critique of Plato and the Pre-Socratics Aristotle then examines the contributions of his predecessors and presents a survey ofregimes of good reputation among the Greeks, without distinguishing between theoreticalconstructions and actually existing cities, both in Greece and abroad. He seems to ignore suchnuances, because his work is a practical treatise intended to guide rulers and statesmen, for whomsuch differences are to some extent irrelevant. Athenian democracy is not studied, for certain becausedemocracy hardly enjoyed a good reputation in the Greek world. Aristotle examines at length elements of his master Plato’s Republic and Laws in search of the best regime, the one that is “in accordance with our/people’s? prayers.” Aristotle theref ore begins by criticizing the views of his predecessors and then offers an outline of his own proposal in books VII and VIII.If his own political views were influenced by his master, Aristotle is nonetheless severelycritical of the regime described in Pl ato’s Republic , claiming that it overstates political “unity” and embraces a system of communism that is impracticable and detrimental to nature, neglecting thehappiness of individual citizens 19 . In his own regime, by contrast, every citizen has to possess the “moral virtue” and the skills to achieve a life of excellence and complete happiness. All citizens haveto hold political office and own private property. One should call a “happy city” only that city which benefits all citizens and not only some of them. There must also be a common education for allcitizens, because they all share the same objective . Aristotle’s best regime does not exist withoutslaves, on account of “scarcity” or resource poverty: not everyone can have the leisure ne eded tocultivate themselves. The city which Aristotle portrays in books VII and VIII is a city without any people devotedto handicrafts; on the contrary, the city is entirely devoted to the education and training of itsmembers in the musical arts — in the broad sense of the Muse-inspired arts. He repeatedly insists thatchildren should be brought up by the city (against Athenian tradition) to habituate them in the pursuitof the common interest and of happiness or wellbeing ( eudaimonia ). Ancient Citizenship Aristotle states that the statesman and legislator are occupied with the city and that the “regime” ( polytheia ) is a certain way of organizing the roles of the city’s inhabitants. The core of Aristotle’s political reflection is found in Book II I. The book begins with a definition of citizenshipand a discussion about whether the city remains the same when there is a change of regime or way of life. This was a practical question: if the city is the same despite a change in “shape,” the ob ligationsand debts incurred by the former regime remain after a revolution.Aristotle also presents a definition of a citizen ( polites ), as the city is made up of a multitudeof citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants of the city, such as resident foreignersand slaves, or even children and the elderly, who are not citizens in their own right, because citizensare not concerned with basic tasks but with the public good. After discussing the debate over the persisting of the city through a revolution, Aristotle defines a citizen as a person who has the right( exousia ) to participate in political or judicial decisions. In Athens, in fact, citizens had the right to participate in the assembly, the council, or other deliberative bodies and could be summoned to juryduty. Athenian citizens were more directly involved in government than those of any modern democracy. Aristotle’s definition of “citizen” certainly reflects this fact. To properly understand Aristotle’s texts, we must understand to what extent ancientcitizenship differs from modern citizenship. The biggest difference is that ancient citizenship is a “privilege,” not a right. It aims at the freedom of free men, not the freedom of men as men, andtherefore peacefully coexists not only with slavery — which was far from unanimously accepted asnatural, as Aristotle himself presents this as controversial and a subject for debate — but also with thenear-absence of any rights for resident aliens or “ metics. ” What Athenian democracy actually presupposes or implies is the idea that no one shouldobey anyone else who is not in turn subject to obedience: it is a method of political organization based on the principle of ruling and being ruled in turn, by lottery, not on the rule of the best or byelections for office, which are aristocratic ways to choose rulers. It also implies an exceptionally partisan or politicized society where citizens totally devote themselves to the life of their city,displaying the sociological behavior of a modern party militant. A citizen does not quibble over civicduties, as a soldier in a campaign should not quibble over his contribution. What is the origin of this ideal that more or less dominated Greek political life for over twocenturies, both in theory and in practice? Max Weber spoke of an origin in the ancient militarydemocracies, 21 but we cannot exclude the possibility that this reflected a deliberate political design. 22 The Athenian citizen makes his assets available to his fellows — or should do so — morespontaneously than the modern taxpayer does: he, for example, collaborates voluntarily in “liturgies” 23 that ennoble his city with beautiful buildings and festivals a duty that is especially binding for the wealthy. In practice, the “ideal” of the Athenian citizen requires leisure— and thus personal fortune — and often comes up against the passive resistance of some individuals, scorned as “idiots.” Aristophanes’ plays present us examples of such idiots. On the other hand, according to Aristotle’s explicit statements , the city (or polis ) wasconcerned not only with the means but with the ends or excellence of man, while recognizing thatthere are different concepts of happiness. But, according to him, it is enough to take into account theconception of happiness by wise, or at least sensible, people — who acknowledge three kinds ofgoods: external goods, allowing for a minimum of material comfort or wealth; bodily goods, likehealth and the pleasures of the body; and the goods of the spirit or the psyche. No sensible manneglects these goods; the argument is only about the right proportion of each good needed to achievehappiness. City-State? Was a polis a city-state? The historicist view now in vogue seems to find no other explanation for Aristotle’s preference for the polis than to say that this attitude was the opinion orcommon- sense view of his age, or if we prefer, that it represented the “popular morality” 24 of the Greeks, or even the morality of the upper-class Greeks. 25 Greeks, especially Athenians (includingAristotle), were supposedly unable to imagine a good life except in a polis . (But this is hardly thecase, for we must recall that the city in the ancient world was not specifically Athenian, nor evenGreek; Aristotle, for example, praises the cities of Carthage and Lacedaemon (Sparta) more than he praises Athens, the city in which he lived as a metic). Aristotle’s supposed inability to transcend the Greek spirit or “worldview” explains why the very idea of a “state” cannot even be expressed in his language, since to speak of a state implies itsopposition to “society,” and the city (or polis ) is prior to and unaware of the separation between Stateand Civil Society. Now if, even while ignoring the historicist contention that Aristotle was blinded by the Greekworldview, we as moderns are to understand his preference for the polis , we must look for the bestmodern equivalents for the terms with which the Greeks expressed themselves. The closest current practical equivalent to the ancient polis is the country or homeland, but even this is far from perfect,as one would have to add that the polis is a “country” whose core is urban and that the inhabitants of the rural world of the country, the rustic, are secondary.The alternatives to the polis , according to Aristotle, are not the State but the tribe or nation, orempire. He knew these other political forms of life, but he deemed them inferior and unable to fostera truly human life, because both proved unable to reconcile civilization and freedom. From atheoretical or conceptual point of view, the scholar might find a better equivalence, not in the modernnation- state (or its ancestor, the “city - state”), but in what we now call “cultures.” 26 Regimes according to Aristotle According to Aristotle, a “regime” is a way of organizing the offices or roles in the city, but particularly the “ sovereign office. ” Regimes are defined according to a sovereign body that takesdifferent forms: for example, in a democracy the sovereign is the people, and in an oligarchy thesovereign is a select group (the wealthy or well-born). Political rule — as opposed to paternal rule ordespotic rule — is the appropriate form when the ruler and the ruled have similar rational capacities.This is the case with naturally equal citizens who take turns in ruling. Aristotle thus sets the stage forthe fundamental argument in his theory: regimes which aim at the common good are unqualifiedlyright and just, while those which aim only at the advantages of their rulers are defective and unjust because they involve a kind of despotic rule not appropriate for a community of free people. A regime is corrupted when its rulers stop worrying about the city’s justice and seek to defend only the interests of a restricted group of men; such a government is despotic, contrary to thevery nature of the polis because a city is a community of free men.The distinction between just and defective regimes is combined with the observation thatgovernment can belong to one person, one group or the crowd. There are therefore six possible typesof regimes. This classification is an adaptation of the theory presented in Plato’s Statesman and sets the stage for Aristotle’s own search for the best regime. “Democracy,” according to Aristotle, is, asthe best regime or the “regime” ( polytheia ) without reserve, one of the six regimes or forms ofgovernment described in the Politics . The others are monarchy and tyranny (when only one manrules) and aristocracy and oligarchy (when a limited group rules). However, despite appearances tothe contrary, this classification is based not merely on the number of rulers, but on the principles thatlegitimize government. It should also be noted that regimes are not “constitutions” in the modern sense of documents that establish the number of rulers and how they are elected. There is neither the notion nor a Greek word for “constitution” as a fundamental law as distinguished from ordinary laws. “Regime” clearlymeans a “political way of life,” as in the French expression Ancien Régime . Regimes take shape inaccordance with the kind of man that inspires the organization of the city. Arguments for Democracy in Aristotle? Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a defective constitution (albeit the best of theimperfect regimes), he also argues that rule based on popular government can be defended, 27 adebate that has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. Aristotle’s central argument is that the rule of many may be better than that of the virtuous few, for when many collaborate, they put together a more comprehensive vision of the affairs of thecity, much like the members of a choir or as we might say the musicians in an orchestra. Even if thevision and the skills of each member of the crowd are lower considered individually, the combinedresult can be superior. If each individual has a small amount of virtue and practical wisdom, it is possible to combine these talents and surpass the ruling ability of even a very wise man. This powerful argument for democracy is based on the analogy of those who judge the arts: “the crowd is a better judge than a single man in music and poetry; for some understand one part, andsome another, and all understand the whole ”. 28 Multiple points of view together bring us closer tothe truth. Such an argument seems to anticipate modern arguments about “ the wisdom of the crowd ” and theorists of deliberative democracy point to a similar argument.Bu t Aristotle doesn’t think that democracy is the best regime, for it is the rule of the uneducated, for the most part solely concerned with the interests of the poor at the expense of what isgood for the city as a whole, such as its honor or adornment and the cultivation of the liberal arts. Hisview of democracy could be termed “ agonistic ” , and in fact to the modern reader, some of his expressions seem to imply a kind of “class struggle.” Aristotle also says there is a need to investigate oligarchy (government by a few, usually thewealthy) and democracy (government of the demos , that is, the poor and less educated) because toaim for the best regime one needs to start from existing regimes. And the most common regimes inreal life are oligarchy and democracy, so Books IV to VI address their variegated forms and how theregimes change. Book V could indeed be read as a practical guide for tyrants — or by the same token,for revolutionaries. Indeed, although Aristotle speaks of the six regimes as being equally regimes, his definitionseems to imply a bias or preference for the specific case of democracy. For example, his definition ofa citizen as “one who has the power to take part in the deliberation s and judicial administration of the city” 29 necessarily presupposes democracy. 30 Yet his recognition of the special value of democracygoes further. While acknowledging the dangers inherent in leaving government offices in the handsof the poor and uneducated, he argues that denying the political participation of these people createsinternal enemies who threaten the preservation of the regime. Regimes and the different conceptions of justice Regimes are not different forms of political authority whose purpose is essentially the samein each case: to secure the common interest of their members, or justice. On the contrary, eachregime corresponds to a distinct conception of justice. This observation explains the seeds of discordwithin the city, because there is not necessarily a convergence between what is generally believed(opinion) and the conclusion of someone who has seriously thought about the matter of justice.In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle distinguishes two different but relatedmeanings of justice. First, in the most general sense, “justice” means observance of the law and aims at the common advantage and happiness of the political community. 31 In a particular sense, however, justice means “equality” or “equity”; this sense correspon ds to commutative or distributive justice. According to distributive justice, different individuals are entitled (although he doesn’t use the word rights ) to a fair share of some common goods, like property. Aristotle analyzes thearguments for and against different regimes as different applications of the principle of distributive justice.Everyone agrees, he says, that justice implies treating equal people equally and treatingunequal people differently, but they do not agree on the standard by which to measure whether onehas equal or unequal merit. In the analysis of distributive justice in Ethic s, he argues that justicerequires that benefits and honors be distributed on merit. In Politics , he further examines certainclaims that were then a matter of debate in Athens. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who aresuperior in wealth should also be superior in all things — i.e., have superior political rights — while thedemocrats argue that those who are equal by free birth should be equal in all things — i.e., have equal political rights.Both conceptions of political justice are, according to Aristotle, mistaken because they err asto the ultimate end of the city. The city is neither a venture for maximizing wealth (as the oligarchsthink) nor an association for promoting freedom and equality (as the democrats think). Instead, he argues, “the good life is the end of the city”— a life consisting of noble deeds.The right conception of justice is aristocratic: those who contribute most to the good of thecity, that is, those who combine virtue, property, and wealth, should have more honor and authority.It is the rule of the best ( aristoi ). Aristotle explores the consequences of the argument in the rest ofBook III, considering the rival demands of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous man.The rule of the absolute monarch is the most extreme case of aristocracy (we cannot avoid thinkingof Alexander). But Aristotle also thinks that everyone should have a voice in government, so we can say that the book retains a certain “republican” bias. 32 Defective regimes and the best regime In addition to studying the conditions required for the best polity to come to exist, the “political scientist” must compare all regimes, even those that are imperfect. Aristotle notes that reforming a defective regime is as important a political task as establishing a new one. The politicalscientist must also be aware of the forces of political change that can undermine regimes. Aristotlecriticizes his predecessors for their neglect of the practical duties of a political scientist, butnonetheless Plato was right to suggest that the best regime is the reference point with which to 31 The content of the “common advantage” (koinon sympheron ) is the subject of controversy. Some passages seem toindicate that justice implies the advantage of all citizens (see, for example, Pol . 1329a23-4, 1332a32-8). But Aristotle alsoallows the banishing of powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crime (cf. Pol . 1284b15-17). 32 In the sense proposed by John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 13 evaluate all systems existing in practice. The best possible regime, however, is, as in Plato’s Laws , a kind of mixed regime centered around the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately affluent class between the rich and the poor. These topics and similar topics occupy the remaining sections of Politics . Books IV to VI areconcerned with existing regimes, that is, the three defective constitutions, as well as the mixedregime, the best possible in most cases. Book V sets out what causes revolution or political change( metabolê ) and how to avoid them.Only at the end of this practical research does Aristotle begin to describe in detail theinstitutions of the best possible regime, which is a kind of universal aristocracy extended to allcitizens. In books VII to VIII, Aristotle describes the best regime, in which all individuals areexcellent. The treatise, however, abruptly ends with a reflection on musical education, and many ofthe subjects said to be addressed in later books are probably in texts that have not reached us. An ancient tradition holds that Aristotle’s works were ignored for a long time because, after their author’s hasty escape from Athens, they were stored in a cave in Asia Minor. The heritage of Aristotle’s political thought We may think that Aristotle’s Politics had no immediate impact on public life because hisdefense of the polis or city was presented when this model was about to become obsolete, as Greekcities lost political autonomy after their conquest by the kings of Macedonia. Many today alsoquestion the applicability of the ideas and institutions that Aristotle advocates to modern nation-states — not to mention the objections, if not outrage, aroused by his defense of natural slavery orfemale subservience and the political exclusion of those who practiced manual trades. But Politics later exerted, nevertheless, an extraordinary influence on political philosophy forcenturies. Aristotle set the boundaries for the study of social reality for longer than any other thinkerin history (according to Hobbes, until close to 1640).In the Middle Ages everyone thought of themselves as following in Aristotle’s footsteps. Even if they had disagreements with him, they still felt themselves to be a part of the tradition ofethical and political inquiry that Aristotle had started. Political science, which, according to Cicero, begins with Socrates, has its first “epistemological break” with the demolition of Aristotleundertaken by Machiavelli and Hobbes. Reference List Aristotle’s Works Aristotle . (2008). Constituição dos atenienses (4.ª ed., Trad. D. F. Leão). Lisboa: Fundação CalousteGulbenkian. ––– . (1998). Política . (Edição Bilingue, Rev. R. M. R. Fernandes & M. C. ––– . (2018). Retórica (5.ª ed., Coord. A. P. Mesquita). Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda. Outras Referências em Português Additional Readings Chroust, A. (1975). Aristotle: New Light on His Life and On Some of His Lost Works , 2 vols. London:Routledge. 14Dorter, K. (1974). Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Basil Blackwell . Vidal-Naquet, P. (1981), Le Chasseur Noir. Paris: Maspero.Düring, I. (1957) Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition . Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell in Komm . Grote, G. (1865). Plato and the other companions of Sokrates . London: John Murray e Guthrie.Guthrie, W. K. C. (1990). A History of Greek Philosophy : Vol. 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Jaeger, W. (1960). Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Meier, C. (1973). Clisthène et le problème politique de la polis grecque. Révue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité , Vol. XX, 115-159.Pangle, P. (2013). Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Pocock, J. (1975). The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic RepublicanTradition . Princeton: Princeton University Press.Strauss, L. (1964). City and Man. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Veyne, P. (1978). Le Pain et le Cirque . Paris: Seuil. 20 1 8 . 8 The domestic economy is natural because it allows the body to meet the needs of the body, but the chrematistic art or art of acquisition ceases to be natural when money is introduced, as itallows the unlimited accumulation of unnatural wealth. Neither the city nor the economy existsnaturally, but each is valued according to the standard of nature. Aristotle’s Critique of Plato and the Pre-Socratics Aristotle then examines the contributions of his predecessors and presents a survey ofregimes of good reputation among the Greeks, without distinguishing between theoreticalconstructions and actually existing cities, both in Greece and abroad. He seems to ignore suchnuances, because his work is a practical treatise intended to guide rulers and statesmen, for whomsuch differences are to some extent irrelevant. Athenian democracy is not studied, for certain becausedemocracy hardly enjoyed a good reputation in the Greek world. Aristotle examines at length elements of his master Plato’s Republic and Laws in search of the best regime, the one that is “in accordance with our/people’s? prayers.” Aristotle theref ore begins by criticizing the views of his predecessors and then offers an outline of his own proposal in books VII and VIII.If his own political views were influenced by his master, Aristotle is nonetheless severelycritical of the regime described in Pl ato’s Republic , claiming that it overstates political “unity” and embraces a system of communism that is impracticable and detrimental to nature, neglecting thehappiness of individual citizens 19 . In his own regime, by contrast, every citizen has to possess the “moral virtue” and the skills to achieve a life of excellence and complete happiness. All citizens haveto hold political office and own private property. One should call a “happy city” only that city which benefits all citizens and not only some of them. There must also be a common education for allcitizens, because they all share the same objective . Aristotle’s best regime does not exist withoutslaves, on account of “scarcity” or resource poverty: not everyone can have the leisure ne eded tocultivate themselves.The city which Aristotle portrays in books VII and VIII is a city without any people devotedto handicrafts; on the contrary, the city is entirely devoted to the education and training of itsmembers in the musical arts — in the broad sense of the Muse-inspired arts. He repeatedly insists thatchildren should be brought up by the city (against Athenian tradition) to habituate them in the pursuitof the common interest and of happiness or wellbeing ( eudaimonia ). 20 Ancient Citizenship Aristotle states that the statesman and legislator are occupied with the city and that the “regime” ( polytheia ) is a certain way of organizing the roles of the city’s inhabitants. The core of Aristotle’s political reflection is found in Book II I. The book begins with a definition of citizenshipand a discussion about whether the city remains the same when there is a change of regime or way of life. This was a practical question: if the city is the same despite a change in “shape,” the ob ligationsand debts incurred by the former regime remain after a revolution.Aristotle also presents a definition of a citizen ( polites ), as the city is made up of a multitudeof citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants of the city, such as resident foreignersand slaves, or even children and the elderly, who are not citizens in their own right, because citizensare not concerned with basic tasks but with the public good. After discussing the debate over the 19 Ver Pol. II, 1-5. 20 For Aristotle education in virtue takes place with the repetition of virtuous actions. See for Books VII and VIII, rarelystudied independently, Thomas Pangle, Aristotle's Teaching in the Politics (Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 2013). 9 persisting of the city through a revolution, Aristotle defines a citizen as a person who has the right( exousia ) to participate in political or judicial decisions. In Athens, in fact, citizens had the right to participate in the assembly, the council, or other deliberative bodies and could be summoned to juryduty. Athenian citizens were more directly involved in government than those of any modern democracy. Aristotle’s definition of “citizen” certainly reflects this fact. To properly understand Aristotle’s texts, we must understand to what extent ancientcitizenship differs from modern citizenship. The biggest difference is that ancient citizenship is a “privilege,” not a right. It aims at the freedom of free men, not the freedom of men as men, andtherefore peacefully coexists not only with slavery — which was far from unanimously accepted asnatural, as Aristotle himself presents this as controversial and a subject for debate — but also with thenear-absence of any rights for resident aliens or “ metics. ” What Athenian democracy actually presupposes or implies is the idea that no one shouldobey anyone else who is not in turn subject to obedience: it is a method of political organization based on the principle of ruling and being ruled in turn, by lottery, not on the rule of the best or byelections for office, which are aristocratic ways to choose rulers. It also implies an exceptionally partisan or politicized society where citizens totally devote themselves to the life of their city,displaying the sociological behavior of a modern party militant. A citizen does not quibble over civicduties, as a soldier in a campaign should not quibble over his contribution.What is the origin of this ideal that more or less dominated Greek political life for over twocenturies, both in theory and in practice? Max Weber spoke of an origin in the ancient militarydemocracies, 21 but we cannot exclude the possibility that this reflected a deliberate political design. 22 The Athenian citizen makes his assets available to his fellows — or should do so — morespontaneously than the modern taxpayer does: he, for example, collaborates voluntarily in “liturgies” 23 that ennoble his city with beautiful buildings and festivals a duty that is especially binding for the wealthy. In practice, the “ideal” of the Athenian citizen requires leisure— and thus personal fortune — and often comes up against the passive resistance of some individuals, scorned as “idiots.” Aristophanes’ plays present us examples of such idiots. On the other hand, according to Aristotle’s explicit statements , the city (or polis ) wasconcerned not only with the means but with the ends or excellence of man, while recognizing thatthere are different concepts of happiness. But, according to him, it is enough to take into account theconception of happiness by wise, or at least sensible, people — who acknowledge three kinds ofgoods: external goods, allowing for a minimum of material comfort or wealth; bodily goods, likehealth and the pleasures of the body; and the goods of the spirit or the psyche. No sensible manneglects these goods; the argument is only about the right proportion of each good needed to achievehappiness. City-State? Was a polis a city-state? The historicist view now in vogue seems to find no other explanation for Aristotle’s preference for the polis than to say that this attitude was the opinion orcommon- sense view of his age, or if we prefer, that it represented the “popular morality” 24 of the 21 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Le Chasseur Noir. (Paris: Maspero, 1981), 149. 22 Veyne, P. (1982). Critique d’une Systématisation : Les Lois de Platon et la réalité». Annales. Économies. Sociétés, Civilizations , Vol. 37 (Nº. 5-6), 887, 904. Cfr. Meier, C. (1973). Clisthène et le problème politique de la polis grecque. Révue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité , Vol. XX, 115-159. 23 Cfr. Paul Veyne, Le Pain et le Cirque (Paris: Seuil, 1978). 24 Cf. For example Kenneth Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 1974). 10 Greeks, or even the morality of the upper-class Greeks. 25 Greeks, especially Athenians (includingAristotle), were supposedly unable to imagine a good life except in a polis . (But this is hardly thecase, for we must recall that the city in the ancient world was not specifically Athenian, nor evenGreek; Aristotle, for example, praises the cities of Carthage and Lacedaemon (Sparta) more than he praises Athens, the city in which he lived as a metic). Aristotle’s supposed inability to transcend the Greek spirit or “worldview” explains why the very idea of a “state” cannot even be expressed in his language, since to speak of a state implies itsopposition to “society,” and the city (or polis ) is prior to and unaware of the separation between Stateand Civil Society. Now if, even while ignoring the historicist contention that Aristotle was blinded by the Greekworldview, we as moderns are to understand his preference for the polis , we must look for the bestmodern equivalents for the terms with which the Greeks expressed themselves. The closest current practical equivalent to the ancient polis is the country or homeland, but even this is far from perfect,as one would have to add that the polis is a “country” whose core is urban and that the inhabitants of the rural world of the country, the rustic, are secondary.The alternatives to the polis , according to Aristotle, are not the State but the tribe or nation, orempire. He knew these other political forms of life, but he deemed them inferior and unable to fostera truly human life, because both proved unable to reconcile civilization and freedom. From atheoretical or conceptual point of view, the scholar might find a better equivalence, not in the modernnation- state (or its ancestor, the “city - state”), but in what we now call “cultures.” 26 Regimes according to Aristotle According to Aristotle, a “regime” is a way of organizing the offices or roles in the city, but particularly the “ sovereign office. ” Regimes are defined according to a sovereign body that takesdifferent forms: for example, in a democracy the sovereign is the people, and in an oligarchy thesovereign is a select group (the wealthy or well-born). Political rule — as opposed to paternal rule ordespotic rule — is the appropriate form when the ruler and the ruled have similar rational capacities.This is the case with naturally equal citizens who take turns in ruling. Aristotle thus sets the stage forthe fundamental argument in his theory: regimes which aim at the common good are unqualifiedlyright and just, while those which aim only at the advantages of their rulers are defective and unjust because they involve a kind of despotic rule not appropriate for a community of free people. A regime is corrupted when its rulers stop worrying about the city’s justice and seek to defend only the interests of a restricted group of men; such a government is despotic, contrary to thevery nature of the polis because a city is a community of free men.The distinction between just and defective regimes is combined with the observation thatgovernment can belong to one person, one group or the crowd. There are therefore six possible typesof regimes. This classification is an adaptation of the theory presented in Plato’s Statesman and sets the stage for Aristotle’s own search for the best regime. “Democracy,” according to Aristotle, is, asthe best regime or the “regime” ( polytheia ) without reserve, one of the six regimes or forms ofgovernment described in the Politics . The others are monarchy and tyranny (when only one manrules) and aristocracy and oligarchy (when a limited group rules). However, despite appearances tothe contrary, this classification is based not merely on the number of rulers, but on the principles thatlegitimize government. 25 L EO Strauss, City and Man. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 30. 26 In spite of the position of Pierre Manent, Les Métamorphoses de la Cité. ( Paris: Flammarion, 2010). 11 It should also be noted that regimes are not “constitutions” in the modern sense of documents that establish the number of rulers and how they are elected. There is neither the notion nor a Greek word for “constitution” as a fundamental law as distinguished from ordinary laws. “Regime” clearlymeans a “political way of life,” as in the French expression Ancien Régime . Regimes take shape inaccordance with the kind of man that inspires the organization of the city. Arguments for Democracy in Aristotle? Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a defective constitution (albeit the best of theimperfect regimes), he also argues that rule based on popular government can be defended, 27 adebate that has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. Aristotle’s central argument is that the rule of many may be better than that of the virtuous few, for when many collaborate, they put together a more comprehensive vision of the affairs of thecity, much like the members of a choir or as we might say the musicians in an orchestra. Even if thevision and the skills of each member of the crowd are lower considered individually, the combinedresult can be superior. If each individual has a small amount of virtue and practical wisdom, it is possible to combine these talents and surpass the ruling ability of even a very wise man.This powerful argument for democracy is based on the analogy of those who judge the arts: “the crowd is a better judge than a single man in music and poetry; for some understand one part, andsome another, and all understand the whole ”. 28 Multiple points of view together bring us closer tothe truth. Such an argument seems to anticipate modern arguments about “ the wisdom of the crowd ” and theorists of deliberative democracy point to a similar argument.Bu t Aristotle doesn’t think that democracy is the best regime, for it is the rule of the uneducated, for the most part solely concerned with the interests of the poor at the expense of what isgood for the city as a whole, such as its honor or adornment and the cultivation of the liberal arts. Hisview of democracy could be termed “ agonistic ” , and in fact to the modern reader, some of his expressions seem to imply a kind of “class struggle.” Aristotle also says there is a need to investigate oligarchy (government by a few, usually thewealthy) and democracy (government of the demos , that is, the poor and less educated) because toaim for the best regime one needs to start from existing regimes. And the most common regimes inreal life are oligarchy and democracy, so Books IV to VI address their variegated forms and how theregimes change. Book V could indeed be read as a practical guide for tyrants — or by the same token,for revolutionaries.Indeed, although Aristotle speaks of the six regimes as being equally regimes, his definitionseems to imply a bias or preference for the specific case of democracy. For example, his definition ofa citizen as “one who has the power to take part in the deliberation s and judicial administration of the city” 29 necessarily presupposes democracy. 30 Yet his recognition of the special value of democracygoes further. While acknowledging the dangers inherent in leaving government offices in the handsof the poor and uneducated, he argues that denying the political participation of these people createsinternal enemies who threaten the preservation of the regime. 27 Pol. III.11. 28 Pol , 1281b7-10. 29 Pol , 1275b19-21. 30 Strauss, City and Man, 36. 12 Regimes and the different conceptions of justice Regimes are not different forms of political authority whose purpose is essentially the samein each case: to secure the common interest of their members, or justice. On the contrary, eachregime corresponds to a distinct conception of justice. This observation explains the seeds of discordwithin the city, because there is not necessarily a convergence between what is generally believed(opinion) and the conclusion of someone who has seriously thought about the matter of justice.In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle distinguishes two different but relatedmeanings of justice. First, in the most general sense, “justice” means observance of the law and aims at the common advantage and happiness of the political community. 31 In a particular sense, however, justice means “equality” or “equity”; this sense correspon ds to commutative or distributive justice. According to distributive justice, different individuals are entitled (although he doesn’t use the word rights ) to a fair share of some common goods, like property. Aristotle analyzes thearguments for and against different regimes as different applications of the principle of distributive justice.Everyone agrees, he says, that justice implies treating equal people equally and treatingunequal people differently, but they do not agree on the standard by which to measure whether onehas equal or unequal merit. In the analysis of distributive justice in Ethic s, he argues that justicerequires that benefits and honors be distributed on merit. In Politics , he further examines certainclaims that were then a matter of debate in Athens. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who aresuperior in wealth should also be superior in all things — i.e., have superior political rights — while thedemocrats argue that those who are equal by free birth should be equal in all things — i.e., have equal political rights.Both conceptions of political justice are, according to Aristotle, mistaken because they err asto the ultimate end of the city. The city is neither a venture for maximizing wealth (as the oligarchsthink) nor an association for promoting freedom and equality (as the democrats think). Instead, he argues, “the good life is the end of the city”— a life consisting of noble deeds.The right conception of justice is aristocratic: those who contribute most to the good of thecity, that is, those who combine virtue, property, and wealth, should have more honor and authority.It is the rule of the best ( aristoi ). Aristotle explores the consequences of the argument in the rest ofBook III, considering the rival demands of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous man.The rule of the absolute monarch is the most extreme case of aristocracy (we cannot avoid thinkingof Alexander). But Aristotle also thinks that everyone should have a voice in government, so we can say that the book retains a certain “republican” bias. 32 Defective regimes and the best regime In addition to studying the conditions required for the best polity to come to exist, the “political scientist” must compare all regimes, even those that are imperfect. Aristotle notes that reforming a defective regime is as important a political task as establishing a new one. The politicalscientist must also be aware of the forces of political change that can undermine regimes. Aristotlecriticizes his predecessors for their neglect of the practical duties of a political scientist, butnonetheless Plato was right to suggest that the best regime is the reference point with which to 31 The content of the “common advantage” (koinon sympheron ) is the subject of controversy. Some passages seem toindicate that justice implies the advantage of all citizens (see, for example, Pol . 1329a23-4, 1332a32-8). But Aristotle alsoallows the banishing of powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crime (cf. Pol . 1284b15-17). 32 In the sense proposed by John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 13 evaluate all systems existing in practice. The best possible regime, however, is, as in Plato’s Laws , a kind of mixed regime centered around the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately affluent class between the rich and the poor.These topics and similar topics occupy the remaining sections of Politics . Books IV to VI areconcerned with existing regimes, that is, the three defective constitutions, as well as the mixedregime, the best possible in most cases. Book V sets out what causes revolution or political change( metabolê ) and how to avoid them.Only at the end of this practical research does Aristotle begin to describe in detail theinstitutions of the best possible regime, which is a kind of universal aristocracy extended to allcitizens. In books VII to VIII, Aristotle describes the best regime, in which all individuals areexcellent. The treatise, however, abruptly ends with a reflection on musical education, and many ofthe subjects said to be addressed in later books are probably in texts that have not reached us. An ancient tradition holds that Aristotle’s works were ignored for a long time because, after their author’s hasty escape from Athens, they were stored in a cave in Asia Minor. The heritage of Aristotle’s political thought We may think that Aristotle’s Politics had no immediate impact on public life because hisdefense of the polis or city was presented when this model was about to become obsolete, as Greekcities lost political autonomy after their conquest by the kings of Macedonia. Many today alsoquestion the applicability of the ideas and institutions that Aristotle advocates to modern nation-states — not to mention the objections, if not outrage, aroused by his defense of natural slavery orfemale subservience and the political exclusion of those who practiced manual trades.But Politics later exerted, nevertheless, an extraordinary influence on political philosophy forcenturies. Aristotle set the boundaries for the study of social reality for longer than any other thinkerin history (according to Hobbes, until close to 1640).In the Middle Ages everyone thought of themselves as following in Aristotle’s footsteps. Even if they had disagreements with him, they still felt themselves to be a part of the tradition ofethical and political inquiry that Aristotle had started. Political science, which, according to Cicero, begins with Socrates, has its first “epistemological break” with the demolition of Aristotleundertaken by Machiavelli and Hobbes. Reference List Aristotle’s Works Aristotle . (2008). Constituição dos atenienses (4.ª ed., Trad. D. F. Leão). Lisboa: Fundação CalousteGulbenkian. ––– . (1998). Política . (Edição Bilingue, Rev. R. M. R. Fernandes & M. C. ––– . (2018). Retórica (5.ª ed., Coord. A. P. Mesquita). Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda. Outras Referências em Português Additional Readings Chroust, A. (1975). Aristotle: New Light on His Life and On Some of His Lost Works , 2 vols. London:Routledge. 14Dorter, K. (1974). Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Basil Blackwell . Vidal-Naquet, P. (1981), Le Chasseur Noir. Paris: Maspero.Düring, I. (1957) Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition . Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell in Komm . Grote, G. (1865). Plato and the other companions of Sokrates . London: John Murray e Guthrie.Guthrie, W. K. C. (1990). A History of Greek Philosophy : Vol. 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Jaeger, W. (1960). Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Meier, C. (1973). Clisthène et le problème politique de la polis grecque. Révue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité , Vol. XX, 115-159.Pangle, P. (2013). Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Pocock, J. (1975). The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic RepublicanTradition . Princeton: Princeton University Press.Strauss, L. (1964). City and Man. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Veyne, P. (1978). Le Pain et le Cirque . Paris: Seui