ORTEGA Y GASSET BBB sobre

https://www.persee.fr/doc/phlou_0035-3841_1980_num_78_37_6325 e/ou https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YEwVpLwrr5hoMx14RcV3B_CHJTceRCeK/edit pas, bien sûr, épuiser le contenu très dense de ces pages; au lieu de cela, nous avons choisi quelques métaphores, car Ortega a été un homme de métaphores, et à partir de celles-ci nous avons interprété le texte. Voici ces quelques métaphores : «la forêt véritable se compose d'arbres que je ne vois pas». «La forêt fuit devant les yeux». «Comme disait le paysan de Poitiers, la hauteur des maisons empêche de voir la ville». «La forêt est une nature invisible»8. Voici maintenant notre interprétation. Le monde est ce qui est invisible, ce que nous ne pouvons pas saisir d'un seul coup : un ensemble de perspectives, d'horizons. Il est la circonstance dernière qui englobe toutes les circonstances. Il est le fait de vivre au milieu d'une situation qui renvoie indéfiniment aux autres situations; ou bien l'ensemble de circonstances qui se renvoient indéfiniment les unes aux autres, la circonstance dernière étant ce que nous ne pouvons saisir parce que nous ne possédons toujours qu'une circonstance. La circonstance dernière (c'est la forêt !) se manifeste à nous précisément comme le renvoi d'une situation vers une autre. Elle est la profondeur qui, comme disait Ortega, ne peut se manifester que comme superficie9, comme dimension limitée, finie. Il n'y a pas une essence du monde qui s'offre à nous; ce que nous possédons, ce sont des profils visibles qui renvoient à ce qui demeure invisible. Rappelons-nous : la forêt est une nature invisible. Et ce mouvement d'une circonstance à l'autre, d'une clairière de la forêt à l'autre en cherchant ce qui fait telle la forêt, est l'histoire humaine. C'est pour cela que nous ne pouvons plus penser dorénavant, si ce n'est d'une façon finie et limitée, car nous ne trouvons jamais la forêt. Bien entendu, si nous ne sommes jamais sans le monde, sans la forêt, celle-ci n'est jamais sans nous. Il y a ici comme une tentative de dépassement de la relation sujet-objet, que notre penseur enfermera dans une phrase trois fois célèbre : « Yo, soy yo y mis circunstancias» (moi, je suis moi et mes circonstances)10. Nous pensons que dans cette phrase apparemment banale se synthétise toute la pensée du grand philosophe espagnol. Avec elle Ortega coupe avec l'idéalisme et sort vers le monde. Le moi souverain, rationaliste, est destitué parce qu'il ne peut pas subsister séparé du monde, dans la tour d'ivoire de la raison pure. Le moi se trouve maintenant profondément constitué par le monde, plongé dans la circonstance. Cependant la circonstance reçoit une réponse du moi. Elle est interprétée par le langage de l'homme : comme dirait Ortega, l'interprétation est une traduction du langage muet de l'être en langage de l'homme11. Sans aucun doute, le cœur même de l'interprétation ortéguienne de la relation ontologique entre l'homme et l'être se trouve ici. Notre penseur abandonne d'un seul coup le grand idéalisme, et non seulement celui-ci, mais aussi toute métaphysique qui voudrait surplomber l'histoire. Peut-être commence-t-il à abandonner à ce moment-là la philosophie même et met-il le cap sur un nouveau continent. En effet ce qui s'institue ici est un dialogue profond entre l'homme et le monde, ou comme Ortega aimait le dire, entre l'homme et les choses; mais un dialogue qui est traversé de part en part par une finitude profonde : d'un côté les choses dans leur silence éternel et de l'autre l'homme perdu au milieu de celles-ci, naufragé12; car pour le penseur cette relation se confond avec un naufrage onto-mythique dans lequel l'homme a échappé à la nature; «l'homme est condamné à s'éloigner de plus en plus de la Nature, à construire dans son trou une sur-nature»13. Peut-être, en un langage que le philosophe n'emploie pas, nous pourrions imaginer une scission au sein de l'être un et originaire d'où l'homme a surgi. Ortega perçoit dans cette union entre l'être et l'homme le mystère même de la liberté humaine au sein du monde; car la liberté est précisément ceci chez lui : se savoir égaré dans le monde avec le devoir de s'inventer sa vie. Nous sommes des naufragés et la liberté est une tentative pour ne pas nous noyer : l'effort désespéré de tout notre être pour ne pas céder au désespoir. Et ne pas céder au désespoir signifie chez notre philosophe s'inventer la vie, toujours sa propre vie : ainsi l'histoire est à la fois naufrage et invention de soi-même. Mais alors, pourrions-nous nous demander, l'histoire comme liberté, vient-elle de Dieu ou est-elle plutôt un fait premier sans aucun fondement, indécidable? Que nous sachions, Ortega n'a jamais dit, au moins dans ses écrits, que la liberté ait son origine en Dieu. Et nous pensons qu'il ne pouvait pas dire cela, parce que ses rares allusions au problème de Dieu sont très ambiguës. On a l'impression qu'Ortega n'a jamais vu très clairement cette dernière question14; ou bien aussi le contexte catholiq

NICOLAI HARTMAN BBB FILO

https://iris.unitn.it/bitstream/11572/91951/2/2012%20Poli%20Nicolai%20Hartmann%20SEP%206.pdf Dicionario: Nicolai Hartman ... All entities are determined by relations, both internal and external. This is why every isolation is secondary and exclusively due to acts of abstraction. Without relations, there is neither unity nor multiplicity; form and quality depend on relations (A.28a). While relations can have other relations as their arguments, at some point the series of relations within relations within relations etc., must end. Sooner or later, there must be a non-relational substratum, a substratum that is not the result of a relational construction (A.25c). A substratum, for Hartmann, is the argument of a possible relation. The term ‘substratum’ implies that what is at stake is the source or domain of an asymmetrical relation. Real categories are constituted by material moments. Moments with the character of substratum do not pertain to the mode of being of ideal entities (A.4a). 4.2.Modus and structure Modus determines intermodal relations and in particular the special form of Dasein; structure refers to the Sosein and all the moments of its determination. All the remaining twenty-two oppositions are articulations of structure. Like the most general relations, the relation between principle and concretum is a structural relation (A.24b). 4.2.Modus and structure Modus determines intermodal relations and in particular the special form of Dasein; structure refers to the Sosein and all the moments of its determination. All the remaining twenty-two oppositions are articulations of structure. Like the most general relations, the relation between principle and concretum is a structural relation (A.24b). 4.3.Substratum and relation All entities are determined by relations, both internal and external. This is why every isolation is secondary and exclusively due to acts of abstraction. Without relations, there is neither unity nor multiplicity; form and quality depend on relations (A.28a). While relations can have other relations as their arguments, at some point the series of relations within relations within relations etc., must end. Sooner or later, there must be a non-relational substratum, a substratum that is not the result of a relational construction (A.25c). A substratum, for Hartmann, is the argument of a possible relation. The term ‘substratum’ implies that what is at stake is the source or domain of an asymmetrical relation. Real categories are constituted by material moments. Moments with the character of substratum do not pertain to the mode of being of ideal entities (A.4a). 4.5.Element and complex Complexes are relational entities. (N.38c) explains that he prefers the term ‘complex’ (Gefüge) to the ‘outworn’ (verbrauchten) term ‘system’ (System). The elements of a complex are its members, not substrata. Elements are determined by the complex of which they are members (A.25c). Complexes have their own type of determination; but in each case, the determination extends across the complex’s outworn’ elements and transforms them. A complex of elements is always a complex of relations and outworn’ outworn’ eterminations. Elements are essentially determined by the positions they occupy within the complex’s total series of relations (A.33a). This explains why elements have functions within the complex. Within a complex, what matters are not the elements, but the relations that they maintain among themselves and with the complex. The main difference between complex and class (Ganze; the terms ‘whole’ and ‘totality’ are used for other concepts, see Poli 2011a) is that a complex has some autonomy vis-à-vis its members, while a class has no autonomy vis-à-vis its parts. Classes depend on their parts, while elements depend on their complex. The two dependence relations proceed in opposite directions. This is not entirely correct, however. To some extent, a complex depends on its elements as well. A better formulation of the difference between classes and complexes runs as follows: within limits, if a class loses one of its parts, the class becomes different but the lost part remains the same; if a complex loses one of its elements, the complex remains the same but the element becomes different (A.33a). An irregularly shaped stone, a grain of sand, a puddle, a mountain are not independent complexes, but fragments and parts of much wider formations that come into existence before them and within which they exist as subordinate moments (A.33c). All natural complexes are complexes of forces and processes. There is no reason to view their elements as simple or as analogous to material particles. If we assume that inorganic parts are elements of an organism, this way of understanding an organism is radically different from the idea that an organism is a dynamic complex able to survive the continuous substitution of its elements (A.33d). The former idea refers to a physical complex, while the latter refers to a biological complex, and the two are authentically different complexes. The inside of the complex of processes that constitutes an organism is the capacity of the complex to maintain its working conditions – what Hartmann calls the self-determination of the organism (A.34 4.6.Inner and outer Not everything has an inside, and not everything is what results from its inner structure. Force does not need to be the exteriorization of anything else, and effects do not need to be the exteriorizations of causes. Only entities that have some ontic autonomy have an inside. In nature, dynamic and organic complexes are the best-known cases. Outer forces of lower-order entities are inner forces of higher-order entities: for instance, outer forces of nuclei are inner forces of atoms (A.34b). Determinations do not need to be internal to things (or to constitute their interiors). Most real nexuses are external determinations. Causality is the most obvious case (A.24e). For all complexes, the inside of the complex is constituted by the relations among its members, while the outside of the complex is constituted by the relations between the complex and other complexes. Every outside can become the inside of a higher-order complex (A.25d). I shall not delve further into the many intricacies of paired categories. What I shall do instead is extract a pattern that governs the behavior of most pairs of ontological categories. This I call the ‘positional aspect’ of paired categories. 5. Paired categories with positional value ‘Positional’ refers to the fact that the two categories composing a pair alternate with each other. It follows that some aspects of the content of each category depend on the position that the latter occupies with reference to its twin category. The simplest case is the matter-form opposition. The guiding idea is that every form is the form of some underlying matter, and it is the matter of some higher form; similarly all matter is the matter of some higher form and the form of some underlying matter (see Figure 1 below). This alternation exemplifies the sense in which I say that matter and form are positional categories. Furthermore, matter and form enter into two different ties: horizontally, matter and form are moments of an individual being; vertically, matter and form connect different individuals (as parts and wholes or members and collectives). Hartmann generalizes this pattern and detects the occurrence of similar alternations for other paired categories as well. Let us consider Dasein and Sosein, which, as already said, can be approximately understood as existence and determination. Here is how Hartmann presents their positional alternation: The Dasein of a tree is the Sosein of a forest (G.19a); without the tree the forest would be different. Similarly, the Dasein of the branch is the Sosein of the tree. The Dasein of the leaf is the Sosein of the branch. The Dasein of the vein is the Sosein of the leaf. Things can be inverted, too: the Sosein of the leaf is the Dasein of the vein; the Sosein of the branch is the Dasein of the leaf, etc. The fact that only a part of the Sosein of an entity X contributes to the Dasein of a different entity Y does not raise problems. The Dasein-Sosein series has two limits: towards the first, original Dasein and towards the last Sosein, the Sosein of the whole of reality. The mainstream interpretation of Dasein and Sosein as entirely separate aspects of being depends on epistemological acts of isolation. Only when moments are separated do independent substances and dependent qualities appear, and it is for this reason that it seems that qualities do not have any Dasein and, complementarily, that their bearers have no Sosein (G.20 he main difference between matter and form, on the one hand, and Dasein and Sosein on the other, is that the latter pair runs homogeneously through the whole of reality, while the matter-form stratification does not run homogeneously from the bottom to the highest layers of reality. Matter and form are always relative to a substrate, and the matter-form stratification stops when a new substratum appears (the section on levels of reality will explain why this is so). 6. Levels of reality The next group after that of paired categories is the group of the categories of levels of reality. Like everything else, levels of reality are characterized (and therefore distinguished) by their categories. By definition, the categories characterizing levels of reality are not general, in the sense that they do not pertain to reality in its entirety, but only to specific families of real being. On the other hand, fundamental categories are the most general and simple categories, and for this reason they are contained in the special categories of levels of reality (A.21b). Levels are the true constructive framework of the real world. Whilst the latter has unity, its unity is the unity of neither a principle nor a center. The unity of the real world is instead provided by the order of the levels of reality (A.52a). Four main levels of reality are distinguished by Hartmann: the inanimate, the biological, the psychological and the spiritual. This last includes all historical realities (history, language, customs, law, art, etc.). The underlying intuition is as follows: whilst the structure and the laws of history and other spiritual processes are different from the structure and laws of, say, inanimate beings, the former are not in any way less real than the latter (A.20a). The same intuition applies to the other levels as well: biological and psychological processes are as real as any other process, and they have their own specific groups of categories. One of the most intriguing aspects of Hartmann’s theory of levels of reality is the question of what kinds of relation connect the levels to each other. From a categorial point of view, however, the problem of what relations connect levels can be easily solved. Leaving general categories aside, two main categorial situations can be distinguished: (a) Being A and B are categorially different because the categories upon which the former is founded are partially different from the categories upon which the latter is founded, in the sense that the latter is founded on new categories (which implies that the latter includes at least a novum, a new category not present in the former); (b) Being A and B are categorially different because the categories upon which the former is founded and those upon which the latter is founded form two entirely different (disjoint) groups of categories. Following Hartmann, the two relations can be termed respectively relations of super-formation (Überformung) and super-position (Überbauung) (A.51f). Super-formation (the type (a) form of dependence) is weaker than super-position because it is partly grounded on already actualized categories, those of the level below. Suffice it to consider the superformation between molecules and cells, i.e., between the physical and the biological levels of reality. In this regard, one can mention that even if organisms are unquestionably more complex than mechanisms, the behavior of organisms is in conformity with laws of mechanics (A.51b).On the other hand, the psychological and spiritual levels are different, because they are characterized by an different (disjoint) groups of categories. Following Hartmann, the two relations can be termed respectively relations of super-formation (Überformung) and super-position (Überbauung) (A.51f). Super-formation (the type (a) form of dependence) is weaker than super-position because it is partly grounded on already actualized categories, those of the level below. Suffice it to consider the superformation between molecules and cells, i.e., between the physical and the biological levels of reality. In this regard, one can mention that even if organisms are unquestionably more complex than mechanisms, the behavior of organisms is in conformity with laws of mechanics (A.51b). On the other hand, the psychological and spiritual levels are different, because they are characterized by an interruption in the categorial series and by the onset of new categorial series (relative respectively to the psychological and spiritual levels). The relations between the biological level and the psychological level, on the one hand, and the relation between the psychological level and the spiritual one, on the other, are both relations of super-position. By way of example, the group of categories embedded in psychological entities is different from the group of categories embedded in biological entities. Similarly, the group of categories embedded in spiritual entities is different from the group of categories embedded in psychological entities. The category of the spirit is divided into personal, objective and objectivated spirit. Personal spirit is the spirit of the individual; objective spirit is the living spirit of communities; and objectivated spirit characterizes the products of spirit. The categorial moments of personal spirit are consciousness, will, foresight and teleological activity, liberty. None of them pass to objective spirit. There is no consciousness apart from individual consciousness, and the same applies to the other moments. There are laws that are valid for all the levels: higher levels rest on lower ones; the lower level is the conditioning one; the higher level is independent from the lower one as to its conformation and its laws. When the connecting relation is a relation of super-formation, some categories of the lower level return in the higher one. Returning categories interact with the categories of the higher level and are, so to speak, contaminated by them; some of their moments become different. Higher levels are never characterized by returning categories. Each level has its novum, the category or group of categories that distinguish the level from the lower ones. The novum does not derive either from the elements of the level or from their synthesis (A.53c). Each of the four levels of the world contains other levels, organized according to a variety of patterns. The sublevels of the main levels may present their own types of gradation and may work one next to the otheror one above the other as the case may be. As soon as we pass from the four levels to their internal divisions, things become more complex. The nexuses of determination working within the intermediate sub-levels are even less well known than those working for the levels. From a categorial point of view, the differences among them may not be as rigorous and clear as the difference distinguishing the four main levels of real being (A.20e). Two aspects characterize super-position relations: firstly, the categories embedded in the entities of the connected levels are entirely different; secondly, a relation of existential dependence links the higher level to the lower one. This latter aspect organizes the order of the levels, so that the spiritual level is founded on the psychological level, which in its turn is founded on the biological one. Conversely, the biological level is the bearer of the psychological level and the latter is the bearer of the spiritual level. Not all the levels are equally well-known. Indeed, for most of the levels we know only some of their elements, possibly not the most important ones. In fact, we do not know the central categories of the interruption in the categorial series and by the onset of new categorial series (relative respectively to the psychological and spiritual levels). The relations between the biological level and the psychological level, on the one hand, and the relation between the psychological level and the spiritual one, on the other, are both relations of super-position. By way of example, the group of categories embedded in psychological entities is different from the group of categories embedded in biological entities. Similarly, the group of categories embedded in spiritual entities is different from the group of categories embedded in psychological entities. The category of the spirit is divided into personal, objective and objectivated spirit. Personal spirit is the spirit of the individual; objective spirit is the living spirit of communities; and objectivated spirit characterizes the products of spirit. The categorial moments of personal spirit are consciousness, will, foresight and teleological activity, liberty. None of them pass to objective spirit. There is no consciousness apart from individual consciousness, and the same applies to the other moments. There are laws that are valid for all the levels: higher levels rest on lower ones; the lower level is the conditioning one; the higher level is independent from the lower one as to its conformation and its laws. When the connecting relation is a relation of super-formation, some categories of the lower level return in the higher one. Returning categories interact with the categories of the higher level and are, so to speak, contaminated by them; some of their moments become different. Higher levels are never characterized by returning categories. Each level has its novum, the category or group of categories that distinguish the level from the lower ones. The novum does not derive either from the elements of the level or from their synthesis (A.53c). Each of the four levels of the world contains other levels, organized according to a variety of patterns. The sublevels of the main levels may present their own types of gradation and may work one next to the other or one above the other as the case may be. As soon as we pass from the four levels to their internal divisions, things become more complex. The nexuses of determination working within the intermediate sub-levels are even less well known than those working for the levels. From a categorial point of view, the differences among them may not be as rigorous and clear as the difference distinguishing the four main levels of real being (A.20e). Two aspects characterize super-position relations: firstly, the categories embedded in the entities of the connected levels are entirely different; secondly, a relation of existential dependence links the higher level to the lower one. This latter aspect organizes the order of the levels, so that the spiritual level is founded on the psychological level, which in its turn is founded on the biological one. Conversely, the biological level is the bearer of the psychological level and the latter is the bearer of the spiritual level. Not all the levels are equally well-known. Indeed, for most of the levels we know only some of their elements, possibly not the most important ones. In fact, we do not know the central categories of the

NEOLIBERALISMO etiologia bbb

https://outraspalavras.net/crise-civilizatoria/perry-anderson-neoliberalismo-este-zumbi/ Perry Anderson: O neoliberalismo, este zumbi Desde a crise de 2008, sistema nega a si mesmo e adota parte do que propugnam seus adversários – apenas para conservar-se vivo e manter sua essência. A causa crucial é falta de uma alternativa. Mas a História, às vezes, preenche esta lacuna…