Aristoteles comunidade bbb

Aristoteles comunidade bbb https://www.academia.edu/9635522/The_Distinction_between_the_Economy_and_Politics_in_Aristotles_Thought_and_the_Rise_of_the_Social?email_work_card=thumbnail Introduction At the outset of the Politics and of the Nicomachean Ethics, 2 Aristotle declares that both texts are composedwith the aim of establishing that the polis is the com-munity in which man, as a communal creature ( zoonkoinonikon ), 3 may live happily. Aristotle not only de-clares that the polis is the “most supreme” of all com-munities because it is the community in which man,qua communal creature, may pursue the best mode of life, a pursuit which is “the aim of politics”; in thesecond book of the Politics he also argues zealouslyagainst Plato’s call to eradicate the distinction betweenthecommunitiesofthe polis andthe oikos bysharingallpossessions among citizens of the polis , as if it were agigantic oikos. How does Aristotle convince us that thisdistinction must be preserved, and that, moreover, the polis ,andnotthe oikos ,isthecommunitythatfacilitatesthe good life?A satisfactory theoretical answer to these questionscannotbefoundintheliteraturethatstudiestheconductof the ancient oikos, 4 as compared with that of the polis .The oikos / polis literaturemakesfrequentuseofHannahArendt’s reading of Aristotle as a reference point. In herwork, 5 Arendt relies on Aristotle’s distinction betweenthe economic community that, as he defines it, comesabout in the course of nature for everyday purposes,” 6 and the political community that, although it “comesinto existence for the sake of life,” exists “for the goodlife,” 7 namely the kind of life that enables citizens to“pursue the best mode of life.” 8 Arendt’s description of the economy, that is, the conduct of the oikos , 9 has beencriticized, however. Even though most scholars accepther description of the oikos as the sphere for managingthenecessitiesoflife,aspherethatwasmeanttosustainthe polis , they present a much more complicated, lesspolarized relation between the oikos and the polis . Inaddition, contemporary literature persuasively presentsthe oikos as a diversified domain in which there existallkindsofhumanrelationsbesidesdespoticones.Theystress the friendship between husband and wife, it be-ing for the sake of happiness and not just as a meansto support the polis , the role of education of childrenwithin the household, the different kinds of slaves, theuse of other means of government beside violence,and the household’s existence in and for itself. In this depiction, not only the master, but many participants inthe household can demonstrate virtue, doing so withinits bounds. It ought to be stressed that what Aristotleand his contemporaries called the economy (oikono-mia), the management (nemein) of the oikos , must notbe mistaken with what we, moderns, call the economy— that is, market relations. Moreover, Aristotle himself regarded market transactions — “the other form of theart of supply ( χρηµατιστικ ῆ ς )” 10 — as standing instark contrast to economics. Another crucial distinctionbetween ancient and modern economics has to do withethics. While modern economics “involves inter alia afirm rejection of the “ethics-related” view,” 11 the an-cient Greeks held that the “economy is intelligible onlyas an ethical domain.” 12 Furthermore, the reason whyAristotle made sure to distinguish between the econ-omy and the market is ethical. As discussed in somedetails in Part 2.3.2, he held that the market arousesthe vice of wantonness — the negation of the economicvirtue of soundness of mind — and as such underminesthe ability to live a happy communal life in both oikos and polis . 13 But while contemporary scholars 14 have providedus with vivid portraits of the oikos as a self-sufficientsphereinwhichmanyofitsmemberscoulddemonstratevirtue and live a relatively happy life, 15 they have notdiscussed in purely theoretical terms their claim that theeconomiccommunitywasindeedhappy,self-sufficient,governed by perfect virtue and manifesting human mul-tiplicity.Moreover,theyhavenotsufficientlyaccountedforthereasonsthatmakethe polis supremeinallhumancommunities. The more complex picture drawn by con-temporaryliteraturerepeatedlyappearsinthecontextof examining each of Aristotle’s three criteria for uphold-ing the distinction between the oikos and the polis : 16 the community’s self-sufficiency and completeness; themultiplicity that appears in it; and its conformity withvirtue.ButasIargueinthisarticle,thoughtheeconomyappears at times to withstand the test of these criteria,emerging as no less self-sufficient than the polis , asexhibiting a greater level of multiplicity and as gov-erned by a perfect virtue equal in rank to the virtuedemonstrated in politics, the supremacy of the politi-cal community over the economic is nonetheless wellestablished by Aristotle. Constellations Volume 00, No 0, 2014. C  2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2 Constellations Volume 00, Number 0, 2014 2. The Three Criteria for a HappyCommunal Life The correspondence between happiness and acting vir-tuously is put forward by Aristotle in his discussionof the nature of happiness, where he argues that “hap-piness is a certain activity of soul in conformity withperfect virtue.” 17 Aristotle adds two further criteria forthe appearance of the happy life in politics: “If, there-fore, the more self-sufficing a community is, the moredesirable is its condition, then a lesser degree of unityis more desirable than a greater.” 18 Thus, according toAristotle, in order to decide which of all human com-munities is the one in which humans can indeed livehappily, one must examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2.1 Self-Sufficiency and Completeness The first criterion for calling a life happy is that it isself-sufficient: Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is itschief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good; 20 [. . .] In speaking of degrees of completeness, we meanthatathing pursued asan end initself is morecompletethan one pursued as a means to something else, andthat a thing never chosen as a means to anything elseis more complete than things chosen both as ends inthemselves and as means to that thing; and accordinglyathingchosenalwaysasanendandneverasameanswecall absolutely complete. Now happiness above all elseappearstobeabsolutelycompleteinthissensewhereasthe Supreme Good seems to be something complete[. . .] The same conclusion also appears to follow froma consideration of the self-sufficiency of happiness —for it is felt that the complete good must be a thingsufficient in itself.[. . .] we take a self-sufficient thingto mean a thing which merely standing by itself alonerenders life desirable lacking in nothing, and such athing we deem happiness to be. 21 The level of self-sufficiency and the completenessattached to it positions all things on the Aristotelianscale of the good life, at whose head stands happiness.Its status at the top of the ladder as the “end all actionsaim at” is justified by its being self-sufficien st examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2 Constellations Volume 00, Number 0, 2014 2. The Three Criteria for a HappyCommunal Life The correspondence between happiness and acting vir-tuously is put forward by Aristotle in his discussionof the nature of happiness, where he argues that “hap-piness is a certain activity of soul in conformity withperfect virtue.” 17 Aristotle adds two further criteria forthe appearance of the happy life in politics: “If, there-fore, the more self-sufficing a community is, the moredesirable is its condition, then a lesser degree of unityis more desirable than a greater.” 18 Thus, according toAristotle, in order to decide which of all human com-munities is the one in which humans can indeed livehappily, one must examine their function according tothethreeabove-mentioned criteria,thatis,thevirtueac-cording to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency andthe multiplicity revealed in it.Inthethreefollowingsections,IwilltrytoshowhowAristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claimthat the political community is indeed the “supremeof all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discussself-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corre-sponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a communityand in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy— soundness of mind ( σωφρ ο σ ´ υνη ). I will also showhow each of the three is accompanied by what may betermeda“generativeparadox.”Thethreeparadoxesare:that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as thatwhich is not subjected to anything, depends on subject-ingitssurroundings;thatthehighestlevelofmultiplicityis revealed in a community that is governed by unifor-mity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude.Another issue that is almost entirely missing from thecritique of Arendt’s depiction of the oikos and its dis-tinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth 19 ),is a reexamination of her understanding of the modernhuman condition. The concluding part of this article isdedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how thedescription of the virtue of soundness of mind as thegoverning virtue of the economic community may shednew light on Arendt’s description of the “rise of thesocial” in the modern age. In addition, seeing sound-ness of mind as the governing virtue of the economiccommunity may redefine the task now facing contem-porary political philosophers who wish to reconstitutethe distinction between politics and the economy. 2.1 Self-Sufficiency and Completeness The first criterion for calling a life happy is that it isself-sufficient: Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is itschief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good; 2