Aristóteles justiça polis bbb

https://www.academia.edu/4841178/ARISTOTLE_AND_AESCHYLUS_ON_THE_RISE_OF_THE_POLIS_THE_NECESSITY_OF_JUSTICE_IN_HUMAN_LIFE?email_work_card=title The issue of justice is central to political thought and of fundamental impor- tance to a complete understanding of politics. Both Aristotle and Aeschylus argue that politics or human political activity necessitates justice. 2 Aristotle says that without justice there can be no city and therefore no political life (Pol. 3.12.1283a19–22). Aeschylus dramatizes this point in his Oresteia. It is clear, at least in Aristotle, to be fully human, human beings need the political community to fulfil their natures (Pol. 1.2.1252a25–53a40). 3 he claim made by Aristotle that ‘human beings are political animals’ (Pol. 1.2.1253a2–6 and 3.6.1278b18–19) has, in the past several years, become controversial topic in Aristotle scholarship. 4 In many ways, the ‘political ani- mal argument’ was put forward to stress the natural sociability of humans, against the view held by Hobbes and other modern political theorists, who argue that human sociability is not per se natural. The rejection of human nat- ural sociability culminates in the rejection of Aristotle’s claim that the polis (city) or the political community is natural. 5 Also, a good portion of the schol- arship concerning the political animal question in Aristotle’s political thought, fails in at least four ways to address the issue of why the political community must be authoritative over all other human associations. The four failings are the following. 1) There is a tendency, among certain scholars, in their attempt to defend the natural sociability of human beings against the arguement of Hobbes et al., either to undermine or ignore the distinction between the political community and the household. 6 In doing so, these mod- ern scholars, who claim to be defending Aristotle’s understanding of political animals, seem to forget that Aristotle explicitly states that those who fail to distinguish between the household and the polis — as being different in kind and not merely different in terms of number or size — ‘do not argue rightly’ (Pol. 1.1.1252a7–15). 2) Another tendency, of another group of scholars, is to overstress the cultural and productive (or technological) aspect of human nature, which they believe really defines human beings as political animals. 7 This group believes that physical and linguistic social constructs are what define how humans are political. Yet this view ultimately denies any sort of naturalness to the political bond and therefore tends to turn Aristotle into Kant or another modern social thinker. 3) Then there are those scholars who claim controversy over Aristotle’s claim that ‘man is a political animal’. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan and Jean Jacques Rousseau, Second Discourse [Discours sur les origins de l’inégalité].political community is not natural. But the focus of this paper is the naturalness of the political community. hat Aristotle’s political animal teaching is a blunder, which forces an incon- sistency in Aristotle’s political thought, when otherwise he would really agree with Hobbes, that the political community is a human construct and is not really natural. 8 4) Finally, there is another group of scholars who in a way agrees with the view stated above, but argues that Aristotle does not make a blunder; instead the blunder about the naturalness of the city is an esoteric cover, one which points to the tension of the city and the best way of life — i.e., philosophy. 9 All four of the above groups of scholars seem to address how or how not human beings are political animals, usually in strictly biological or anthropo- logical terms. They tend not to address the question in political terms — i.e., that politics is the ruling or most central concern for human beings. Thus, against the aforementioned ways of looking at the political animal question, I will examine a question that was ignored by the above scholars — namely, why the city or the political community must be authoritative. Addressing this question is of utmost importance if one desires to understand why human beings are political animals. It is the logic of man’s political nature which requires that the polis or the political community be authoritative — i.e., to have the authority or the power to sanction, legitimize or empower — in mat- ters of human affairs. To do this, we must explore the origins of the polis and Aristotle’s claim that the polis is prior to both the individual and the house- hold (Pol. 1.2.1253a19). Although Aristotle gives us the conceptual frame- work to address this question, Aeschylus gives us a poetic example, which not only dramatizes but also clarifies and presents explicit reasons why the politi- cal community must be authoritative, that are implicit in Aristotle’s account. Aeschylus’ trilogy suggests that the city became authoritative when the forces of the household were made to submit to the laws of the city. Or as Fer- guson says, ‘the play cycle is about the blood feud coming under the rule of law, and the people caught up in the process’. 10 This article will attempt to show how Aeschylus’ trilogy helps us come to a fuller understanding of Aris- totle’s teaching about the authoritativeness of the polis. Although the authori- tativeness of the polis over the household is stated by Aristotle in the Politics, nowhere in that text is it shown how or why the polis became authoritative. On the other hand, Aeschylus’ Oresteia, especially the Eumenides, dramatizes both how and why the polis is authoritative. It shows how the old gods, repre- sented by the Furies, which symbolize the power of the household, are put under the control and rule of the polis. Thus the tension, between the new — Olympian — deities and the older deities, is an intentional reflection of the tension between the household and the political community. As Christian Meier contends, the discovery of the political occurs when political life through community — derived decisions override family/kinship — derived decision processes. This is the teaching of the Oresteia. At the end of the Oresteia, the realm of the household, oikos, is now to be under the authority of the polis or more correctly the political community. 11 In one sense the Oresteia represents not the rise of the polis per se, since the polis may be said to have existed before the end of the trilogy, but the rise of the authoritativeness of the polis or, as Meier says, the discovery of the political in Greek political thought. 12 Meier says that the Oresteia ‘gave expression to the political at the very moment when it first burst upon Athens, and did so, more- over, in a manner that was wholly adequate to the theme and is still relevant today’. 13 Although the Oresteia concerns itself with showing how the politi- cal became authoritative, let us not forget the particular regime that triumphs at the end of the trilogy — Athenian democracy — and Aeschylus’ role in giv- ing it a defence. Also, W.B. Stanford argues that Aeschylus’ portrayal of Athena’s founding of the Areopagus presents him as a ‘conservative demo- crat, conserves his origins by competing with them, evincing their potential for the future’. 14 I The plot of the Oresteia should be familiar to most readers. The Oresteia is in fact a trilogy — Agamemnon, The Libation Bearers, and The Eumenides. It begins with Agamemnon, the leader of the Greeks in their war against the Tro- jans, returning home from the war. He returns home the victor of a great, yet costly war. He brings back many great prizes. One of them is the Trojan prin- cess Cassandra. While expecting great acclaim and acknowledgment upon his triumphal return, he finds his wife Clytemnestra has taken up with Aegisthus, a political enemy. The reason for her action is that she desires revenge on Aga- memnon for the sacrifice of their daughter Iphigeneia. Clytemnestra plots Agamemnon’s death with her lover to revenge Iphigeneia’s sacrifice by Agamemnon, whom he sacrificed to win the war against Troy. Although Aegisthus does not actually take part in the killing — Clytemnestra alone murders Agamemnon — he goes along with the plot so he may take over the city. Agamemnon ends with Clytemnestra and her lover Aegisthus in charge of the city and the citizens waiting for Orestes to remove the newly imposed tyranny. 15 Although the citizens of Argos challenge what both Aegisthus and Clytemnestra did, they are powerless to right it. Although the citizens can easily rise up and kill both murders, 16 they lack the authority or sanction to take action against either Aegisthus or Clytemnestra. The citi- zens must wait for Orestes, who because he is Agamemnon’s son, has sanc- tion to take vengeance. The city of Argos is thus reduced to the household of Agamemnon, where only the head of the household has authority to pursue policy. Orestes, who is in exile, returns home to mourn over his father’s grave. There he meets his sister, Electra. Although he desires to revenge his father, he has some doubts. Electra demands that her father’s murderers be punished. This is the story of The Libation Bearers. To aid him in his decision, Orestes informs her that he sought counsel from Apollo’s oracle. He says the oracle told him to ‘kill them to match their kill- ings’ or the Furies of his father’s blood would drive him mad. Now resolved to do as Apollo’s oracle commands, he disguises himself as a stranger to enter his mother’s house. He then kills both his mother and Aegisthus. Apollo then requires Orestes to cleanse himself. Although he does what Apollo requires, his mother’s Furies nevertheless pursue him, attempting to drive him mad. This is how they seek vengeance for the murder of his mother. The Eumenides begins with Orestes fleeing from the Furies. He again appeals for Apollo’s protection. The god arrives but he cannot stop the Furies’ wrath. In an attempt to stop the Furies and aid Orestes, Apollo arranges with the Furies for a trial of Orestes with Athena presiding. In Athens, however, ARISTOTLE & AESCHYLUS ON THE RISE OF THE POLIS 51 15 Peter Euben rightly argues that Clytemnestra’s actions take her beyond the proper scope of human action, thus endangering the possibility of human association (The Road Not Taken: The Tragedy of Political Theory (Princeton, 1990), pp. 72–5). However Euben’s feminist sensitivity understates the differences between the injustices of Aga- memnon and Clytemnestra. In one sense, although Agamemnon’s actions are harmful to his own family, they could be justified in the context of faithfulness to one’s own oath. Remember, he is obligated by an oath to punish the Trojans for their injustice to his brother. On the other hand, Clytemnestra’s acts are far worse than her husband’s since they destroy the basis of marriage, which is the most fundamental basis of human associ- ation that does not rely upon force. 16 Nicholas Rudall says that the powerlessness or inaction of the free male citizens in Agamemnon should be contrasted to the slave women, who are prepared to take action, in the beginning of LB (Green and O’Flaherty, The Oresteia of Aeschylus, p. 21). Although the slave women are equally without authority to act, their thirst for vengeance — echo- ing the same thirst in the Furies against Orestes — has a plausible justification against tyr- anny. Clearly the rule of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra is tyrannical and since tyranny is an abrogation of the standards of all established authority and social norms, thus the slave women’s lack of authority to act can be practically ignored given the general lawlessness of the newly established political regime. Yet the slave women do not act. Rather, Orestes, who in the old system — as heir and head of the household — alone has authority to act, carries out what they themselves desire to do, revenge Agamemnon’s murde Athena says she cannot decide the case of murder alone, because the law requires a jury trial. In doing this, Athena establishes the Areopagus as the political institution in Athens which is concerned with justice and the rule of law. 17 A jury trial is agreed to. Apollo presents his defence of Orestes and his actions. As Meier says, in this play, ‘right is pitted against right: a worse dilemma cannot be imagined’. 18 Following Apollo’s defence, the Furies present their case against Orestes. Meier argues that the Furies ‘alone have assumed the task of avenging Clytemnestra, since no mortal avenger is left’. 19 Thus they see their role as defender of blood ties and are forced to take action against Orestes, since no one else shall. Athena, before the jury hands in its verdict, says her vote will be for Orestes, because she is wholly for the father, and if there is a tie Orestes is to go free. With Athena’s vote, the vote of the whole jury results in a tie — thus the verdict favours Orestes. Ferguson suggests that there is a relationship between the number of speeches made by both parties and the vote of the jury. He says ‘the Furies have spoken six times, Apollo five; there are six votes for condemnation, five for acquittal’. 20 The Furies are not satisfied with the out- come of the verdict. Although they will end their pursuit of Orestes, they now desire to seek vengeance on Athens. Athena is aware of this and being Athens’ protector she tries to persuade the Furies not to engage in that course of action. Instead, she attempts to persuade them to be the special guardians of the city. She is successful in her argument and the Furies are reconciled to the city. The play ends with Orestes restored as ruler of Argos, promising that Argos will never be an enemy of Athens, and the Furies, now to be known as the Eumenides, becoming the defender of the city. In the Eumenides, there is a clear tension between the old gods, the Furies, and the new gods, Apollo and Athena, fathered by Zeus. This tension echoes the tension that is found in the play between the household (and the pre-politi- cal) and the city (and the political). The old gods are aligned with the house- hold and the new gods are aligned with the city. This is important: At the time of the trial, the Furies are still unreconciled toward the city. The household bonds, expressed as kin loyalty, force one to a cycle of revenge, in order to right wrongs done to the family. There is no end to vengeance and no peace. The desire for peace, which is needed for the fulfilment of human happiness (eudaimonia), entails that one rise above one’s own — kin ties — to some other claim that is more authoritative. This other claim is that of the polis. In attempting to understand the tension between the household and the polis, we can turn to Aristotle on the political and the polis. 21 He says that human beings are political animals (Pol. 1.2.1252b30–53a5 and 3.6.1278b18–19). Yet Aristotle also says that the family, expressed in terms of the household, is natural (Pol. 1.2.1252b10–14 and 1.2.1253a15–18). In the Nicomachean Eth- ics, Aristotle is more explicit concerning the naturalness of the family. He says that, The friendship of man and woman also seems to be natural. For human beings naturally tend to form couples more than to form cities, to the extent that the household is prior to the city, and child bearing is shared more widely among the animals (NE 8.12.1262a17–19 [my emphasis]). The two ties are essential to our nature as human beings, yet in order to be fully human we need justice. In the last analysis, for Aristotle, justice (what reason informs us that nature or human nature suggests is the right and fitting course of action) — or at least one’s perception of justice — is what truly defines a city. He explicitly says that without justice there is no city (Pol. 3.12.1283a19–22). This only reinforces his argument concerning the political nature of human beings. But would not the passage from Aristotle, which seems to say man is a bonding animal, imply that the household is prior to the polis and being prior to the polis, is also more authoritative than it? This appears to be, in that being prior seems to imply being historically prior and thus having a more ancient origin than the polis. Being older tends to give more authority and if the family is prior, and thus older, it would appear to have more authority than the polis. But note that Aristotle says that the bond- ing between man and woman is more natural than the formation of cities because couples are more easily formed than are cities. Thus the forming of couples over cities is accidental and due to the relative simplicity of forming a couple, compared to the greater difficulty of creating a city. Yet the passage infers something more significant than the statement that couples arise more easily than cities. The passage seems to suggest that the association between the paired man and woman is akin to or similar to the political community. This would further suggest that the household is more dependent on the polis than one would originally think. But Aristotle does not develop either claim to any final extent. Rather, he merely argues that the polis is not only prior to the household (and the individual) in terms of existence (Pol. 1.2.1253a19), but it is also authoritative, which means the household is subordinated to it. On this point, the setting of the Oresteia is extremely informative, in that the two natural human ties — of family and of city — are not yet unified. Rather, it could be said that there is truly no polis — or at least it has not yet become authoritative over the claims of the oikos, the household. To repeat: the setting of the Oresteia is one in which the polis or the political community is not yet authoritative. Rather the household, oikos, is still the source where legitimate moral and social authority emanates. But as shown by the action of both Clytemnestra and Orestes, who only act out the blood heritage of their family, the household only has recourse to revenge and vengeance, which is shown to be unending. The example of the Furies, the defender of the oikos, compels us to examine how non or a-political forces are limited in their attempt to rectify wrongs done. It is clear in the trilogy that, for the household, revenge is the only ave- nue available to rectify injustices. Yet, vengeance is unending, in that those who are acted against will desire to right what they now perceive to be an unjust injury. In one sense vengeance only ensures further vengeance. Also, vengeance allows no purgation of crimes committed or evil deeds done to enact it. It allows no peace nor happiness. It is the cycle of unending retribu- tion. The cycle of violence is also reflected in the nature of the gods. Ferguson observes that, ‘Ouranos ruled the gods by violence and was overthrown by violence. Cronos ruled by violence and was overthrown by violence. Zeus now rules’. 22 This seems to indicate that up until the end of the Oresteia, there seems to be no end to the cycle of violence. But Ferguson notes that Zeus’ rule is unlike the rule of the other divine ruler, in that he does not merely rule by force but through wisdom as well. 23 Zeus’ rule is a break in the cycle of vio- lence and thus is an attempt to establish the permanence of his rule over the gods. Zeus’ actions — or directions — reflect the necessity to end the cycle of violence within the human community, in that Apollo claims he is acting on Zeus’ orders. To end it will allow the establishment of a form of human rule that will lead to human happiness (eudaimonia) or, as Martha Nussbaum would say, lead to the flourishing of human beings. 24 The ending and purging of this cycle of violence is something required if human beings are going to be able to live together in a fine and noble fashion. In one sense, the Oresteia is all about the need to establish some source of authority that will judge on matters of perceived injuries and evils. The 54 C.A. BATES 22 Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, p. 78. 23 Ibid., p. 79. 24 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Trag- edy and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1986); ‘Nature, Function and Capability’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 6 [suppl.] (1988) pp. 145–84; ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism’, Political Theory, 20 (1992), pp. 202–authoritativeness of the political community allows the submission of griev- ances to a non-participant judge who binds all parties to the decided outcome. This is what law attempts to do. Law is, thus, the particular embodiment of justice in the given political framework of a given political system. The estab- lishment of authority of law in the city is an attempt to redress wrongs and pre- vent further injustices. However, the Furies also claim to redress wrongs and the Furies’ wrath caused both fear and terror in the minds of human beings that restrained them in their acts against their own. This is not enough, because human beings must associate with more than merely their kin in order to live finely. However, the Furies seem not to care about injustices done to strangers or people one is intimate, rather they merely defend the ties of blood kin. Also, the Furies are unending and single minded in their pursuit of viola- tors of kin ties. Thus they bring about the cycle of violence that the city desires to escape from. III The wrath of the Furies, by perpetuating the cycle of unending and relentless violence, does not allow the possibility of human community. Although it does allow for the perpetuation of the family, via the preservation of the ties of blood, it ignores the ties of oaths or of words spoken. Recall that the Furies are deaf to the violation of Clytemnestra’s marriage vows (Eum. 209–225). In fact they reject their duty to revenge Agamemnon’s murder because Clytemnestra was not blood kin to her husband. From the point of view of the Furies there is only one really important association, that of blood ties. Aristotle argues that there are two natural human associations: 1) family, and 2) political community. 25 The first is expressed in the household, oikos, and the second is expressed in the city, polis. The Furies only protect the ties of blood and this is essentially the realm of the oikos, the household. In regard to the city, the Furies are originally its enemies. This is made explicit, when the Furies awaiting the jury’s verdict, say to Apollo, I wait to hear the settlement. I have two minds still about my hate for the city (Eum. 731–32) This implies up to this point, the Furies clearly perceived themselves to be an enemy of the city, but now they appear to be undecided how to direct their hatred. Their hostility towards the city goes along with their ignoring the importance of speech or words. Not only do they ignore the marriage vow of Clytemnestra as unimportant, they will not let words have power over them. This is shown when the Furies refuse to let Apollo stop their prosecution of Orestes by the power of his words (Eum. 228). The Furies in the beginning will not let mere words stop them in their demand for vengeance and Apollo and the other gods appear either not to desire to use force or cannot use force to stop the Furies. However, when Athena does end the Furies’ hostility to both Orestes and the city, she does so not with force but through speech. She accomplishes this feat because the Furies are worn down by the power of Athena’s words. Note that she tries to subdue them by persuasion at least three times before the Furies surrender to her argument. Why is Athena’s speech more powerful than Apollo’s? Clearly it rests within the greater persuasive- ness of her speech over Apollo’s. This is so because, unlike Apollo’s, Athena’s speech does not exclude, reject or spurns the Furies. Instead, her speech offers them a new and more important a role to play in the new dispen- sation. She offers them beauty and role in defending the political community, whereas Apollo merely desire their downfall. The Furies ignore the claim of the marriage bed, and hence of the oath that makes possible the marriage bed. But is not the relationship between husband and wife, properly speaking, the realm of the household? The Furies say No! In this sense their view of the oikos agrees with Kevin Cosner’s Wyatt Earp that wives (or husbands) come and go and live and die. The Furies would wholeheartedly agree with Earp’s father who says ‘that blood kin is all that matters, all the others are strangers’. Clearly the Furies hold to this same phi- losophy — blood kin over all, there is no other significant obligation. The view presented by the Furies, that blood ties are the only ties that mat- ter, very emphatically states that the most significant bond for the household is the bond of parent and child. In one sense this view is not incorrect, in that the bond between parent and child is the preservation, hence survival, of the household. Without the next generation the household dies. Because of this fact, the next generation owes a debt to the previous one for both giving them life and giving them a particular heritage. It is this debt that the next genera- tion has to the previous one and it is the source of the Furies’ authority, in that it is wrong for a debt to be dishonoured. The breaking of this bond is seen as a sacrilege that demands retribution. This is why Orestes is hounded. His act of killing his mother is seen as ignoring the debt of one generation to its prede- cessor. Also, this is why Clytemnestra is not haunted by them. She is no blood relation to her husband and hence owes no debt to him. Aristotle suggests that the relationship between husband and wife, properly speaking, belongs not to the household but to the polis, in that the relationship between man and wife is not one based upon either master-slave or the rule of the foresighted over one lacking in foresight. Rather, the relationship between man and wife is akin to the relationship of citizens in the political community. Therefore the limited protection of the oikos by the Furies opens the door to the fuller protection by the polis. Thus Aristotle allies the marriage relation to the political relation, rather than either economic-household rule or despotic rul Please recall that at Politics 1.2.1252a25–b1, the two reasons for social association are: 1. reproductive bonding and 2. the rule of the foresighted over those who lack it. Clearly the household involves both these associations — the pairing of man and woman and also both the rule of parents over children and masters over slaves. Yet in one sense it overlooks something about the first association. The process of sexual reproduction involves two stages: 1. the union of male and female, and 2. the birth of offspring from that union. Although birth of offspring necessitated the union, the union does not neces- sarily produce the offspring. In other words, you can have the pairing (or bonding) of man and woman without necessarily bearing young. Therefore the pairing has a character to it that is more than merely the desire to reproduce another like one’s self. The claim of the Furies, and hence the household in the Oresteia, is the claim of blood ties and thus they concern themselves with the second aspect of the bonding of man and women — the production of offspring. Here is the tie of blood from one generation to another. Here is how the household is perpet- uated. But the Oresteia seems to indicate that the guardians of the household, the Furies, have no concern for that which necessarily is prior and necessary for the generation of offspring — the paring of husband and wife. The Furies are not concerned with the killing of a husband (or even a wife), but merely of a mother (or a father or a son, daughter, brother or sister). 26 This supports Aristotle’s claim that the relationship between husband and wife is not similar to the household/economic rule or despotic rule, but to political rule. This is why the polis must be both prior to the household in nature and more authoritative than the household. The relationship between husband and wife is the political bond — oaths are sworn to be loyal — like the oaths citi- zens make. One has some choice in marriage, one has no such choice in blood ties. Thus marriage is like politics in that one deals with choice or different possible courses of action, hence praxis The Oresteia is set against two different cities, with two different regimes (politeiai): Argos and Athens. It is through these two cities and their differ- ences that the question of how justice arises from the political first becomes clear. Argos is an elected kingship, whereas Athens is some form of limited democracy. First let us examine Argos and its regime and then Athens. Argos’ regime, elected kingship, is one of the five forms of kingship men- tioned at Politics 3.14. The succession of the title of king is to be passed on from father to son. This is the law of Argos. Clytemnestra and Aegisthus’ murder of Agamemnon, along with the forced exile of Orestes, enact a revolu- tion of regimes in Argos, from kingship to tyranny. Thus an act of vengeance becomes a revolution in regimes. Clytemnestra and Aegisthus’ reign in Argos is clearly tyrannical. It is tyrannical in that it both violates the law, nomos, of succession of the title of king from father to son and is rule over unwilling sub- jects. The latter point is clear in what is said by the citizens in the ending of Agamemnon. After hearing the death moans of Agamemnon, the chorus of cit- izens say, It is the king crying out; I think all is over. But let us plan safety for ourselves — if we can. My vote is to cry, Help! to the citizens to come to the palace. Yes, and at once, I think, to catch them red-handed with dripping sword. I think you’re right; at least we should do something. It certainly isn’t the moment for hesitation. But we can see. This is a kind of first act; it looks like the beginning of a tyranny. Yes, it does — because we’re wasting time. Their hands don’t sleep, and they trample underfoot the good reputation of delay (Agm. 1343–1357). Yet this passage points out another and more important problem with the regime of Argos. With kingship, the regime of Argos, it is too easy to confuse the household of the king with the city. Thus the distinction of the household and the city is blurred under such a regime. Clearly the problem of the blurring of the city and the household is seen in the reaction of the citizens of Argos to the tyranny imposed by the two mur- derers. The citizens say, Are we then, in order to stretch our own lives, to yield to a government that shames our royal house? No, that is awful. Death is better than that. Death is better than subjection to a tyranny (Agm. 1362–5). Note that tyranny is said to be imposed on the household, not the city (see Aristotle’s Pol. 2, 3, and 5). But clearly Aegisthus and Clytemnestra’s reign is not merely over the house of Agamemnon but over the city of Argos. The citizens are not alone in their confusion over the difference of the household and the polis. Aegisthus and Clytemnestra also blur the city and household. Clytemnestra says at the end of Agamemnon, Do not pay heed to their vain yappings. I and you together will make all things well, for we are masters of this house (Agm. 1672–3). And the inaction of the citizens of Argos and their awaiting for Orestes to set things right shows that in Argos there is no distinction between household and city. On this point Peter Euben says that Clytemnestra, in murdering her husband, ‘moves out of the household to assume her husband’s place’. 27 Euben goes on to argue that like her husband, Clytemnestra assaults both the household and the city. But unlike her husband, she destroys ‘the balance of nature’ between the two. 28 In one sense Euben over-personalizes the action of the play, in that the wrongs Agamemnon commits are inherent in the political nature of his regime — kingship, in which the distinction between the city and his own house is unclear. However, Clytemnestra’s actions are a wilful destruction of the difference of the household and the city. The weak balance between the city and the household that kingship creates is wholly destroyed by her alliance with Aegisthus. She needs him to keep Argos, not her house- hold, controlled. Also, her act of murder of her husband is not only a strike at the household but also the basis of all non-violent human association. Her murder not only destroys the existing social order and replaces it with her arbitrary and wilful rule, but undercuts all human associations and therefore the possibility of human flourishing — happiness. Thus, Euben overstates the balance between household and city, because he ignores Argos’ regime and the role it plays in structuring the action of the characters. The inability to easily distinguish between the city and the household found in the regime of kingship renders the citizens of Argos powerless or without authority to act against Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. Tyranny is a political concept. It cannot be applied to the rule of the household in a fitting manner. The only similarity in the household to tyranny is the despotic rule of masters over slaves — thus the members of the household are all treated as slaves. But despotism and tyranny are not the same. Tyranny is the negation of the laws of the city (or ruling without law or any rules restraining the ruler or ruling body), in favour of the personal rule of the tyrant. Whereas despotism is the rule over slaves or treating persons as though they are merely slaves. Thus Aeschylus’ use of tyranny is said to be inappropriate in that it is anachronis- tic. 29 But I believe that Aeschylus did this intentionally, to force the viewer or the reader to ponder the political consequences of blurring the household and the city. 30 Clearly the citizens of Argos are correct in saying that the new regime is a tyranny, but to say this is to imply a political reality that is not present in the context of Argos. Thus there is no city — or more correctly — no political community of Argos, there is only the household of Agamemnon Therefore there are no citizens, only subjects. 31 Again this is why the chorus awaits Orestes — the son who is in authority after the father. He must lead in the household. If Argos were truly a city, the citizens themselves could have set affairs right and avoided the fate of Orestes. But Argos is not a city and the member of the chorus are not citizens, rather they are subjects of the house- hold and are totally without authority in this matter. This is why after Orestes takes vengeance on the murderers, the dramatic action must leave Argos and go to Athens. V This leads us to Athens and why the last part of the trilogy is set there. Athens is either a form of democratic rule guided by law or some form of rule by a political multitude (see Pol. 4.4.1291b29–92a38 and 4.6.1292b22–93a10). The exact nature of Athens’ regime is not clear, but it does incline to some form of popular rule. Where Argos had a king, Athens in the play has no king presently. Athens on the other hand does have Athena — a goddess. Yet although she is there, she is not sovereign, rather the city and its regime restrain her. This is shown when Athena says that she cannot decide Orestes’ case by herself. Although Athena may have the authority by divine sanction, she defers to the city. Why does she defer her authority to the city? Because, as she argues, the outcome of the case is too great a matter for her to judge, since the poison of the Furies if thought wronged could bring ill to Athens. But another reason is more likely: If Apollo could not stop the Furies from haunting Orestes, could Athena really have more power? One doubts it. So instead of deciding the case herself, which the Furies agreed to originally, the case will be decided by a jury of the citizens of Athens. Now in originally agreeing to having Athena hear the case, the Furies submitted their case to be judged by a deity who was a third party, not directly involved in the case. However, by deferring the authority of the case to the city, Athena defers divine sanction to political sanction. Or she establishes the legitimacy of decisions by the political body concerning such matters, whereas before these matters where dealt with within the moral realm of the household, oikos. As said before, the jury sides with Orestes — only barely because of Athena’s vote. 32 Athena’s vote siding with Orestes may forgive the murder of 60 C.A. BATES 31 See Pol. 3.3–4 about the distinction between being a citizen and being a mere sub- ject. Also see Pol. 1.3–13 concerning the character of the household and the relations of the various members — i.e., husband/wives, parents/children, and master/slaves — within it. 32 The closeness of the vote is interesting in that the ugliness and horrible nature of the Furies versus the beauty, rationality, and nobility of Apollo is almost overlooked by the male citizens of Athens. Far from being the male sexists which most feminist interpreta- tions assert they are, the juror’s outcome is too close to justify such a view. Rather, the cit- izens take seriously the argument of the Furies and are not convinced by Apollo’s argua mother by a son, but it also says that the murder of a husband by a wife (or vice versa) is worse and more dangerous to the life of a political community in that marriage is clearly a political creation. Stanford points out that Athena’s siding with Orestes can be seen as lending support to ‘the ties of marriage, a civic institution, rather than the ties of blood’. 33 The Furies are not happy and wish to punish Athens for acquitting Orestes. However this does not occur. Because Athena is determined to have them become part of the new social order — the city. Athena’s point in bringing the Furies into the political is, as Stanford argues: ‘Think what men might gain . . . if Athens lets the Furies choose for good instead of for evil. Why together they might turn the tragic choice into a victory, nothing less than the birth of law itself, the Furies’ evolution from their origins to the ministers of justice.’ 34 In fact, although Orestes is acquitted, he is not welcomed in the city or at least he is not persuaded to become a citizen of Athens. On the other hand, the Furies are welcomed to become a part of Athens. 35 Thus the Furies are persuaded by Athena to be reconciled to the city and thus to play a very important role in the new order as the city’s special protector. The embracing of the Furies by Athens at the end of the Eumenides symbol- izes the new role that the household and its primary defender will play in the polis. Thus, Euben is insightful on the importance of the Furies. He says that they are ‘as much sustainers of civilization, pious dread of authority, and pun- ishers of pride and violent outrages by men against their own, as they are uncivilized, outrageous violators’. 36 Athena’s actions indicate a fundamental awareness that the polis or the political community as such needs the power of the Furies so that the city is able to defend itself. Thus like the alliance Orestes gives to Athens at the end of the trilogy, the alliance of the Furies to the city is intended to strengthen the city as the source of human fulfilment. Clearly the goods that the household brings are essential to any notion of human happiness or flourishing (see Pol. 2.2.1261a10–b15). However, the problem of the household was its inability to get beyond both the loyalty merely to one’s own and the endless violence that occurred, because of its inability to adjudicate acts of injustice without recourse to personal acts of vengeance. The city provides an attachment that, while it does not implicitly reject the love of one’s own, places restraint on it so the public and common good of all who live in that association will be preserved. In doing this, peace is maintained and peace provides the possibility for the attainment of human happiness.